United States District Court, D. Minnesota
John Deere Financial, f.s.b., f/k/a FPC Financial, f.s.b., Plaintiff,
Bio-Mass Renewable Technologies, Inc., Jeff Buresh, and Jeffrey and Holly Littrell, Defendants.
Matthew C. Berger, Esq., Michael S. Dove, Esq., and Rick J.
Halbur, Esq., Gislason & Hunter LLP, counsel for
Jeffrey Littrell, pro se, and Holly Littrell, pro se,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DONOVAN W. FRANK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff John Deere Financial,
f.s.b.'s (“John Deere”) Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. No. 76.) For the reasons discussed below, the
Court grants the motion.
January 15, 2008, Defendant Bio-Mass Renewable Technologies
(“BRT”) entered into an agreement with John Deere
to become an authorized merchant of John Deere. Defendants
Jeffrey Littrell and Jeff Buresh were part-owners of BRT. In
addition, Jeffrey and Holly Littrell separately opened
farm-plan accounts with John Deere. The farm-plan accounts
allowed the Littrells to purchase inventory on credit. Under
the Farm Plan Agreement for the Littrells' farm-plan
accounts, the Littrells each agreed to pay “all amounts
charged by the use of the Account, plus Finance
Charges.” (Doc. No. 114 ¶ 3, Ex. A (the
“Farm Plan Agreements”).) The Littrells accepted the
terms of the Farm Plan Agreements by any authorized use of
the accounts. (Id.)
April and May 2013, the Littrells purchased almost $450, 000
worth of inventory through BRT with their farm-plan accounts.
(Doc. No. 19-1.) The Littrells never paid those charges.
(Doc. No. 79 (“Dunek Aff.”) ¶ 4.) John Deere
alleges that the Littrells are liable for $511, 150.11, which
represents the unpaid invoices, plus additional accrued
interest, fees and charges through November 17, 2014.
(Id. ¶ 2.)
January 7, 2015, John Deere filed suit against BRT, the
Littrells, and Jeff Buresh. As relevant here, John Deere
brought a claim for breach of contract against the Littrells
for their unpaid accounts. John Deere now moves for summary
judgment against the Littrells.
judgment is appropriate if the “movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Courts must view the evidence, and the
inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence, in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Weitz
Co., LLC v. Lloyd's of London, 574 F.3d 885, 892
(8th Cir. 2009). However, “[s]ummary judgment procedure
is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut,
but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a
whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.'”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).
moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank v. Magna
Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving
party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the
record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v.
Cty. of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A
party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256
John Deere is Entitled ...