Knutson, C.j., and Nelson, Sheran, Peterson, and Frank T. Gallagher, JJ.
Torts -- damage caused by pile driving on adjacent land -- recovery in absence of negligence.
1. Substantial property damage sustained by a landowner as the actual result of the concussion and vibration from pile-driving operations upon adjacent land are recoverable even though such operations are reasonably necessary and even though the pile driving is conducted in a careful and workmanlike manner. A directed verdict based only upon the assumption that damages incurred from such reasonably necessary construction methods may be recovered only upon proof of negligence in the conduct of such operations is reversed.
Torts -- drainage of surface water -- liability of landowner.
2-3. A landowner is liable for the drainage of surface water from his land onto that of an adjoining landowner only if, considering all of the particular facts of each case, the interference is unreasonable. A jury could find in this case that defendant had made a reasonable use of his land, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's application for an injunction directing defendant to take affirmative measures to prevent such drainage.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Peterson
Action in the Hennepin County District Court for an injunction and for damages for injury to plaintiff's property resulting from construction of a house on adjacent property by defendant Harvey Chiat and defendant McNulty Construction Company, his contractor. The case was tried before Earl J. Lyons, retired judge, and a jury. The court denied the injunction and directed a verdict for defendants on the issue of liability for damages from pile-driving and the jury found for defendants on the issue of whether damage was caused by surface waters. Plaintiff appealed from an order denying amended findings on the injunction issue, from an order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial on the damage issue, and from the judgment entered.
Defendant McNulty Construction Company constructed a home for defendant Harvey Chiat at 3812 Drew Avenue South, Minneapolis, adjacent to the home of plaintiff, Louis Sachs, at 3816 Drew Avenue South. Plaintiff sued these defendants for damages to his property alleged to have resulted from the concussion and vibrations of pile-driving operations employed in constructing the foundation for the Chiat home and from the drainage of surface water onto plaintiff's lot because of the elevated grade established for the Chiat lot; plaintiff additionally applied for an injunction requiring defendants to take measures which would prevent the continuance of such water drainage. *fn1
The issues concerning the drainage of surface waters were submitted to the jury, except that the determination of whether an injunction should be granted was reserved to the court. The jury returned a verdict for defendants, and the trial court denied plaintiff an injunction. The issue of liability for damages caused by defendants' pile-driving operation was decided by a directed verdict for defendants. Plaintiff appeals from the order denying his post-trial blended motion for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial and from the order denying his application for injunction.
1. The principal issue presented is whether one who authorizes or engages in pile driving may be liable to an adjoining landowner for property damage resulting from the concussion or vibrations from such operations even though the pile-driving operations were conducted in the customary and workmanlike manner and without negligence. The question, at least in this specific context, is one of first impression in this state. *fn2 Although similar questions have been raised in other jurisdictions, the legal principles applied and the results reached have varied. We do not undertake to frame a general rule for application to all situations in which concussion and vibration damage may result from the use of the widely varied mechanical instruments common in our industrialized society.
The homesites of plaintiff and defendant Chiat, like others in their immediate residential area, are situated in a peat bog. Because of these peculiar soil conditions, houses could not be erected on these lots without special foundation support. Plaintiff himself found it necessary to undergird the foundations of both his house and detached garage with driven piles when he constructed them in 1958; and other lot owners in the same block likewise used foundation pilings. It is undoubted, therefore, that it was necessary for defendant Chiat similarly to support the foundation for his house in 1962. The record is silent concerning the availability of an alternative method for supporting a residential structure.
The competing interests of the parties are obvious: Plaintiff, who has built his home in the peat bog, wishes to be protected from damage to his property and wants to be compensated if such damage occurs; defendant Chiat wishes to build his home in the same locale and does not want imposed upon him any greater burden than had confronted his neighbor. The accommodation of these competing social interests involves, at the same time, a regard for the interests of the community in the maximum utilization of limited urban land.
Defendants, it must be acknowledged, were not engaged in blameworthy and wrongful activity, but were making a natural and not unreasonable use of land. The trial court, in directing a verdict for defendants, doubtless based its decision upon that premise, for it reasoned that defendants had employed the necessary and usual means to adapt the Chiat lot to its lawful and appropriate use and that plaintiff, as the first occupant of a lot in this tract, should not be able to control Chiat's use of his adjoining property by imposing a penalty for using it in precisely the same manner as plaintiff had. This rationale is supported by such cases as Booth v. Rome, W. & O.T.R. Co. 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E. 592, 24 L.R.A. 105; Trull v. Carolina-Virginia Well Co. 264 N.C. 687, 142 S.E. (2d) 622; and Ted's Master Service, Inc. v. Farina Brothers Co. Inc. 343 Mass. 307, 178 N.E. (2d) 268. We are not persuaded, however, that this view achieves the soundest adjustment of these competing social interests. It occurs to us that there may well be no person who would be willing to be first to utilize a tract of urban land if the price of priority were exposure to unrecoverable damage at the hands of whoever chooses to be second. The ...