State of Minnesota, ex rel. Demetris L. Duncan, Appellant,
Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections, Respondent.
of Appeals Office of Appellate Courts
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender,
Jennifer L. Lauermann, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for appellant.
Swanson, Attorney General, Kelly S. Kemp, Rachel E. Bell,
Assistant Attorneys General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for
the plain and unambiguous language of Minn. Stat. §
609.109, subd. 7 (2004) (repealed 2005), appellant is not
entitled to credit against his conditional-release term for
the time he spent in prison after the Department of
Corrections revoked his supervised release.
Demetris Duncan filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
claiming that the Department of Corrections (DOC) had
incorrectly calculated the expiration date of his sentence.
Specifically, Duncan argued that, after the DOC revoked his
supervised release, it failed to credit his incarceration
time against his mandatory conditional-release term. The
district court and the court of appeals disagreed and upheld
the DOC's determination of the expiration date of
Duncan's sentence. Because the phrase "the time the
person served on supervised release" under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.109, subd. 7 (2004) (repealed 2005), does not
include incarceration time served after the DOC revokes an
inmate's supervised release, we affirm.
evening of July 8, 2000, Duncan entered a stranger's
apartment, located in St. Cloud, through an unlocked door.
Duncan proceeded to the bedroom, where he found a woman
asleep in bed with her young child. Duncan woke up the woman,
threatened her with a knife, and dragged her into the next
room, where he raped her.
was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d) (2014),
to which he later pleaded guilty. The district court
committed Duncan to the Commissioner of Corrections for a
term of 196 months, which constituted a double upward
durational departure from the presumptive sentence. Duncan
appealed his sentence, arguing that his conduct did not
justify a double upward durational departure. In an
unpublished opinion, the court of appeals upheld Duncan's
sentence. State v. Duncan, No. CX-01-1400,
2002 WL 378146, at *3 (Minn.App. Mar. 12, 2002), rev.
denied (Minn. May 14, 2002).
required by Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1 (2014),
Duncan's sentence consisted of a term of imprisonment,
which was originally 130-2/3 months, and a supervised-release
term, which was originally 65-1/3 months. While incarcerated,
Duncan was disciplined and sentenced to an additional 28 days
of imprisonment. As a result, Duncan was not scheduled for
release until August 2011, and his supervised-release term
was projected to expire in December 2016. See Minn.
Stat. § 244.05, subd. 1b(a) (2014) (providing that the
supervised-release term is equal to the entire term of the
sentence, minus the term of imprisonment and any time the
inmate spends in prison as a result of discipline imposed by
the Commissioner of Corrections).
he is a sex offender, Duncan was also sentenced to a
conditional-release term. See Minn. Stat. §
609.109, subd. 7 (2004). Accordingly, the Commissioner of
Corrections was instructed to place Duncan on conditional
release after Duncan completed his sentence. See id.
Duncan was sentenced to 5 years of conditional release,
"minus the time [he] served on supervised release."
Id., subd. 7(a).
Duncan was projected to serve 65-1/3 months on supervised
release. When Duncan was sentenced, the DOC calculated the
expiration date of an offender's sentence by assuming
that the conditional-release term ran concurrently with the
supervised-release term. See generally State v.
Koperski, 611 N.W.2d 569, 572-73 (Minn.App. 2000)
("[S]upervised release and conditional release periods
must run concurrently."), abrogated by State ex rel.
Pollard v. Roy, 878 N.W.2d 341 (Minn.App. 2016),
rev. granted (Minn. June 29, 2016). In other words,
by subtracting Duncan's projected supervised-release term
from his 5-year conditional-release term, Duncan would not
serve additional time on conditional release beyond the time
he served on supervised release. Consequently, the DOC
originally projected that Duncan's conditional-release
term would expire in August 2016-nearly 4 months before his
supervised-release term was set to expire.
August 18, 2011, the DOC released Duncan from prison on
supervised release. As a condition of his supervised release,
Duncan was required to secure approved housing-specifically,
housing where no children were present. Because Duncan was
unable to secure approved housing before his release, he was
transported to the Stearns County jail where a hearing was
held to determine whether he had violated the terms of his
supervised release. A corrections agent testified that Duncan
had been unable to secure approved housing, that there were
no halfway houses available in Stearns County that would
accept a level-three ...