United States District Court, D. Minnesota
ORDER
JOAN
N. ERICKSEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Janice Hustvet brings discrimination, unlawful inquiry, and
retaliation claims against Defendant Allina Health System
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”),
primarily arising from Allina's decision to terminate
Hustvet for failing to fulfill a job requirement that she
have immunity to rubella. Both Parties moved for summary
judgment. (See Dkt. Nos. 25, 46.) Allina also moved
to exclude the testimony of Hustvet's expert witness.
(See Dkt. No. 38.) For the reasons that follow, the
Court denies Hustvet's motion and grants summary judgment
in Allina's favor on all claims. The Court denies
Allina's motion to exclude as moot.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). A genuine dispute exists “if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To support an assertion
that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed, a party must
cite “to particular parts of materials in the record,
” show “that the materials cited do not establish
the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, ” or show
“that an adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)(1)(A)-(B). “The court need consider only the
cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the
record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3). In determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate, a court views the record and
all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-movant.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255.
II.
BACKGROUND
Hustvet
worked for Courage Center, out of its Golden Valley campus,
as an Independent Living Specialist (“ILS”) for
several years. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 6, Dkt. No.
1.) In May 2013, Courage Center announced it would be merging
with Sister Kenny Rehabilitation Institute, part of Allina,
on June 1, 2013. (Id. ¶ 7.) As a condition of
continued employment, Allina required all ILSs to complete a
health screen, which, among other things, included testing
for immunity to certain communicable diseases and a
“Respirator Medical Evaluation”
(“RME”). (See Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) The
RME, which is based on OSHA standard forms, asked questions
about potential health conditions directed at evaluating safe
respirator fit and use. (See Dkt. No. 28-10.)
Testing
revealed that Hustvet had immunity to mumps, measles, and
varicella (chickenpox), but that she lacked immunity to
rubella. (See Dkt. No. 29.) Hustvet did not complete
the RME and instead wrote “N.A.” on the form
because her supervisor told Hustvet that the form did not
pertain to her position as an ILS. (See Deposition
of Janice Hustvet (“Hustvet Dep.”) 185:17-23,
Dkt. No. 66.) Allina informed Hustvet that she would need to
submit a full RME and develop immunity to rubella by taking a
Mumps, Measles, Rubella (“MMR”) vaccine.
(See Dkt. No. 28-13 at 3-4.) Hustvet did not comply
with either request, but later stated she was willing to
complete the RME, despite her feeling that it was invasive
and unnecessary. (See Hustvet Dep. 66:10-16,
118:3-6, 140:2-5, 170:10-15, 186:15-25, 214:6-9 216:25-2;
Deposition of Heather Lindblom (“Lindblom Dep.”)
184:13-19, Dkt. No. 28-2; Dkt. No. 28-13 at 3.) However,
Hustvet never completed the RME, nor did she develop immunity
to rubella. (See Dkt. No. 28-13 at 1.)
Hustvet
told Allina that she was concerned about taking the MMR
vaccine because her “health is of the utmost
concern” and because she “had severe cases of
mumps and measles-the MM part of the MMR.” (See
Id. at 3.) She also stated that she has “many
allergies and chemical sensitivities, ” such that she
needed to limit her “exposure.” (Id.;
see Hustvet Dep. 76:7-77:5, 82:9-21.) Based on these
factors, she concluded that “[i]t would be unwise and
unhealthy to expose [her]self to those unneeded parts of the
vaccine.” (Dkt. No. 28-13 at 3.) She offered to take a
rubella-only vaccine instead of the MMR vaccine. (See
Id. at 2.) However, a rubella-only vaccine was not
available in the U.S. (See Id. at 1; Dkt. No. 28-19
at 20.)
Allina's
immunization policy applies to all employees who have patient
or client contact, regardless of location or job title.
(See Dkt. Nos. 28-9 at 1-2, 28-13 at 4.) The policy
aligns with the CDC's recommendation that all healthcare
professionals[1] with direct patient contact have immunity
to mumps, measles, and rubella. (See Dkt. No. 28-19
at 4, 20.) In her position as an ILS, Hustvet worked
one-on-one with clients in their homes, helping them with
everyday chores and skills learning. (See Hustvet
Dep.71:2-25.) Her clients were fragile and
immuno-compromised, and they received regular assistance and
medical care. (Id. at 73:9-20; 74:8-11.) Hustvet
accompanied clients to doctors' appointments. (Deposition
of Cynthia Guddal (“Guddal Dep.”) 13:17-24, Dkt.
