United States District Court, D. Minnesota
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
E. RAU, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
above-captioned case comes before the undersigned on Tuan Anh
Dang's (“Dang”) Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus (the “Petition”) under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 [Doc. No. 1]. In his Petition, Dang seeks release from
custody, an injunction, and attorney's fees. This matter
has been referred for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C) and District of Minnesota
Local Rule 72.1. For the reasons stated below, the Court
recommends denying the Petition as moot, and dismissing the
filed his Petition on June 20, 2017. As of that date,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) had
been unable to remove him to Vietnam (his home country) or
any other country. (Pet. ¶ 15). Dang seeks release, an
injunction, and attorney's fees. (Id. at 7).
their response, Respondents assert that this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition because Dang
was released on July 26, 2017, subject to certain conditions.
See (Resp. to Pet., “Resp.”) [Doc. No. 6
at 1]; see also (Ex. 1, Attached to Decl.) [Doc. No.
7-1]. No reply to the Response was filed.
See (Order Dated July 10, 2017) [Doc. No. 5].
alien who has been ordered removed must be removed within
ninety days, the “removal period, ” subject to
certain exceptions. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). An alien
who is considered inadmissible based on his or her criminal
convictions “may be detained beyond the removal period,
and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of
supervision in [§ 1231(a)(3)].” Id.
§ 1231(a)(6). The United States Supreme Court held that
§ 1231(a)(6) contains “an implicit
‘reasonable time' limitation, the application of
which is subject to federal-court review.” Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001). In
Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that an alien may
only be kept in custody for six months subject to a final
removal order unless there is a significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at
701; see also Bah v. Cangemi, 489 F.Supp.2d 905, 916
(D. Minn. 2007) (Schiltz, J.).
release implicates this Court's subject matter
jurisdiction. See (Resp. at 1-2). “Article III
of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of
the federal courts to actual, ongoing cases and
controversies.” Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722,
723 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “This case-or-controversy
requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial
proceedings, trial and appellate . . . . The parties must
continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the
lawsuit.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7
(1998) (omission in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In other words, “throughout the litigation,
the plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with, an
actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “When,
during the course of litigation, the issues presented in a
case lose their life because of . . . a change in
circumstances . . . and a federal court can no longer grant
effective relief, the case is considered moot.”
Ali, 419 F.3d at 723 (second omission in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted). When a case is moot under
Article III, it must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 724.
Dang's release does not automatically render his Petition
moot. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7;
Ali, 419 F.3d at 724. Whether Dang's Petition is
moot “depends on potentially applicable exceptions to
the mootness doctrine.” Sayonkon v. Beniecke,
No. 12-cv-27 (MJD/JJK), 2012 WL 1621149, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr.
17, 2012) (Keyes, Mag. J.), adopted by 2012 WL
1622545 (May 9, 2012) (Davis, C.J.). A petition
should not be dismissed as moot if: “(1) secondary or
‘collateral' injuries survive after resolution of
the primary injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable
of repetition yet evading review; (3) the defendant
voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but is free
to resume it at any time; or (4) it is a properly certified
class action suit.”
Id. (quoting Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d
1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2002)).