Sherburne County District Court File No. K1-00-2332.
Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge; Toussaint, Chief Judge; and Crippen, Judge.
For a conviction and sentence becoming final after Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), the more recent decision in Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), does not merely alter the application of Apprendi but establishes a new constitutional rule governing the process of determining facts forming the basis for sentencing; Blakely was neither dictated by Apprendi nor made apparent to most reasonable jurists after Apprendi was decided. As a result, the rule of Blakely will not be applied retroactive to Apprendi in a collateral attack on the sentence; and exceptions to the general rule against retroactivity of new rules are inapplicable, Blakely neither defining a new offense nor altering our understanding of bedrock procedural elements.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Crippen, Judge
In December 2003, this court affirmed the conviction and sentence of appellant Gerald Houston for attempted controlled substance crime in the first degree, methamphetamine manufacture, and one count of controlled substance crime in the fifth degree, possession. State v. Houston, No. C5-02-584, 2002 WL 31892561, *6 (Minn. App. Dec. 31, 2002). In a subsequent post-conviction proceeding, appellant asserts, inter alia, that the cause of the upward durational departure must be scrutinized under Blakely. Because Blakely does not have retroactive effect in the case and because there is no merit in the other claims stated by appellant, we affirm the district court's denial of appellant's post-conviction petition.
Appellant was charged after a search of his car revealed several items associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine in the trunk of the vehicle. His convictions occurred after a jury trial. The district court determined that appellant met the criteria of the career-offender statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4 (2002). Appellant was sentenced on January 11, 2002, and subsequently filed his direct appeal, resulting in the 2003 decision of this court. Four months later, appellant initiated this post-conviction proceeding.
Although the district court determined in 2002 that the presumptive sentence for appellant's offenses was six and a half years, the court relied on the presentence investigation report to determine that appellant was a career offender, and sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 240 months (20 years). Appellant's criminal history included six prior felony convictions dating back 20 years. Five of appellant's prior convictions involved the possession, sale, or manufacture of controlled substances. The court noted that appellant left California without permission from his parole officer and never successfully completed any period of parole or probation. Additionally, the court took note of a 1981 burglary conviction, which it considered in the career-offender analysis.
1. Is appellant entitled to sentencing relief under Blakely in a collateral attack initiated four months after the finality of his conviction and sentence?
2. Given the scope of what was decided or could have been decided when appellant's claims were considered in an earlier appeal, is he entitled to relief on his ...