No. 28-3.) She also periodically visited the Courage
Center's Golden Valley campus for meetings. (See
Hustvet Dep. 159:12-23.) That campus includes inpatient
rehabilitation clinics and other fitness facilities.
(See Lindblom Dep. 15:16-24, 25:17-26:18.) When
attending meetings in the building, Hustvet came into close
proximity with rehabilitation clinics and their patients.
(Guddal Dep. 21:20-22:24, 24:14-19.)
On July
9, 2013, Allina terminated Hustvet's employment due to
her failure to comply with immunity requirements and to
complete the RME. (See Dkt. No. 28-13 at 1.)
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Disability Discrimination
Hustvet
brings disability discrimination claims under the ADA and
MHRA against Allina for utilizing discriminatory
qualification standards, not making reasonable
accommodations, and denying employment on the basis of
disability. (See Compl. ¶¶ 28, 36-37.)
Claims
for disability discrimination in violation of the ADA or MHRA
are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework. See Dovenmuehler v. St. Cloud
Hosp., 509 F.3d 435, 439 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2007).
Under this framework, Hustvet must show that (1) she has a
disability within the meaning of the ADA or MHRA, (2) she is
qualified to perform the essential functions of her job, with
or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) she suffered an
adverse employment action because of her disability.
Id. at 439. If Hustvet meets her burden of making
out this prima facie case, the burden shifts to Allina to
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse action. See Id. If it does so, Hustvet must
show that Allina's reason is pretext for discrimination.
See id.
1.
Disability
To
demonstrate that she is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA and MHRA, Hustvet must show that she: (1) has a physical,
sensory, or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more major life activities, (2) has a record of such an
impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); Minn. Stat. §
363A.03, subd. 12 (2017); Dovenmuehler, 509 F.3d at
439. Relevant to this case, major life activities include
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, eating,
concentrating, interacting with others, and working.
See § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(i)(1)(i). They also include the operation of major
bodily functions, such as the functions of the immune and
other systems. See § 12102(2)(B); §
1630.2(i)(1)(ii).
A
limitation must be “substantial.” See
§ 12102(1)(A); § 363A.03, subd. 12.[2] That is, it must
substantially limit the plaintiff's ability to perform a
major life activity “as compared to most people in the
general population.” § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Although
“[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or
severely restrict, the individual from performing a major
life activity in order to be considered substantially
limiting . . . . not every impairment will constitute a
disability.” Id. Whether a major life activity
is substantially limiting is a fact-specific inquiry.
Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 425 (8th
Cir. 1999).
Hustvet
does not argue or put forth evidence showing that Allina
regarded her as having a disability. Instead, Hustvet asserts
that she is actually disabled, as shown by her impairments
and/or her record of impairments. (See
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment (“D.S.J. Pl. Br.”)
10-11, 34-37, Dkt. No. 77; Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Support of Her Motion for Summary Judgment (“P.S.J. Pl.
Br.”) 8-9, Dkt. No. 61.) She argues that her conditions
limited her performance of major life activities (such as
breathing, eating, caring for oneself, cleaning, and
socializing) and major bodily functions (including the
functioning of her immune, digestive, neurological,
respiratory, circulatory, cardiovascular, and musculoskeletal
systems). (See D.S.J. Pl. Br. 11, 35.)
There
is insufficient evidence in the record to support the
conclusion that Hustvet's conditions substantially limit
her ability to perform major life activities. For example,
the record shows that Hustvet has garden-variety allergies to
various foods, grass, pets, trees, etc. (See Hustvet
Dep. 82:25-86:14.) She has “typical” allergic
reactions, such as “itchy runny eyes and nose.”
(Id. at 87:6-9.) She has never been prescribed an
Epi-Pen. (See Id. at 87:18-19.) She is generally
able to breath, eat, care for herself, clean, and socialize,
but sometimes she must avoid certain fragrances and chemicals
by relocating herself farther away from the ...