of Appeals Office of Appellate Courts
Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Brandi
Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorney, Samuel P. Weeks,
Assistant Meeker County Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota, for
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon
E. Jacks, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for appellant.
C. Holten, Jeffrey D. Bores, Gary K. Luloff, Chestnut
Cambronne P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae
Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association Legal Defense
the United States Constitution nor the Minnesota Constitution
requires police to obtain a search warrant before entering a
third party's home to execute a lawfully issued arrest
warrant for a guest.
case presents the question of whether police, having obtained
an arrest warrant, are required by the United States
Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution to obtain a search
warrant to enter a third party's home to arrest the
subject of the arrest warrant. Because we conclude that a
search warrant is not required, we affirm.
2015, appellant Leona Rose deLottinville was arrested and
charged by complaint with two felonies: fifth-degree
possession of methamphetamine and storing methamphetamine
paraphernalia in the presence of a child. In ordering
deLottinville's pretrial release, the district court
imposed conditions that she not possess or consume alcoholic
beverages or any mood-altering drugs, and that she be subject
to random testing. DeLottinville acknowledged that a
violation of the conditions of release could result in her
arrest. When she failed several random tests, the State
applied for an arrest warrant. The district court found
probable cause that deLottinville had violated the conditions
of her release and issued a warrant for her arrest.
DeLottinville does not challenge the lawfulness of the arrest
days later, responding to a tip, officers went to the
residence of deLottinville's boyfriend, D.R., in Grove
City. D.R. lived in an apartment in the lower level of his
parents' house. Upon arriving, one officer spoke with
D.R.'s mother at the front door while the other officer
walked around to the back door to prevent anyone from
fleeing. At the back of the house, the officer looked through
a glass patio door and saw deLottinville. He opened the
unlocked door, went inside, and arrested her.
arresting deLottinville, the officer saw marijuana and a bong
on a countertop. There is no dispute that the items were in
plain view. Later that day, law enforcement obtained a search
warrant for D.R.'s apartment and discovered marijuana,
methamphetamine, hydrocodone pills, and drug paraphernalia.
The State charged deLottinville with two counts of
fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, Minn.
Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016); and possession of
drug paraphernalia, Minn. Stat. § 152.092 (2016).
motion to suppress, the district court ruled that
deLottinville's arrest was illegal because the warrant
for her arrest did not authorize police to enter D.R.'s
apartment. The district court suppressed all fruits of the
arrest and dismissed the charges. The court of appeals
unanimously reversed, adopting the reasoning of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Clifford, which held that a guest in a home
does not have a greater expectation of privacy than the
homeowner under the Fourth Amendment. State v.
deLottinville, 877 N.W.2d 199, 204-05 (Minn.App. 2016)
(citing 664 F.2d 1090, 1092-93 (8th Cir. 1981)). We granted
review to decide whether either the United States
Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution requires that the
evidence be suppressed.
reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
we review the district court's factual findings under a
clearly erroneous standard and its legal determinations de
novo. See State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 483-85
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states
that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Fourth Amendment rights
are "personal" and "may not be vicariously
asserted." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 174 (1969). As relevant here, standing to bring a Fourth
Amendment claim hinges on whether deLottinville has "a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place."
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). The
parties agree that an overnight guest such as deLottinville
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in her host's
home. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue in this
case, but two of its decisions set the boundaries of the
legal analysis. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980), the Court announced that police may enter into the
"dwelling in which the suspect lives" to execute an
arrest warrant. Id. at 603. The Court reasoned,
"If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen's
participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that
his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to
require him to open his doors to the officers of the law,
" even though "an arrest warrant requirement may
afford less protection than a search warrant
requirement." Id. at 602-03. The Court
explicitly reserved the question of whether the same holds
true when the subject of an arrest warrant is believed to be
present in another person's home. Id.
question Payton left open was explored, but not
answered, in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204
(1981). In Steagald, armed with an arrest warrant,
police entered a third party's home to arrest a guest.
Id. at 206. While police searched for the guest
inside the home, they found evidence incriminating the
homeowner. Id. at 206-07. The Court held that, with
regard to the homeowner's Fourth Amendment
rights, the arrest warrant for the guest did not justify
entry into and search of the home. Id. at 216. The
crux of the Court's reasoning was that, unlike a search
warrant, an arrest warrant does not contain "a showing
of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a
search is located in a particular place." Id.
at 213. Thus, the homeowner's "only protection from
an illegal entry and search was the agent's personal
determination of probable cause." Id. But the
Court again confined its holding, limiting it to a challenge
raised by "a person not named in the warrant."
Id. at 212.
nutshell, Payton describes the Fourth Amendment
rights of a homeowner subject to an arrest warrant, while
Steagald explains the rights of a homeowner when
police execute an arrest warrant for a guest. But the Supreme
Court has not yet defined the Fourth Amendment rights of
those in deLottinville's position: guests subject to an
conclude that Payton sets the ceiling on a
guest's Fourth Amendment rights. A guest should not
receive any greater Fourth Amendment protection when outside
her home than when inside it. The home is "first among
equals" under the Fourth Amendment, representing the
"very core" of a person's constitutional
protections. Florida v. Jardines, __U.S.__, __, 133
S.Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Yet Payton held that it is
constitutionally reasonable for police to enter a
person's own home when police have an arrest warrant for
that person. Payton, 445 U.S. at 602. Because Fourth