Hennepin County District Court File Nos. 27-CR-05-035318, 27-CR-05-035365
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Interim Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Connolly, Judge.
In this appeal from the district court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief, appellant Dakari Michael Coles argues that the district court erred by (1) treating his motion to correct a sentence as a postconviction motion and finding it time-barred, and (2) refusing to correct appellant's sentence. We affirm.
In August 2003, appellant entered into a three-component plea agreement with respondent State of Minnesota. Appellant was initially charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, first-degree aggravated robbery, and two counts of simple robbery. Appellant pleaded guilty to an amended charge of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and to the first-degree aggravated robbery charge as part of the plea bargain, in exchange for a 96-month prison sentence, stayed until his 21st birthday, and the dismissal of the other charges. The 96-month sentence was based on a 48-month sentence for the second-degree criminal sexual conduct and a consecutive 48-month sentence for the first-degree aggravated robbery. The parties also agreed that appellant would be designated an extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ).
In June 2005, appellant's EJJ status was revoked and his 96-month sentence was executed. Almost seven years later, in May 2012, appellant filed a pro se postconviction petition. His petition was forwarded to the Office of the Minnesota Appellate Public Defender, and it filed a supplemental petition and supplemental memorandum in support of the petition for postconviction relief on appellant's behalf. In denying appellant's request for relief, the district court concluded that appellant's petition directly challenged his 2003 plea and, therefore, was subject to the two-year statute of limitations for postconviction petitions in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2012).
Appellant argues that the district court erred because his supplemental petition referenced Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, and therefore was not a petition for postconviction relief subject to the two-year statute of limitations. We will not reverse the denial of either a petition for postconviction relief or a motion under rule 27.03, subd. 9, unless the district court abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law. See Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (addressing petition for postconviction relief); Anderson v. State, 794 N.W.2d 137, 139 (Minn.App. 2011) (addressing motions under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9), review denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 2011).
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, provides that a "court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law." But petitions for postconviction relief are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4. We review de novo the interpretation of a procedural rule. Johnson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn. 2011).
Appellant contends that because his petition was clearly identified as a rule 27.03, subd. 9, motion, and the only issue being raised relates to his sentence, his petition should be considered on its merits under our holding in Vazquez v. State, 822 N.W.2d 313 (Minn.App. 2012). We disagree.
Even characterizing appellant's motion as a challenge solely to his sentence, Vazquez is not controlling. See Bonga v. State, 765 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Minn. 2009) (noting "that [§ 590.01] is sufficiently broad ...