United States District Court, D. Minnesota
K. Bell, Assistant United States Attorney, Counsel for
Anthony Isaac Williams, pro se.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW & ORDER
Michael J. Davis Judge United States District Court
matter is before the Court on Defendant Anthony Isaac
Williams' Pro Se Motion Regarding Supervised Release.
[Docket No. 60]
November 27, 2007, Defendant pled guilty to Count 1 of the
Indictment, Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). The Court
sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment to be followed
by a term of supervised release.
has now filed a letter motion questioning the
constitutionality of supervised release. In particular,
Defendant questions whether the imposition of supervised
release violates the Double Jeopardy clause or the Due
Process clause of the United States Constitution.
Court is permitted to include supervised release after
imprisonment by way of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a), which
The court, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment
for a felony or a misdemeanor, may include as a part of the
sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term
of supervised release after imprisonment, except that the
court shall include as a part of the sentence a requirement
that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release
if such a term is required by statute . . . .
Double Jeopardy clause “proscribes being ‘twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb' for the same
offense.” United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d
1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V).
“It protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal. It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it
protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense.” N. C. v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717
(1969) (footnotes omitted) overruled on other grounds by
Ala. v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
hearing to determine whether supervised release should be
revoked, however, is not a criminal prosecution.”
United States v. Bennett, 561 F.3d 799, 802 (8th
Cir. 2009). And “a sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release is not a new punishment but rather
‘relate[s] to the original
offense.'” United States v. Richey, 758
F.3d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Johnson v. United
States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000)). Defendant,
“therefore, [i]s not at risk for either successive