United States District Court, D. Minnesota
M. Hollenhorst, United States Attorney's Office, counsel
Floyd Manske, defendant pro se.
S. Doty, Judge.
matter is before the court upon the pro se motion by
defendant Tyler Floyd Manske to vacate, set aside, or correct
his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Based on a review
of the file, record, and proceedings herein, and for the
following reasons, the court denies the motion.
December 21, 2015, Manske pleaded guilty to Conspiracy to
Distribute Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846, and being a
Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (a)(2). O n March 31, 2016,
the court sentenced Manske to 300 months' imprisonment.
Manske appealed his sentence, and on May 16, 2016, the appeal
was dismissed. Manske now moves to vacate his sentence,
arguing that (1) he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter a
guilty plea; and (2) the sentence violated due process.
a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of constitutional rights,
“[i]t is beyond dispute that [it] must be both knowing
and voluntary.” Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20,
28-29 (1992). In order to accept a plea of guilty, the court
must place the defendant under oath and determine that the
defendant understands, among other things, his rights, the
nature of the charge, and the possible penalty for the
offense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). Here, there is
no doubt that Manske knowingly and voluntary pleaded guilty.
Manske testified that he was of sound mind and not under the
influence of alcohol or drugs. ECF No. 91, at 3-5. Manske
stated that he understood the possible penalties he faced for
each of the offenses and the guideline factors as outlined in
the plea agreement. Id. at 6-10. The government and
the court fully explained all the rights that he would be
giving up if he pleaded guilty, and Manske stated that he
understood these rights. Id. at 13-18, 24-30.
Manske, in response to the court's questions, testified
that he was appearing voluntarily, that he understood it
would be very difficult to withdraw a plea of guilty, and
that he was satisfied with representation of his counsel.
Id. at 24-30. Therefore, Manske knowingly and
voluntarily pleaded guilty to the offenses for which he was
argues that his sentence violated due process because the
court did not resolve disputed matters, but the record
indicates otherwise. Manske raised two issues at sentencing:
(1) he disputed the two-level enhancement for reckless
endangerment; and (2) he moved for a downward departure
arguing that his criminal history score of VI overstated the
seriousness of his criminal history and the likelihood that
he would re-offend. ECF No. 139, at 5-6. The court addressed
each of these arguments and made factual findings in support
of its decision to apply the reckless endangerment
enhancement and to deny the motion for a downward departure.
also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a
finding that he was responsible for 1.5 kilograms of actual
methamphetamine. But Manske specifically agreed to the drug
amount in his plea agreement and did not contest that amount
at sentencing. ECF No. 46 ¶ 7a. Further, a laboratory
analysis of the seized methamphetamine shows that Manske
possessed at least 1.5 kilograms of actual methamphetamine
during the course of the conspiracy. See ECF No.
140, Ex. 1. Therefore, even if the court somehow erred at
sentencing, Manske cannot show any resulting prejudice.
Manske argues that the court did not inform him of his right
to appeal, but this claim is meritless. At sentencing, the
court informed Manske that under the plea agreement he had
waived his right to appeal his sentence, but also stated that
he had fourteen days to file a notice of appeal if he
believed he still had a right to appeal. ECF No. 139, at 12.
The court also informed Manske of his right to counsel on an
appeal. Id. As a result, Manske's sentence did
not violate due process, and the court denies the § 2255