United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Dean Meyer, pro se.
Tweeten, Richard S. Reeves, David Grobeck, Ronald S. Stadler,
Mallery & Zimmerman, S.C., Stacy A. Broman, Laura J.
Hanson, Meagher & Geer, PLLP, Bryon Glen Ascheman, Burke
& Thomas, PLLP, Virginia K. Ekola, Amie E. Penny Sayler,
Jonathan P. Norrie, Bassford Remele, P.A., Angela B. Brandt,
David M. Wilk, Larson King LLP, Ann-Marie Anderson, Wright
Welker & Pauole, PLC, Steven C. Kerbaugh, Steven M.
Phillips, Anthony Ostlund Baer & Louwagie P.A., Barry G.
Vermeer, Jennifer M. Waterworth, Gislason & Hunter,
Lindsey A. Streicher, Patrick M. Biren, Brownson &
Linnihan, PLLP, Erin M. Secord, United States Attorney,
Ashley M. DeMinck, and Ellen B. Silverman, Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Harley Dean
Meyer's Motion to Set Aside Order and Judgment in a Civil
Case [Doc. No. 476]. Meyer requests that the Court set aside
two orders [Doc. Nos. 427, 432] and two related judgments
[Doc. Nos. 429, 433] pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(d)(3). After careful review of
Meyer's submissions, Defendants' responses, and the
relevant case law, the Court concludes that the requested
relief is procedurally improper and substantively
unwarranted. Accordingly, Meyer's motion is denied.
general facts pertaining to this matter are set forth in
previous rulings from this court, and are incorporated herein
by reference. See, e.g., Meyer v. Haeg, No.
15-cv-2564 (SRN/HB), 2016 WL 4153611, at *1-3 (D. Minn. Aug.
5, 2016). Briefly stated, this action arises generally from
claims related to a child custody dispute that occurred in
2003. See Id. at *2. Meyer had divorced his wife in
2001, and they were awarded joint legal and physical custody
of their son, J.M. See Id. Shortly thereafter,
however, Meyer and his wife began disputing the terms of
custody, leading to litigation in Hennepin County Family
Court. Numerous hearings were held related to the dispute in
2002 and 2003, at which Meyer was either present in person or
represented by counsel. See Id. Ultimately,
Meyer's wife was awarded sole custody of J.M., and Meyer
was ordered to pay child support. Id.
the 2003 custody decision, Meyer's employers at times
garnished his wages to satisfy his child support obligations,
and banks where Meyer held accounts also levied those
accounts for the same purpose. See Id. at *3.
According to Meyer, these levies caused him numerous harms,
including credit and tax difficulties, and placement in a
“passport denial program.” See id.
now contends that all aspects of the 2003 custody decision,
and the hearing preceding it, were fraudulent, procedurally
deficient, involved negligence, and amounted to a civil
conspiracy against him. See Id. As a result, Meyer
brought state and federal law claims against hundreds of
individuals and entities (e.g., his former attorneys, judges
and referees in the Minnesota state court system, the federal
agencies involved with his alleged passport and tax issues,
former employers, administrators at the high school J.M.
attended) who he alleges were responsible for the 2003
custody decision, or relied on that decision to take actions
that adversely impacted him. See Id. In general, the
vast majority of Meyer's claims allege that the
Defendants' acts relating to or relying on the 2003
custody decision were violations of his civil rights,
Minnesota state law, and various federal laws and
regulations. See id.
response to Meyer's action, most defendants moved for
dismissal on various grounds, including lack of personal
jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, and insufficient service of process. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (5), (6). As relevant to this
matter, defendants' motions were referred to United
States Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer for a report and
recommendation (“R&R”). See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The magistrate judge duly submitted
two R&Rs covering defendants' motions on June 27,
2016 [Doc. No. 292] and October 5, 2016 [Doc. No. 283],
recommending that defendants' motions be granted. Meyer
timely objected to both R&Rs. On review, this Court
overruled his objections and entered orders dismissing the
Complaint as to all relevant defendants. (See Aug.
5, 2016 Order [Doc. No. 341] (as amended by Dec. 9, 2016
Order [Doc. No. 432]); Nov. 21, 2016 Order [Doc. No. 427].)
Judgments were subsequently entered by the Clerk of Court on
November 22, 2016 [Doc. No. 249] and December 13, 2016 [Doc.
now moves the Court to set aside the relevant orders and
judgments pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
60(b)(3) and 60(d)(3), “on the grounds of fraud,
” and “on the grounds that the fraud prevented
the Plaintiff from fully and fairly presenting his
initial question confronting the Court is whether Meyer's
Motion, though styled as one for relief from a judgment or
order under Rule 60, properly invokes that rule. Rule
60(b)(3) provides that “[o]n motion and just terms, the
court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: (3) fraud (whether
previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party.” Rule 60(d)(3)
likewise indicates that a court retains power to “set
aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” Here, Meyer
appears to allege that this Court's orders and judgments
should be set aside under Rule 60 because various orders and
judgments entered in the state court case were
“forgeries, ” meaning that this Court's
orders were, in a sense, procured by fraud.
as this Court has previously recognized, Rule 60 does not
apply to all orders or judgments-rather, it applies only to
those that are “final.” See John v. MainGate,
Inc., No. 10-cv-4902 (SRN/JJK), 2014 WL 3805662, at *2
(D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2014). As the Eighth Circuit has explained,
an order or judgment is only final if an appeal may lie from
that order or judgment. See Auto Servs. Co. v. KPMG,
LLP, 537 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2008). Except in
certain limited circumstances not present here,
order dismissing fewer than all of the defendants or claims
does not give rise to a right of appeal. See id.; see
also St. Mary's Health Ctr. v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 493,
498 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Rule 60(b) applies only to relief
from a final judgment or order.”). Because ...