United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Manda M. Sertich, Esq., United States Attorney's Office, 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 600, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55415, for Plaintiff.
Alan D. Margoles, Esq., Margoles & Margoles, 790 Cleveland Avenue South, Suite 223, St. Paul, Minnesota 55116, for Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEVEN E. RAU, Magistrate Judge.
The above-captioned case comes before the undersigned on Defendant Matthew James Martinka's ("Martinka") Motion to Quash the Search Warrant and Suppress All Evidence Seized Pursuant to the Search Warrant ("Motion to Suppress") [Doc. No. 21]. This matter has been referred for the resolution of the issues raised in Martinka's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C) and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1. For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends denying Martinka's Motion to Suppress.
On March 18, 2015, Martinka was indicted on five counts of distribution of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) and 2252(b)(1), and one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2252(b)(2). (Indictment) [Doc. No. 1 at 1-3]. On May 19, 2015, Martinka filed several pretrial motions, including the Motion to Suppress. The Court held a hearing on the pretrial motions on June 4, 2015. (Minute Entry Dated June 4, 2015) [Doc. No. 25].
At the motion hearing, the parties and the Court discussed the Motion to Suppress, as well as Martinka's related Motion and Memorandum to Grant a Suppression Hearing with Regard to Unconstitutional Administrative Subpoenas ("Motion for Hearing") [Doc. No. 16]. Specifically, the parties and the Court discussed whether the hearing requested in Martinka's Motion for Hearing was necessary in light of the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Wheelock, 772 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2014).
Martinka argues that all evidence obtained from a search of his property should be suppressed because the search warrant was based on information obtained via an illegal administrative subpoena. (Mot. to Suppress at 1-2). Martinka challenges the administrative subpoena on several grounds and initially requested a hearing to develop facts relevant to those challenges. (Mot. for Hr'g at 1, 4). The parties stipulated on the record, however, that the facts relevant to the Motion to Suppress are the same as those in Wheelock. See (Order Dated June 4, 2015 at 2). That is, the instant case and Wheelock involve different defendants, and the specific administrative subpoenas requested and issued in each case are technically distinct, but the parties agree that those differences are of no consequence to the legal issues presented in Martinka's Motion to Suppress. On this basis, the parties agreed that no further testimony or argument was required regarding the Motion to Suppress, making the motion ripe for consideration.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In light of the parties' stipulation, the facts relevant to Martinka's challenges to the administrative subpoenas are derived from Wheelock, 772 F.3d 825, and the affidavit of Martinka's counsel filed in support of the Motion for Hearing. (Aff. of Alan D. Margoles in Supp. of Mot. for Hr'g, "Margoles Aff.") [Doc. No. 17]. The Margoles Affidavit includes a description of the administrative subpoena process typically utilized by the investigating officer in both this case and Wheelock, Minneapolis Police Officer Dale Hanson ("Officer Hanson"). ( Id. ). Counsel's description of the administrative subpoena process is consistent with the parties' stipulation, in that counsel describes the same process that was described in Wheelock. See also (Mot. for Hr'g at 1-2) (stating that Martinka's counsel has cross-examined Officer Hanson "in at least five child pornography cases" and that counsel cross-examined Officer Hanson in state court proceedings regarding the investigation of Martinka that led to the indictment in this case). The relevant facts are as follows.
Officer Hanson used investigative software to discover that child pornography was available for download at a particular Internet Protocol ("IP") address. Officer Hanson then requested an administrative subpoena from the Hennepin County Attorney, ordering the Internet Service Provider ("ISP") to provide subscriber information for the identified IP address. Officer Hanson certified that the information requested was relevant to an ongoing legitimate law enforcement investigation of distribution of child pornography. The Hennepin County Attorney sent the administrative subpoena to the ISP, and the ISP responded, providing Martinka's name, address, and other subscriber information. Using the information obtained from the ISP, Officer Hanson obtained a search warrant, which was later executed at Martinka's property and led to the discovery of incriminating evidence on Martinka's computers, hard drives, cds, dvds, and/or computer peripherals.
A. Legal Standard
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The protections of the Fourth Amendment apply where a defendant has a "constitutionally cognizable privacy interest." Wheelock, 772 F.3d at 828. "To prove he had a constitutionally cognizable privacy interest, [Martinka] must show that (1) he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas searched or the items seized, and (2) society is prepared to ...