United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Qeauna Thompson, Pro Se.
Pamela Marentett, Assistant United States Attorney, for Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
FRANKLIN L. NOEL, Magistrate Judge.
THIS MATTER came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge on Qeauna Thompson's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1). This matter was referred to the undersigned for Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1. For the reasons set forth below, this Court recommends that the Petition be DENIED and that this action be dismissed as moot.
On March 8, 2012, petitioner Qeauna Thompson was convicted of Conspiracy to Commit Access Fraud and Aggravated Identity Theft. Buege Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 5; Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1 at 3. She was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment. Id. Thompson's habeas petition seeks a court order releasing her to a Residential Reentry Center (RRC) for the last year of her sentence. ECF No. 1 at 1. The Government argues that Thompson does not have a right to incarceration at a particular facility and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her petition. Resp. to Petitioner's Habeas Petition 8, ECF No. 4.; See Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3625 precludes judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act of any "determination, decision, or order" made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621-3624). The Government also argues that the decision to transfer an inmate to a RRC is discretionary under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) and that a proper evaluation was conducted in Thompson's case. ECF No. 4 at 11.
According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons inmate locater, Thompson has already been transferred to a Residential Reentry program in Chicago. See http://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/. Generally, a petitioner's release from custody does not automatically render a habeas petition moot. Sayonkon v. Beniecke, 2012 WL 1621149 at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 17, 2012) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). The Court should not dismiss a petition as moot if any of the following exceptions apply: "(1) secondary or collateral' injuries survive after resolution of the primary injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review; (3) the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but is free to resume it at any time; or (4) it is a properly certified class action suit." Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Chong v. District Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir. 2001)).
None of these exceptions apply in this case. First, there is no injury and, therefore, no secondary or collateral injury. Sayonkon, 2012 WL 1621149 at *2 (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7). The second exception applies when "there is a reasonable expectation the complaining party will be subject to the same action again." See Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 856 n.7 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Hickman v. Missouri, 144 F.3d 1141, 1143 (8th Cir. 1998)). There is no reasonable expectation of Ms. Thompson's situation reoccurring. Third, there is no indication that Thompson was released in order to divest the Court's review of the Petition on the merits. Finally, the case is not a class action suit.
In sum, this Court can no longer grant the relief Thompson originally sought in her habeas petition. Because Thompson has been released from custody and the mootness doctrine exceptions are inapplicable to the case at hand, no case or controversy exists under Article III. This action is therefore moot and should be dismissed.
Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. Thompson's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. ...