United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Freddie L. Dillard, Plaintiff,
Joan Fabian, Department of Correction Commissioner; Tom Roy, Department of Correction Commissioner; Christopher Coleman, City of St. Paul Mayor; Carol Pender Roberts, Ramsey County Adult Community Correction Director; Tom Smith, St. Paul Chief of Police in his personal, official, and individual capacity; Tom Harrington, St. Paul Chief of Police in his personal, official, and individual capacity; and all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable right or accrued interest described in the complaint adverse to plaintiff's complaint, Defendants.
Freddie L. Dillard, pro se.
Marisam, Assistant Attorney General, Minnesota Attorney
General's Office, St. Paul, MN, on behalf of Defendants
Joan Fabian and Tom Roy.
M. Sisk, Assistant City Attorney, City of St. Paul
Attorney's Office, St. Paul, MN, on behalf of Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MONTGOMERY U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the undersigned United States District Judge
for a ruling on Defendants Joan Fabian and Tom Roy's (the
“DOC Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss [Docket No.
18]; Defendant Christopher Coleman's
(“Coleman”) Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 24];
Plaintiff Freddie L. Dillard's (“Dillard”)
Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 29]; and
Dillard's Motion to Rebut Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss [Docket No. 32]. For the reasons set forth below,
both Motions to Dismiss are granted, Dillard's Motions
are denied, and the case is dismissed.
2000, a Minnesota state court jury convicted Dillard of
solicitation to practice prostitution, engaging in
prostitution with a child, and kidnapping. See State v.
Dillard, No. C7-00-2168, 2001 WL 1491295, at *1
(Minn.Ct.App. Nov. 27, 2001). He was sentenced to 158 months
of imprisonment, which was affirmed by the Minnesota Court of
Appeals. Id. at *1, *4.
then challenged his conviction by filing three habeas corpus
petitions in United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota, each of which was dismissed. See Dillard v.
Fabian, No. 03-5317; Dillard v. State of Minn.,
No. 05-2087; Dillard v. Ramsey Cty., No. 09-1165.
21, 2009, Dillard was released from custody to supervised
release. First Am. Compl. [Docket No. 4] ¶ 9; Courtney
Aff. [Docket No. 21] Ex. C. His supervised release date was
scheduled to expire on September 18, 2013. Courtney Aff. Ex.
C. Over the next four years, his supervised release was
revoked several times, resulting in additional periods of
incarceration. On June 19, 2009, Dillard's supervise
release was revoked for failure to complete a residential
program as directed. Id. Ex. D. After serving 90
days, Dillard was assigned additional days of incarceration
until a bed became available at a residential treatment
program. Id. Ex. E. On March 5, 2010, Dillard's
supervised release was revoked for 220 days for absconding
from a halfway house and remaining a fugitive for 18 days.
Id. Ex. F. The expiration date for his supervised
release was extended by18 days to October 6, 2013.
Id. On November 2, 2012, Dillard's supervised
release was revoked for 120 days for owning or operating a
device with internet access and failing to submit to a
polygraph test. Id. Ex. G. On April 8, 2013, Dillard
was required to remain incarcerated pending approval of a
residence plan for him. Id. Ex. H. On July 8, 2008,
Dillard's supervised release was revoked until the
expiration of his sentence on October 6, 2013, “with
the understanding that Mr. Dillard can leave anytime to an
agent-approved residence.” Id. Ex. I. On
October 6, 2013, Dillard's sentence expired and he was
discharged. Id. Ex. J.
his discharge, Dillard filed three lawsuits under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota challenging the revocations of his supervised
release. See Dillard v. State Dep't of Corrs.,
No. 09-2061; Dillard v. City of St. Paul, No.
09-2154; Dillard v. Minnesota Dep't of Corrs.,
No. 12-2626. All were dismissed for failure to state a claim.
October 7, 2016, Dillard filed this lawsuit and an
application to proceed without prepaying the filing costs.
See Compl. [Docket No. 1]; IFP Application [Docket
No. 2]. Although Dillard's pleadings are difficult to
understand, Dillard appears to challenge the legality of his
supervised release on the basis that it was not lawful to
begin with and also that it was wrongly revoked. See
First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-10, 13-18. Dillard also
alleges that he was falsely adjudicated as a level one
predatory sex offender. Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
Dillard asserts the same allegations and claims against all
Defendants. See generally id.
February 17, 2017, United States Magistrate Judge Leo I.
Brisbois granted Dillard's request to proceed IFP.
See Order [Docket No. 6] at 4. Although Dillard was
allowed to proceed IFP, Judge Brisbois observed that
Dillard's claims were likely to be dismissed:
This Court strongly suspects that Dillard's claims are
precluded by the doctrine set forth in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), in which the Supreme
Court held that a litigant cannot maintain a civil-rights
action that, if successful, would necessarily cast doubt on
the validity of a facially valid criminal confinement. That
said, due to the lack ...