The opinion of the court was delivered by: Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 8]. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss and dismisses the Complaint [Doc. No. 1-1] with prejudice.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff William B. Butler is an attorney who, in the past two years, has filed nearly 70 lawsuits on behalf of himself and others, seeking to invalidate foreclosures of residential mortgages. This is not the first time that Mr. Butler has sought to forestall eviction from his own home. His first lawsuit challenging the foreclosure of the mortgage on his home, Butler v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 11-cv-461 (DWF/TNL), was dismissed by the Honorable Donovan W. Frank of this Court. That dismissal was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 690 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2012). Indeed, Mr. Butler has thus far avoided dismissal in only two of the cases he has brought, and has been sanctioned nearly $200,000 in the process. Undeterred by adverse rulings and adverse binding precedent, Mr. Butler here continues to contend that the foreclosure of the mortgage on his home was legally deficient.
In his first Complaint (Butler I), Mr. Butler sued Bank of America and its servicing arm, BAC Home Loans Servicing, as well as a law firm that brought the foreclosure process in state court. The gravamen of the Butler I Complaint was Mr. Butler's now-discredited theory that an entity that does not hold the original note is not entitled to foreclose on the mortgage. (July 13, 2011, Order [11-cv-461 Doc. No. 46] at 2.) See Butler, 690 F.3d at 962 (characterizing the theory of the Butler I case as "flawed" and noting that the court "cautiously examined each of the sixteen causes of action the complaint advances" but "[found] no merit to any of them").
Mr. Butler insists that this challenge to the foreclosure process is
different. The Complaint alleges that his mortgage,*fn1
although held by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc. ("MERS") was actually in favor of "investor" Defendant Federal
National Mortgage Association (known colloquially as Fannie Mae).
(Compl. ¶¶ 3-4.) This mortgage was serviced by Butler I Defendant BAC
Home Loans Servicing. (Id. ¶ 6.)
But, according to the Complaint, Fannie Mae and the servicer of its loans were contractually bound by a "Seller/Servicer Guide" that required the servicer of the mortgage to prepare an assignment of the mortgage to Fannie Mae. (Id. ¶ 12.) The Complaint alleges that BAC prepared this assignment and delivered it to Fannie Mae (id. ¶ 16) but that this assignment was never recorded. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff contends that not only did the assignment deprive BAC of the power to foreclose on the mortgage, but because a condition precedent to foreclosure is the recording of all assignments, there could be no foreclosure by any entity. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.)
The Complaint does not allege when the foreclosure and sheriff's sale of Mr. Butler's property occurred, but documents in the public record show that sheriff's sale was accomplished on July 23, 2010, and that BAC was the successful bidder on Mr. Butler's home. (Schroeder Aff. [Doc. No. 11-1] Ex. D (Sheriff's Certificate of Sale and Foreclosure Record).) On September 7, 2010, the Complaint contends that BAC executed a quitclaim deed to the property in favor of Fannie Mae. (Compl. ¶ 26.) This deed was recorded in February 2011. (Id.) A writ of eviction was issued by the state court on October 4, 2010. (Id. ¶ 31.)
Fannie Mae commenced eviction proceedings against Mr. Butler in Minnesota state court in January 2011. In September 2011, the state court determined that the undisputed evidence established that Mr. Butler had failed to redeem the property within the statutory period for redemption and thus granted judgment in favor of Fannie Mae. (Schroeder Aff. Ex. L.) At Mr. Butler's request and after he posted a $22,000 bond, the state-court eviction judgment was stayed, pending the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Butler I. Immediately after the Eighth Circuit affirmed Judge Frank and denied Mr. Butler's petition for rehearing en banc, the state court directed the entry of judgment in Fannie Mae's favor and also directed that Fannie Mae retain the full amount of Mr. Butler's bond payment. (Id. Ex. M.) Mr. Butler filed this lawsuit two days later.
In the instant Complaint, which is ostensibly an action to quiet title under Minnesota law, Mr. Butler contends that he and not Fannie Mae or any other entity is the "owner of fee title and the sheriff's certificate of sale is void." (Compl. ¶ 30.) The Complaint does not explain how Mr. Butler, who has failed to pay anything toward his mortgage since at least 2010, retains the title to the undisputedly mortgaged property.*fn2
The Complaint contains only two counts: "Determination of Adverse Claims" under Minnesota's quiet title statute, Minn. Stat. § 559.01 (id. ¶ 37), and a request for three declaratory judgments: that the sheriff's sale and quitclaim deed are void, "whether Plaintiffs [sic] owe any obligation to [Fannie Mae]," and that Mr. Butler "remains the owner of the property in fee title." (Id. ¶ 38.)
Mr. Butler initially filed this lawsuit in state court. He requested a temporary restraining order against his eviction from the property. The state court judge issued an ex parte restraining order preventing the eviction. Fannie Mae then removed the lawsuit to this Court.
When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumes the facts in the Complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). However, the Court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions Plaintiffs draw from the facts pled. Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990).
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court ordinarily does not consider matters outside the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The Court may, however, consider exhibits attached to the complaint and documents that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings, Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003), ...