Jonathan L. R. Drewes and Michael J. Wang, Drewes Law, PLLC, 1516 West Lake Street, Suite 300, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55408, for Plaintiff.
D. Charles Macdonald and Jessica Z. Savran, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, 90 South Seventh Street, Suite 2200, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402-3901, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 4] Plaintiff Teri Smith's Complaint [Doc. No. 1] with prejudice. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendant's Motion.
In this lawsuit, Plaintiff is challenging the foreclosure of the mortgage on her home. Plaintiff executed a mortgage on property located in Eagan, Minnesota ("Mortgage"), in favor of Minnesota Lending Company, LLC, in February 2009, and the Mortgage was assigned to Defendant later that year. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3 [Doc. No. 1]; App. 1-2, 10 [Doc. No. 7].) In 2012, Defendant began foreclosure-by-advertisement proceedings. Relevant to this lawsuit, the Notice of Mortgage Foreclosure Sale ("Notice of Sale"), dated April 4, 2012, was published in the Farmington Independent for six consecutive weeks, beginning on April 12, 2012. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 15 [Doc. No. 1]; App. 20 [Doc. No. 7].) The Farmington Independent is listed on the Minnesota Secretary of State's website as a legal newspaper for Dakota County. See Legal Newspapers, Minnesota Secretary of State, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/index.aspx?page=98. On April 16, 2012, the Notice of Foreclosure Sale and Help for Homeowners in Foreclosure Notice were served on Plaintiff. (App. 22 [Doc. No. 7].) In addition, through a Power of Attorney to Foreclose Mortgage ("Power of Attorney") acknowledged on April 17, 2012,  Defendant authorized the law firm of Shapiro & Zielke, LLP, to "to do all things necessary and incident" to foreclosing the Mortgage by advertisement. (Compl. ¶ 9 [Doc. No. 1]; App. 11-12 [Doc. No. 7].) The Power of Attorney states that it was effective as of April 3, 2012, and that it is meant to "ratify all acts of the appointed agent that are consistent with th[e] Power of Attorney taken at any time since such effective date." (App. 11 [Doc. No. 7].) The Power of Attorney was recorded on April 26, 2012, (id.), and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale on August 7, 2012, (id. at 13-14).
Plaintiff's Complaint raises five causes of action based on the foreclosure proceedings. Count I alleges that Defendant failed to strictly comply with Minn. Stat. § 580.05 because the Power of Attorney was executed after both the date of the Notice of Sale and the date of the first publication of the Notice of Sale. (Compl. ¶¶ 5-13 [Doc. No. 1].) Count II alleges that Defendant failed to strictly comply with Minn. Stat. §§ 580.03 and 331A.03 because the Farmington Independent is not sufficiently circulated in Eagan to be qualified to publish the Notice of Sale. (Id. ¶¶ 14-20.) Count III alleges that Defendant failed to strictly comply with Minn. Stat. §§ 580.03 and 580.041 because the phone number included on the Help for Homeowners in Foreclosure Notice was the general number for Defendant rather than the loss mitigation phone number. (Id. ¶¶ 21-28.) In Count IV, Plaintiff seeks to have the title to the property at issue quieted in her name, subject to the Mortgage. (Id. ¶¶ 29-33.) Finally, Count V alleges slander of title against Defendant. (Id. ¶¶ 34-49.)
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on March 4, 2013 [Doc. No. 4], along with a supporting memorandum [Doc. No. 6] and several exhibits [Doc. No. 7]. Plaintiff filed an opposition memorandum on March 25 [Doc. No. 11], along with an affidavit and several exhibits [Doc. No. 12]. Defendant filed a reply brief on April 5 [Doc. No. 13], and the matter was heard on June 6 [Doc. No. 14].
A. Standard of Review
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumes the facts in the Complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Morton v. Becker , 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). However, the Court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens , 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions Plaintiff draws from the facts pled. Westcott v. City of Omaha , 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). In addition, the Court ordinarily does not consider matters outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). The Court may, however, consider exhibits attached to the complaint and documents that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings, Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc. , 323 F.3d 695, 697 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003), and may also consider public records. Levy v. Ohl , 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations, " it must contain facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, " will not pass muster under Twombly. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, ...