United States District Court, D. Minnesota
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
E. RAU, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Fredrick Dewayne
Hines's (“Hines”) First Motion for
Preliminary Injunction [Doc. No. 18]; Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. No. 49], Hines's Motions to Amend [Doc. No.
68, 80, 97],  and Hines's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (“Second Motion for Preliminary
Injunction”) [Doc. No. 99]. This matter was referred
for the resolution of pretrial matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1.
For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends denying
the Motions for Preliminary Injunction, denying as moot the
Motion to Dismiss, and granting Hines's Motions to Amend.
is a prisoner confined in Minnesota Correctional Facility -
Oak Park Heights (“MCF-OPH”). (Compl.) [Doc. No.
1 ¶ 3]. He alleges that the Minnesota Department of
Corrections (the “DOC”) transferred him from the
Minnesota Correctional Facility in Stillwater
(“MCF-Stillwater”) to MCF-OPH allegedly because
of “bed space.” (Id. ¶¶ 11,
13). Hines nevertheless alleges the real reason he was
transferred was in retaliation for his filing of federal
lawsuits. See (id. ¶¶
11, 41, 60, 105).
alleges inmates assigned to cells near him are located there
in order to intimidate or kill him. See
(id. ¶¶ 18-28, 31, 38, 42, 51, 56, 58, 60,
62-63, 77, 80, 134, 136, 137). Hines alleges that he informed
various MCF-OPH employees about the threats on his life, but
they took no action. (Compl. ¶¶ 29-30, 39, 45,
48-49, 55-56, 92, 121, 131-32). Instead, Hines alleges that
they took further action that endangered his life, such as
trying to move him to various areas within MCF-OPH and
conspiring with each other and with other inmates to kill him
in retaliation for filing a lawsuit. (Id.
¶¶ 31, 34, 37-39, 41-42, 56-57, 60, 63, 65, 68,
106, 108, 141, 147).
result of the actions described above, Hines alleges that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶
151-57). Hines seeks (1) declaratory judgment; (2) an
injunction ordering him to be transferred to one of three
specific facilities, that Defendants and other DOC employees
be prohibited from harassing him, filing false reports,
opening his mail, and retaliating against him; and (3)
compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 32-34).
December 14, 2016, Hines filed a document that the Court
construes as a motion for preliminary injunctive relief.
(First Mot. for Prelim. Inj.). Defendants responded at the
same time they filed their Motion to Dismiss, on April 14,
2016. See (Mem. of Law Opposing Pl.'s Mot. for
Prelim. Injunctive Relief, “Mem. in Opp'n to First
Mot. for Prelim. Inj.”) [Doc. No. 54]. Hines moved for
the appointment of counsel,  and purported to file a motion to
amend the complaint on May 23, 2017, which Defendants opposed
because it contained insufficient information to determine
whether an amended or supplemental complaint would be
appropriate. (Mot. for Appointment of Counsel) [Doc. No. 58];
(Mot. to Amend-68); (Mem. of Law in Resp. to Pl.'s Mot.
to Amend Compl.) [Doc. No. 72]. On June 19, 2017, Hines filed
his Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss. [Doc. No. 78]. On the same day, Hines again moved
to amend his complaint, providing only a list of defendants
and additional exhibits. See (Mot. to Amend-80);
(Ex. List) [Doc. No. 82]. Defendants again opposed
Hines's Motion to Amend because it contained only a list
of Defendants. (Defs.' Mem. of Law in Opp'n to
Pl.'s Mot. (Doc. 80)) [Doc. No. 93]. On September 19,
2017, Hines filed what the Court construes as a third Motion
to Amend, stating that he wants to abandon his previous
attempts to amend his complaint, and seeks amendment on other
grounds, namely adding claims that he was raped at MCF-OPH.
(Mot. to Amend-97). Defendants have not responded to this
most recent filing, likely because it was captioned as a
memorandum, not a motion. On October 13, 2017, Hines filed a
letter that the Court construes as Hines's Second Motion
for Preliminary Injunction, to which Defendants have not yet
had an opportunity to respond. The Court considers the most
recent Motion to Amend and the Second Motion for Preliminary
Injunction sua sponte, even though they are not
short, before the Court are three issues: Hines's
requests for preliminary injunctive relief, Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, and Hines's requests to amend his
Complaint. The Court first addresses Hines's requests for
injunctive relief, then addresses the remaining motions.
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
preliminary injunction is issued “to preserve the
status quo and prevent irreparable harm until the court has
an opportunity to rule on the lawsuit's merits.”
Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir.
1994) (per curiam).
“[W]hether a preliminary injunction should issue
involves consideration of (1) the threat of irreparable harm
to the movant; (2) the state of balance between this harm and
the injury that granting the injunction will inflict upon
other parties litigant; (3) the probability that [the] movant
will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public
Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995)
(alterations in original) (quoting Dataphase Sys. v. C L
Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981)).
“The burden of proving that a preliminary injunction
should be issued rests entirely with the movant.”
Id. “[A] party moving for a preliminary
injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between
the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct
asserted in the complaint.” Devose, 42 F.3d at
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and
“in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief
must always be viewed with great caution because judicial
restraint is especially called for in dealing with the
complex and intractable problems of prison
administration.” Goff, 60 F.3d at 520
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wickner v.
Larson, No. 09-cv-940 (DWF/JJK), 2010 WL 98940, at *2
(D. Minn. Jan. 11, 2010) (Keyes, Mag. J., as adopted by
Frank, J.) (noting that reluctance to grant injunctive relief
“is particularly pronounced where a state prisoner
seeks relief in federal court”).
First Motion for Preliminary Injunction
no single [Dataphase] factor is determinative, the
probability of success factor is the most significant.”
Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d 494, 497
(8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “[A]n injunction cannot issue if there is no
chance of success on the merits.” Mid-Am. Real
Estate Co. v. Iowa Realty Co., Inc., 406 F.3d 969, 972
(8th Cir. 2005); see also CDI Energy Servs. Inc. v. W.
River Pumps, Inc., 567 F.3d 398, 402 (8th Cir. 2009)
(stating that “the absence of a likelihood of success
on the merits strongly suggests that preliminary injunctive
relief should be denied”); McMahon v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 830 F.Supp.2d 674, 688 (D. Minn. 2011)
(Schiltz, J.) (“If a party's likelihood of
succeeding on the merits is sufficiently low, a court may
deny a preliminary injunction even if the other three
factors- irreparable harm, balance of harms, and the public
interest-weigh in the party's favor.”). Under the
Eighth Amendment, ...