United States District Court, D. Minnesota
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
E. Rau U.S. Magistrate Judge
Samantha Latraille applied for in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) status. See ECF No. 2. That IFP
application is before the Court and must be considered before
any other action may be taken in this matter.
review of that IFP application, this Court concludes that
Latraille qualifies financially for IFP status. That said, an
IFP application will be denied, and an action will be
dismissed, when an IFP applicant has filed a complaint that
fails to state a cause of action on which relief may be
granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);
Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam); Carter v. Schafer, 273 Fed. App'x
581, 582 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[C]ontrary to
plaintiffs' arguments on appeal, the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply to all persons proceeding IFP and
are not limited to prisoner suits, and the provisions allow
dismissal without service.”). In reviewing whether a
complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, this
Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in
the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor. Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.,
511 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2008). Although the factual
allegations in the complaint need not be detailed, they must
be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570. In assessing the
sufficiency of the complaint, the court may disregard legal
conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See
Ashcroft v. tlineIqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Pro se
complaints are to be construed liberally, but they still must
allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.
See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.
allegations are serious, though somewhat vague. She claims
that she has been extorted, slandered, raped, and physically
assaulted in the City of St. Paul over a period of several
years and that “police haven't done anything but
take me to psych ward hospitals.” Compl. at 4. Based on
those allegations, Latraille seeks to bring federal claims
against the ‘Owner of the City of St. Paul.”
only specific federal cause of action gestured
towards by Latraille is for relief under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968.See Compl. at 3 (alleging that
federal-question jurisdiction exists because the claim is for
“extortion, fraud, raquteering [sic],
organized.”). As pleaded, however, Latraille's RICO
claim is not viable. First, “[a] RICO claim must be
pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b)” of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Crest Constr. II, Inc.
v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 353 (8th Cir.2011). None of the
allegations of predicate RICO offenses found in the complaint
are stated with sufficient particularity to clear the Rule
9(b) standard. See Drobnak v. Andersen Corp., 561
F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that under Rule 9(b),
“the complaint must plead the who, what, where, when,
and how of the alleged fraud.” (quotation omitted)).
Second, a plaintiff cannot plead a RICO offense without first
pleading the existence of a RICO enterprise.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), Crest Constr.
II, 660 F.3d at 354-55. No such enterprise is alleged in
the complaint. The RICO claim must therefore be dismissed.
Because repleading of the complaint would not necessarily be
futile, it is recommended that the claim be dismissed without
remaining claims suggested by the complaint - which includes
allegations of slander, invasion of privacy, and physical
assault - each arise under state law. Latraille does not
allege that the parties are of diverse citizenship,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and thus this Court has
jurisdiction over those claims only to the extent that
supplemental jurisdiction is exercised, see 28
U.S.C. § 1367. The Eighth Circuit has made clear that
when all federal claims in a complaint have been dismissed
before trial (as this Court has recommended), the court
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
remaining state-law claims. See Hervey v. Cnty. of
Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711, 726-27 (8th Cir. 2008).
Accordingly, it is also recommended that any state-law claims
be dismissed without prejudice as well.
on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and
proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff Samantha Latraille's application to proceed
in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2] be DENIED.
 Latraille also obliquely mentions that
her “civil rights” have been violated. To the
extent that her complaint references claims brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, those claims fail on the grounds
that she has not alleged how the defendant named to this
action, himself or herself, was directly responsible for, or
was personally involved in, ...