United States District Court, D. Minnesota
MALIK E. MUHAMMAD-BEY, Plaintiff,
DR. STEPHEN CRAANE, KATHY REID, DR. DAVID A. PAULSON, NANETTE LARSON, JEANNE LUCK, and JOHN AND JANE DOES, In their respective individual and official capacities for actions under color of law as Plaintiff's Treating physicians of Minnesota Correctional Facilities, Oak Park Heights, Defendants.
E. Muhammad-Bey, plaintiff, pro se.
Patrick J. Schiltz United States District Judge
Malik Muhammad-Bey is a prisoner incarcerated at the
Minnesota Correctional Facility in Oak Park Heights.
Defendants are various state employees who are allegedly
responsible for providing medical services to Muhammad-Bey.
Muhammad-Bey brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
applied for, and received, IFP status. As required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b), Muhammad-Bey was ordered to pay an
initial partial filing fee (here, $71.75) within 20 days or
have his complaint dismissed for lack of prosecution. After
Muhammad-Bey did not pay the fee within 20 days, Magistrate
Judge Stephen E. Rau recommended that this action be
dismissed for failure to prosecute, in a Report &
Recommendation (“R&R”) filed on September 23,
2016. ECF No. 4.
objects to the R&R, but it is somewhat difficult to
discern the basis of his objection. Muhammad-Bey's
objection and his accompanying “Affidavit of
Fact” consist largely of the type of legal gibberish
that is typically found in the filings of tax protesters. For
example, Muhammad-Bey seems to argue that he does not have to
pay the initial partial filing fee because (1) that fee can
be paid with only “gold or sil[v]er coins” due to
Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution and (2)
Muhammad- Bey “do[es] not have or possess, any gold or
silver coins.” ECF No. 5 at 3. But Article I, Section
10 has nothing to do with this case. That section prohibits a
state from “mak[ing] anything but gold and
silver coin a tender in payment of debts.” That section
does not restrict the federal government-including this
(federal) court-in any way.
has funds available to pay the initial partial filing fee. A
prison official certified that Muhammad-Bey had $20.16 in his
trust-fund prison account at the time of the IFP application,
had average monthly deposits to that account of $358.73, and
had in that account an average monthly balance of $272.28.
ECF No. 2 at 6. Muhammad-Bey himself acknowledged that he had
an average monthly income of $30 and an expected income for
the subsequent month of $70. Id. at 1. Muhammad-Bey
clearly has the means to pay an initial partial filing fee.
papers also appear to raise a number of other arguments,
including arguments that (1) requiring an initial partial
filing fee violates his constitutional rights, ECF No. 5 at
3; (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction over him because “I
am Sovereign to this land and as such, this Administrative
Court does not have lawful jurisdiction to hear, present, or
pass judgment in any matter concerning my affairs under a
quasi criminal non sanctioned tribunal of foreign private law
process, ” id. at 1;and (3) requiring him to file
a financial statement before granting him IFP status violated
his due process rights and his “right to free access to
the Courts, ” ECF No. 5 at 3. All of these arguments
are frivolous. See, e.g., Christiansen v.
Clarke, 147 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The
monetary provisions of the PLRA certainly withstand
constitutional scrutiny . . . .”); Nicholas v.
Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1997) (“. . . the
filing fee provisions of the Act do not unconstitutionally
impinge on indigent inmates' right of meaningful access
to the courts or right to petition the courts for
is required by the PLRA to pay the initial partial filing
fee. He was warned that, if he did not pay that fee, his
lawsuit would be dismissed. He did not pay the fee, and
therefore his lawsuit is dismissed.
on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and
proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Report and Recommendation of September 23, 2016 [ECF
No. 4] is ADOPTED.
2. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to
prosecute. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.