United States District Court, D. Minnesota
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEVEN E. RAU, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge on Plaintiff's application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ("IFP"). (Docket No. 2.) Plaintiff is seeks IFP status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, to avoid paying the filing fee and other associated costs. The matter has been referred to this Court for report and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1. For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that Plaintiff's IFP application be denied, and that this action be dismissed.
An IFP application will be denied, and the action will be dismissed, when the plaintiff has filed a complaint that fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir. 1996) ( per curiam ).
To state an actionable claim for relief, a complaint must allege a set of specific historical facts, which, if proven true, would entitle the complainant to some legal recourse against the named defendant(s), based on some cognizable legal theory. Although federal courts must "view pro se pleadings liberally, such pleadings may not be merely conclusory: the complaint must allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law." Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). The facts supporting a plaintiff's claims must be clearly alleged. Federal courts are not required to "assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint." Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004).
In this case, the substantive allegations set forth in Plaintiff's complaint, repeated verbatim and in their entirety, are as follows:
"Unauthorized use of copyrights and trademarks Unauthorized distribution of copyrights and trademarks Unauthorized reproduction of copyrights and trademarks."
(Complaint, p. 4, § 7.)
Based solely on these brief obscure assertions, Plaintiff is seeking a judgment that would provide relief described as follows:
"Court ordered injunctions $8, 10000/100 Eightyone [sic] hundred dollars and no cents"
( Id., p. 4, "REQUEST FOR RELIEF.")
A complaint fails to state a cause of action if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plaintiff's complaint does not meet this standard. The complaint does not describe any specific acts or omissions by the named Defendant that could entitle Plaintiff to any relief under any legal theory. Indeed, the complaint does not describe any specific historical events at all. Even with the liberal construction accorded in pro se pleadings, ( Atkinson, 91 F.3d at 1129, citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) ( per curiam )), Plaintiff's current complaint clearly fails to state any actionable claim for relief.
Because Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action on which relief can be granted, his IFP application must be denied, and this case must be summarily dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff has filed several previous lawsuits in this District that have been summarily dismissed. In one of the last such cases, Kujak v. HTTP:/WWW.MNCIS.COM, Civil No. 13-786 (JNE/JJK), Magistrate Judge Jeffrey J. Keyes cautioned Plaintiff that if he filed another plainly inadequate complaint, his ability to file more actions might be restricted. Plaintiff has now flouted that cautionary observation by filing yet another obviously defective pleading. This Court believes that it is now time to restrict Plaintiff's ability to file further actions in this District.
Pro se litigants do, of course, have a right of access to the courts. That right, however, does not ensure an unrestricted opportunity to file frivolous, malicious or abusive lawsuits. See In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1988) ("there is no constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous or malicious'"), (quoting Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 208 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 985 (1981)). "Frivolous, bad faith claims consume a significant amount of judicial resources, diverting the time and energy of the judiciary away from processing good faith claims." Tyler, 839 F.2d at 1292. Such "excessive litigation" imposes Aunnecessary burdens on, and the useless consumption of, court resources." Id. A federal court Ahas authority to control and manage matters pending before it, " ...