Frances S. Bland, Plaintiff,
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Defendant.
Jonathan L. R. Drewes, Esq., and Michael J. Wang, Esq., Drewes Law, PLLC, counsel for Plaintiff.
Kirstin D. Kanski, Esq., and Bryan A. Welp, Esq., Lindquist & Vennum PLLP, counsel for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DONOVAN W. FRANK, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. No. 7). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion.
On February 27, 2004, Frances S. Bland ("Plaintiff") and her husband executed a mortgage in favor of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. that secured a lien for residential property on Vista Ridge Lane in Shakopee, Minnesota ("Subject Property"). (Doc. No. 1, Ex. 1 ("Compl.") ¶¶ 1, 4; Doc. No. 13, Ex. A.) In a document dated March 6, 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), as Receiver for IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB, successor in interest to IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., assigned the mortgage to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee of the IndyMac INDX Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR2, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-AR2 under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated June 1, 2004 ("Defendant"). (Compl. ¶ 5; Doc. No. 13, Ex. B.) The assignment was signed and executed on March 29, 2011, and recorded on April 1, 2011. (Compl. ¶ 5; Doc. No. 13, Ex. B.)
On or about February 28, 2012, Defendant commenced foreclosure by advertisement proceedings. (Compl. ¶ 6; Doc. No. 13, Ex. D.) Notice of the Sheriff's Sale was published in the Jordan Independent newspaper. (Compl. ¶ 11; Doc. No. 13, Ex. D.) Ultimately, Defendant purchased the Subject Property at the Sheriff's Sale on July 24, 2012. (Compl. ¶ 6; Doc. No. 13, Ex. E.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant had represented to her, by telephone in the summer of 2012, "that the Sheriff's Sale had been put on hold and would not occur on July 24, 2012." (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 32.) Plaintiff asserts that she did not become aware that the sale had occurred until she received a letter from Defendant, through its counsel, dated February 7, 2013, after the redemption period had expired. ( Id. ¶ 37.)
On February 26, 2013, Plaintiff initiated the present action by filing a Complaint in state court. ( See id. at 11.) Defendant removed the case to this court. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff's Complaint asserts the following six causes of action: (1) Failure to Strictly Comply with Minn. Stat. § 580.03; (2) Failure to Strictly Comply with Minn. Stat. § 580.05; (3) Failure to Strictly Comply with Minn. Stat. § 580.02; (4) Fraud, and in the alternative, Negligent Misrepresentation; (5) Quiet Title, Minn. Stat. § 559.01; and (6) Slander of Title. (Compl. ¶¶ 9-56.) Defendant now moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims.
I. Legal Standard
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). In doing so, however, a court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts alleged. Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). A court may consider the complaint, matters of public record, orders, materials embraced by the complaint, and exhibits attached to the complaint in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations, " it must contain facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. As the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, " will not pass muster under Twombly. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at ...