St. Louis County District Court, File No. 69DU-CV-07-2772.
1. Because matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum state, a choice-of-law analysis requires a determination of whether the conflicting laws are procedural or substantive.
2. Minnesota may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, consistent with federal due process, when the subject lawsuit arises from, and is directly related to, the nonresident‟s involvement in an automobile collision in a location where Minnesota has concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Larkin, Judge
Concurring specially, Minge, Judge
Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Stauber, Judge.
Appellant challenges the district court‟s award of summary judgment, arguing that the district court erred in its determination that (1) Wisconsin‟s statute of limitations governs the underlying lawsuit and bars appellant‟s claims as untimely and (2) Minnesota lacks personal jurisdiction over respondent. Because Minnesota‟s statute of limitations governs the underlying lawsuit, and because Minnesota may exercise personal jurisdiction over respondent consistent with federal due process, we reverse and remand.
For the purpose of the district court‟s summary judgment award, the relevant facts are undisputed. On January 9, 2004, a vehicle driven by respondent Judith M. Birch collided head-on with a vehicle driven by appellant Genna L. Christian. The collision occurred on the Blatnik Bridge, which spans the St. Louis River between Superior, Wisconsin and Duluth. Christian was driving toward Wisconsin; Birch was driving toward Minnesota, but in the Wisconsin-bound lane. Birch was intoxicated. According to Christian‟s uncontroverted affidavit, "The accident occurred only feet from what is commonly referred to as the "arch‟ or center of the bridge. Said accident was directly above the St. Louis [R]iver."
Minnesota emergency vehicles responded to the collision scene and transported Christian to a medical facility in Minnesota, where she received medical care. Wisconsin police officers also responded to the scene. The Wisconsin officers arrested Birch for driving while intoxicated. Criminal charges were subsequently filed against Birch in Wisconsin, and she pleaded guilty to a charge of causing injury by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle.
Both Christian and Birch are Wisconsin residents. Christian had a passenger in her vehicle at the time of the collision. Christian‟s passenger is a Minnesota resident. Birch does not own any property in Minnesota and is not employed in Minnesota.
Christian sued Birch in Minnesota, asserting a negligence claim. Christian served Birch at her home in Wisconsin sometime after May 18, 2007. Birch moved to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(a) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted), (b) (lack of personal jurisdiction), and (f) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). Because the parties submitted matters outside of the pleadings for the district court‟s consideration, the district court treated Birch‟s motion as one for summary judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 56. The district court concluded that Minnesota has subject-matter jurisdiction, but determined that Wisconsin‟s three-year statute of limitations barred Christian‟s lawsuit and that Christian had therefore failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The district court also concluded that Minnesota lacked personal jurisdiction over Birch. The district court granted summary judgment for Birch on both grounds. This appeal follows.
I. Did the district court err in its choice-of-law analysis by failing to consider and determine whether the relevant conflicting laws were procedural or substantive?
II. Did the district court err by concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over respondent?
On appeal from summary judgment, an appellate court determines (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the district court erred in its application of the law. Olmanson v. LeSueur County, 693 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Minn. 2005). When summary judgment is granted based on application of the law to undisputed facts, as is the case here, the result is a legal conclusion that we review de novo. Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Minn. 1998).
We first consider whether the district court erred by determining that Wisconsin‟s statute of limitations governs Christian‟s lawsuit. The district court‟s determination was based on a choice-of-law analysis. When a party asserts that a case brought in Minnesota may have a significant relationship to more than one state, the court must consider whether there is a choice-of-law issue. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws § 1(c) (3rd ed. 2002) (stating that "[w]henever a legal problem involves incidents or issues concerning more than one state, a court must determine which state‟s legal rules should control"). "Where a conflict of law question has not been raised, Minnesota law will govern." Miller v. A.N. Webber, Inc., 484 N.W.2d 420, 422 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. June 10, 1992). Christian argues that a choice-of-law analysis was inappropriate, and that Minnesota law should automatically apply, because Minnesota has concurrent jurisdiction over the lawsuit.
Minnesota courts have concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction over claims arising from events that occur on boundary waters. Minn. Stat. § 484.02 (2006); Opsahl v. Judd, 30 Minn. 126, 129, 14 N.W. 575, 576 (1883). Minnesota courts also have concurrent jurisdiction over events that occur on bridges spanning boundary waters. State v. George, 60 Minn. 503, 505, 63 N.W. 100, 100-01 (1895) (holding that Minnesota can exercise criminal jurisdiction over an offense that occurred on a bridge between Wisconsin and Minnesota based on Minnesota‟s concurrent jurisdiction over bordering waters). Because the collision that underlies this lawsuit occurred on the Blatnik Bridge, which spans the St. Louis River between Minnesota and Wisconsin, on a portion of the bridge that is over the St. Louis River, Minnesota has concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising from the collision.
