United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Michael W. Lowden, Lowden Law Firm, 5101 Thimsen Ave., Suite 204, Minnetonka, MN 55345, for Plaintiff.
Robert B. Bauer and William M. Topka, Dougherty, Molenda, Solfest, Hills & Bauer PA, 7300 W. 147th St., Suite 600, Apple Valley, MN 55124; Kaari Gagnon, Robert M. Einhorn, and Robert Zarco, Zarco Einhorn Salkowski & Brito, PA, 100 SE 2d St., Suite 2700, Miami, FL 33131; and Mikhael Ann Bortz, Britto Central, Inc., 150 N.W. 25th St., Miami, FL 33127, for Defendants.
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Britto Central, Inc., Magical Thinking Art, Inc., and Romero Britto (collectively, "Defendants") [Doc. No. 14]. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss and dismisses the Complaint [Doc. No. 1] without prejudice.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ryan Mack is an art dealer with a gallery located in Minnesota. (Compl. ¶ 2 [Doc. No. 1].) Defendant Romero Britto is an artist and resident of Florida. (Britto Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5 [Doc. No. 16].) Defendants Magical Thinking Art, Inc., and Britto Central, Inc., are Florida corporations that sell Defendant Romero Britto's artwork to individuals and art galleries. (Pomares Decl. ¶¶ 5-6 [Doc. No. 17].)
The facts as alleged in the Complaint are as follows. In 2009, Plaintiff purchased what he believed to be a painting by Defendant Romero Britto from a seller in Florida, initially identified as Linda Safira. (Compl. ¶ 12 [Doc. No. 1].) The name Linda Safira turned out to be an alias for a Miami art dealer named Les Roberts and his wife. ( Id. ¶ 13.) Over the next several months, Plaintiff purchased 65 paintings from Mr. Roberts, all ostensibly painted by Romero Britto. ( Id. ¶ 39.) He re-sold a number of these paintings, including selling one over the internet to an anonymous buyer with the same address as Defendant Magical Thinking Art. ( Id. ¶ 17.) Before making the purchase, this anonymous buyer requested a certificate of authenticity for the painting. ( Id. ¶ 18.) When Plaintiff called Mr. Roberts about such a certificate, Mr. Roberts told Plaintiff that he could supply certificates for the paintings at a cost of $35 for each certificate. ( Id. ¶ 19.) Mr. Roberts eventually supplied what he claimed were certificates of authenticity for the paintings. (Id.)
In November 2009, another art dealer in Florida called Plaintiff and told him that the Britto paintings Plaintiff was selling were not authentic. ( Id. ¶ 24.) Mr. Roberts claimed that the other dealer's statements were false. ( Id. ¶ 25.) In early December 2009, an employee of Defendant Magical Thinking Art called Plaintiff. ( Id. ¶ 26.) She asked Plaintiff to remove the online listings for the paintings because the paintings were forgeries. (Id.) Plaintiff again consulted with Mr. Roberts, who said that Plaintiff should remove the online listings because Mr. Roberts was concerned that his alleged source for Britto's paintings was nervous about Plaintiff's below-market-price sale of the paintings. ( Id. ¶ 27.) Eight days later, Plaintiff's biggest client for the Britto paintings called him to say that Britto Central claimed that none of the Britto paintings Plaintiff sold him were authentic. ( Id. ¶ 28.) Mr. Roberts again reassured Plaintiff that the paintings were authentic and purported to communicate directly with Plaintiff's client regarding the paintings' authenticity. ( Id. ¶ 29.) The paintings turned out to be forgeries, and Plaintiff was forced to refund his clients' money. (See id.)
On January 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court, seeking relief from Defendants for intentional misrepresentation and negligence. (See id. ¶¶ 66-78.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 19, 2013 [Doc. No. 14], along with a supporting brief [Doc. No. 15] and several declarations [Doc. Nos. 16-18]. Plaintiff filed an opposition brief [Doc. No. 21] and two affidavits [Doc. Nos. 22-23] on March 12, 2013. On March 19, Defendants filed a reply brief [Doc. No. 26] and two additional declarations [Doc. Nos. 27-28]. This Court held a hearing on the matter on June 27, 2013 [Doc. No. 36].
Defendants' motion is brought alternatively under Rule 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(2) provides for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants, it will not address their alternative ground for dismissal.
It is a plaintiff's burden to demonstrate, "by a prima facie showing, that personal jurisdiction exists." Stevens v. Redwing , 146 F.3d 538, 543 (8th Cir. 1998). The Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if (1) Minnesota's long-arm statute, Minn. Stat. § 543.19, is satisfied; and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend due process. Stanton v. St. Jude Med., Inc. , 340 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 2003). Because Minnesota's long-arm statute extends the personal jurisdiction of Minnesota courts as far as due process allows, In re Minn. Asbestos Litig. , 552 N.W.2d 242, 246 (Minn. 1996), the Court need only evaluate whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the requirements of due process. Guinness Import Co. v. Mark VII Distribs., Inc. , 153 F.3d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 1998).
Due process requires that the defendant have "certain minimum contacts" with the forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted). Sufficient minimum contacts exist when the "defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that [it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). There must be some act by which the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privileges of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). In contrast, contacts that are merely random, fortuitous, attenuated, or that are the result of "unilateral activity of another party or a third person" will not support personal jurisdiction. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (citation omitted).
To determine the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts with the forum state, the Court examines five factors: (1) the nature and quality of the contacts; (2) the quantity of the contacts; (3) the relation between the contacts and the action; (4) the forum state's interest in the litigation; and (5) the convenience of the parties. Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp. , 327 F.3d 642, 648 (8th Cir. 2003). The third factor distinguishes between general and specific jurisdiction. Wessels, Arnold & Henderson v. Nat'l Med. Waste, Inc. , 65 F.3d 1427, 1432 (8th Cir. 1995). General jurisdiction is present whenever a defendant's contacts with the forum state are so "continuous and systematic" that the defendant may be sued in the forum over any controversy, independent of whether the cause of action has any relationship to the defendant's activities within the state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over causes of action arising from or related to the defendant's actions within the forum state. Burger King , 471 U.S. at 472-73. The fourth and fifth factors are secondary to the analysis. Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Nippon Carbide Indus. Co., Inc., 65 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 1995). In examining these factors, the Court may consider matters outside the ...