James Thomas and Diane E. Thomas, husband and wife, Plaintiffs,
New York Mellon f/k/a as Trustee for the Certificateholders CWMBS, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust 2006-8T1 Mortgage Pass-through Certificate Series 2006-7, Defendant.
Aaron M. Lorentz, Esq., and Richard L. Morris, Esq., Morris Law Group, PA; and Richard M. Carlson, Esq., counsel for Plaintiffs.
Jared M. Goerlitz, Esq., Peterson, Fram & Bergman, PA, counsel for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DONOVAN W. FRANK, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss brought by Defendant New York Mellon f/k/a as Trustee for the Certificateholders CWMBS, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust 2006-8T1 Mortgage Pass-through Certificate Series 2006-7 ("Defendant") (Doc. No. 15). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendant's motion.
Husband and wife James Thomas and Diane E. Thomas (together, "Plaintiffs") bring this action to void the foreclosure sale of their home in Edina, Minnesota (the "Property"). (Doc. No. 14, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-3, 28.) On January 25, 2006, Plaintiff James Thomas obtained a loan from, and executed a note in favor of, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. ("Countrywide"). ( Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiffs also executed a mortgage in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"). ( Id. ¶ 10.) On July 6, 2009, MERS assigned the mortgage to Defendant. ( Id. ¶¶ 2, 11.)
Plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, and Defendant commenced foreclosure by advertisement proceedings on or about September 9, 2011. ( See id. ¶ 13.) On October 5, 2011, Plaintiff Dianne E. Thomas was personally served with a notice of mortgage foreclosure sale while she was in her vehicle on Schaefer Road, outside the Property. ( Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) The sheriff's sale of the Property occurred on November 4, 2011, at which time Defendant purchased the Property for the sum of $3, 808, 280.97. ( Id. ¶ 20.)
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint asserts one count for declaratory judgment, seeking to set aside and void the foreclosure sale of the Property. ( Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) Defendant now moves to dismiss.
I. Legal Standard
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). In doing so, however, a court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts alleged. Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). A court may consider the complaint, matters of public record, orders, materials embraced by the complaint, and exhibits attached to the complaint in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations, " it must contain facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. As the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, " will not pass muster under Twombly. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at ...