But Wisconsin also has concurrent jurisdiction over the lawsuit. Wis. Stat. § 1.01 (2007) ("The sovereignty and jurisdiction of this state extend to all places within the boundaries declared in article II of the constitution."); see also Wis. Const. art. II, § 1 (adopting territorial boundaries of the State of Wisconsin). Accordingly, the case has a significant relationship to Wisconsin and a choice-of-law issue arises. Birch raised the choice-of-law issue in summary-judgment proceedings before the district court, and the district court properly considered whether the Minnesota or Wisconsin statute of limitations governs this case. The district court‟s resolution of the choice-of-law issue is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Danielson v. Nat'l Supply Co., 670 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2003).
The first step in a choice-of-law analysis is to consider whether there is a conflict between the legal rules. Jepson v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 513 N.W.2d 467, 469 (Minn. 1994). A conflict exists if choosing the law of one state over the law of another state would be "outcome determinative." Schumacher v. Schumacher, 676 N.W.2d 685, 689 (Minn. App. 2004) (quoting Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 590 N.W.2d 670, 672 (Minn. App. 1999)). The district court correctly determined that there was an outcome-determinative conflict between the Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes of limitations. Minnesota has a six-year statute of limitations for negligence actions. Minn. Stat. § 541.051 (2006). Wisconsin has a three-year statute of limitations. Wis. Stat. § 893.54 (2005-06). The collision occurred on January 9, 2004, and the complaint was not personally served on Birch until after May 18, 2007. Christian‟s claims are time-barred under Wisconsin‟s statute of limitations.
The second step in a choice-of-law analysis is to consider whether each state‟s statute may be constitutionally applied. Jepson,513 N.W.2d at 469. In explaining this second step, the supreme court stated, "[f]or a State‟s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Id. (quotation omitted) (emphasis added).
Third, if both states‟ substantive laws can be constitutionally applied, the district court then analyzes five choice-influencing factors to determine which state‟s law governs: "(1) predictability of result; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum‟s governmental interest; and (5) application of the better rule of law." Jepson,513 N.W.2d at 470 (citing Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 161, 203 N.W.2d 408, 412 (1973)).
But the second and third steps in the choice-of-law analysis apply only if the conflicting rules of law are substantive rather than procedural. Danielson, 670 N.W.2d at 5. The Minnesota Supreme Court has unequivocally held that "the Milkovich analysis should not be extended to conflicts of procedure" based on "the almost universal rule that matters of procedure and remedies [are] governed by the law of the forum state." Davis v. Furlong, 328 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Minn. 1983).
Minnesota courts have consistently recognized the distinction between procedural and substantive law in choice-of-law analysis.
Traditionally when a conflict-of-law issue arises, the preliminary step is to decide whether the question is substantive or procedural. If the matter is one of substantive law, Minnesota applies a multi-step choice-of-law analysis, which includes application of five choice-influencing considerations, to determine which state‟s law applies. . . . On the other hand, if the matter is one of procedural law, Minnesota follows the almost universal rule that matters of procedure and remedies [are] governed by the law of the forum state.
Danielson, 670 N.W.2d at 5 (citations and quotation omitted); see also Schumacher, 676 N.W.2d at 689-90 (proceeding from a determination of whether there is a conflict to an analysis of whether the law is procedural or substantive).
The parties here each rely on Danielson, whichinvolved a choice-of-law analysis concerning whether to apply the Minnesota, Texas, or Arizona statute of limitations to a claim brought in Minnesota, arising out of an injury that occurred in Arizona, allegedly caused by a product purchased in Texas. Danielson, 670 N.W.2d at 4. Christian argues that the district court erred by failing to consider and determine whether Minnesota‟s statute of limitations is procedural or substantive consistent with our analysis in Danielson. See id. at 4-6. Birch argues that the district court did not err because Danielson obviated the need to determine whether a statute of limitations is procedural or substantive and recognized that statutes of limitations are substantive. See id. at 6.
Birch misinterprets Danielson. In Danielson, we explicitly recognized that in a choice-of-law analysis, we must first determine "whether the question is substantive or procedural." Id. at 5. After considering Minnesota caselaw, we held that Minnesota‟s statute of limitations is procedural and that the Minnesota statute of limitations therefore governed. Id. at 5-6. But we also stated, "it may be inappropriate to use the procedural classification" and proceeded to engage in the substantive Milkovich analysis. Id. at 6. After conducting both analyses, we held that Minnesota‟s statute of limitations applied both under the procedural-versus-substantive analysis and under the Milkovich analysis. Id. at 9. But Danielson did not hold that the procedural-versus-substantive determination need not be made in a choice-of-law analysis. To the contrary, we recognized that statutes of ...