United States District Court, D. Minnesota
St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company, Plaintiff,
Order of St. Benedict, Inc., Defendant.
S. Doty, Judge
matter is before the court upon the motion to alter or amend
judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or, in the alternative, for
relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) by defendant The
Order of St. Benedict, Inc. (Order). Based on a review of the
file, record, and proceedings herein, and for the following
reasons, the court denies the motion.
background of this matter is fully set forth in the
court's order granting summary judgment to plaintiff St.
Paul Mercury Insurance Company (St. Paul) and will not be
repeated here. The Order moves for post-judgment relief on
the grounds that newly discovered evidence belies the
court's reasoning and analysis. The Order also argues
that the court erred in applying the law.
district court has broad discretion in determining whether to
grant or deny a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to
Rule 59(e) ....” United States v. Metro. St. Louis
Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006). A Rule
59(e) motion serves the limited function of “correcting
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” Innovative Home Health Care, Inc. v.
P.T.-O.T. Assocs. of the Black Hills, 141 F.3d 1284,
1286 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). It does
not afford an opportunity to present evidence or legal
argument that could have been offered prior to entry of
judgment. Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 589 (8th
Cir. 2003). Nor can the rule be used to rehash arguments
already made and lost. Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223
F.3d 818, 827 (8th Cir. 2000).
a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b) “is an
extraordinary remedy and will be justified only under
exceptional circumstances.” Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Nat'l Park Med. Ctr., Inc., 413 F.3d 897, 903
(8th Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Such circumstances include mistake, newly
discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, or “any
other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
respect to the claimed errors in law, the court will not
address the Order's arguments, because they simply repeat
its position, which the court has already considered and
rejected. See Dale & Selby Superette & Deli v.
U.S. Dep't of Agric., 838 F.Supp. 1346, 1348 (D.
Minn. 1993) (noting that post-judgment motions are “not
intended to routinely give litigants a second bite at the
apple, but to afford an opportunity for relief in
newly discovered evidence, the Order argues that recently
uncovered documents support its assertion that the parties
intended to expand the relevant policies to include coverage
for sexual abuse claims. After the court entered judgment,
the Order requested documentation from its insurance
brokerage firm relating to its St. Paul insurance policies.
Berg Aff. ¶¶ 1-4. Diane Berg, senior vice president
of Willis of Minnesota, Inc., reviewed the Order's policy
file and located letters from 1994 discussing “sexual
molestation or activity exclusion.” Id. ¶
5 & Exs. The Order argues that these letters definitively
establish that the parties intended to expand coverage to
include coverage for sexual abuse claims for the policies at
issue, which were in place from July 1990 to July 1992.
order to prevail on the basis of newly discovered evidence,
the Order must show that: (1) the evidence was discovered
after judgment; (2) due diligence was exercised to discover
the evidence; (3) the evidence is material and not merely
cumulative or impeaching; and (4) the evidence would probably
produce a different result. Mitchell v. Shalala, 48
F.3d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir. 1995). The Order has not met this
the Order did not exercise due diligence during the case to
discover the evidence. In fact, the Order acknowledges that
it undertook no discovery during the nearly two years the
case was pending despite having the ability to do so. Given
the ease with which the Order was able to retrieve the
documents post-judgment, it appears that nothing prevented it
from doing so sooner. Second, the evidence is not material.
In the underlying order, the court held that the policies
were unambiguous. As a result, the letters, even if directed
to the policies at issue, would not have been considered by
the court. Further, the letters are from 1994, two years
after the policies expired, and thus are of dubious relevance
in any event. As a result, the evidence is not “newly
discovered, ” and the Order is not entitled to relief.
based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for
to alter, amend, or correct the judgment or, in the