United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Rene J. L'Esperance, L'Esperance Law LLC, Counsel for Plaintiff.
Lawrence J. Hayes, Jr., Assistant City Attorney, Counsel for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MICHAEL J. DAVIS, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
I. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff was hired by the City of St. Paul for its COMET Project in October 2008 as an IS Info Tech I/business analyst on a temporary, part-time basis. (Hayes Aff. Ex. 1.) In March 2010, Plaintiff began working full-time on a provisional basis. (Id.) A provisional appointment is made when the City does not have a list of qualified persons who have passed an examination for the position, and the vacancy is such that the department cannot reasonably wait for an examination to be held before securing an employee. (Id. Ex. 2.) Prior to commencing his provisional appointment, Plaintiff was given a form to read and sign that listed the nature and characteristics of provisional employment with the City. (Id.) The form provides that a provisional appointment may last only until the vacancy can be filled from a list of persons who have passed an examination for the position; that performing work as a provisional employee will not give that person any preference when an examination is announced; provisional employees can earn sick leave and vacation credits, and the time they work "is credited toward increases if a regular appointment follows the provisional employment." (Id.) Finally, the form notifies provisional employees that they "are hired on an at-will basis, which means that either the employee or the City may terminate employment at any time for any reasons or no reason." (Id.) Plaintiff signed this form on March 25, 2010. (Id.)
When a provisional appointment is approved pursuant to the City's Civil Service Rules, the Human Resources Director "shall, except in special cases, schedule an examination for such position." (Id. Ex. 4 (Civil Service Rules § 11 at 21.) The City asserts that the COMET Project for which Plaintiff was hired was temporary in nature and thus a "special case" as referred to in Section 11 of the Civil Service Rules. (Schmidt Aff. ¶ 7.)
The City of St. Paul has entered into a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME"). (Hayes Aff. Ex. 3.) The CBA provides that the covered bargaining unit includes the position of IS Information/Technical Analyst I - the position for which Plaintiff was hired. The CBA provides for the sole and exclusive procedures for processing grievances of covered employees. (Id. at § 6.3.) Plaintiff testified that he paid union dues for the entire time he worked for the City, although he paid less when he was a temporary employee. (Id. Ex. 6 (Plaintiff Dep. at 8).)
On January 9, 2012, Plaintiff was called to the office of Defendant Eric Willems, COMET Project Director. (Id. Ex. 6 (Plaintiff Dep. at 11).) At that meeting, Plaintiff was told that because of budget cuts, they no longer needed Plaintiff on the COMET Project. (Id. at 12.) He was told to turn in his badge immediately, and to clean out his desk. (Id.) Plaintiff later received a letter from Willem which stated that in accordance with Rule 11 of the Civil Service Rules, his provisional employment as an IS System Consultant I had ended, effective January 9, 2012. (Id. Ex. 5.) Following his termination, Plaintiff requested AFSCME to file a grievance on his behalf, but AFSCME did not do so because of the fact that Plaintiff was a provisional employee. (Id. Ex. 6 (Plaintiff Dep. at 43).)
Plaintiff brought this action originally against the City of St. Paul, Willems and AFSCME asserting three claims: violation of constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, failure to provide notice of termination in violation of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, and failure by AFSCME to file a grievance on his behalf in violation of the LMRA. Plaintiff thereafter voluntarily dismissed AFSCME as a defendant, and Counts II and III. The only claim remaining is Count I, a procedural due process claim under Section 1983 asserted against Defendants Willems and the City of St. Paul (collectively referred to herein as the "City").
II. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing that there is no disputed issue of material fact. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323. "A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case." Amini v. City of Minneapolis , 643 F.3d 1068, 1074 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986)).
III. Section 1983 Claim
In Count I, Plaintiff asserts that he was a public employee as defined by Minnesota Statute § 179A.03, Subd. 14, and that he was deprived of his protected property interest in employment when the City terminated his employment without prior notice and an opportunity to meaningfully ...