United States District Court, D. Minnesota
appearance for Plaintiff.
Osborne for Defendants.
ORDER AND REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
FRANKLIN L. NOEL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MATTER came before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge on October 16, 2017, on Plaintiff Margot
Kapacs' motions for a temporary restraining order (ECF
No. 6), preliminary injunction (ECF No. 30), and for legal
representation (ECF No. 41). This matter was referred to the
undersigned for Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1. See Order,
ECF No. 16. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned
recommends that Plaintiff's motions for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction be
DENIED, and the undersigned orders that
Plaintiff's motion for legal representation is
is the owner and operator of Minnehaha Lofts, LLC.
See ECF No. 32 at 2. Minnehaha Lofts provides
short-term, extended stay accommodations as a hotel
alternative. See ECF No. 7, Ex. 4 at 1. In June
2015, Defendant City of Minneapolis (the “City”)
revoked Plaintiff's rental license for a duplex property
he owns, located at 3324 23rd Avenue South, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, after Plaintiff allegedly failed to respond to the
City's numerous attempts to inspect the property.
See ECF No. 1 ¶ 10. In late 2015 and early
2016, the City denied Plaintiff's applications for rental
licenses at other Minneapolis properties because a City
rental ordinance, § 244.1910(13)(b), prohibits new
rental license applications from being granted if an
applicant had a license revoked within the preceding year.
See generally ECF No. 1. On October 20, 2015, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that Plaintiff failed to
timely appeal the City's rental license revocation, and
the revocation stood as final. See ECF No. 54 at 50.
then filed suit in the Hennepin County, Minnesota, District
Court, challenging, inter alia, the
constitutionality of a City rental ordinance, §
244.1840(3). On November 30, 2015, the Hennepin County
District Court dismissed all, but one of Plaintiff's
claims. See Id. at 28. On August 31, 2016, the
Hennepin County District Court dismissed Plaintiff's
remaining claim. See Id. at 32.
then filed several appeals before the Minnesota Court of
Appeals, contesting the City's rental license revocation,
the City's denial of his rental application for a
property, located at 5420 44th Avenue South, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, and the Hennepin County District Court's
dismissal of his claims. See Id. at 34; see
generally ECF No. 40, Exs. 2, 3. However, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals affirmed the City's rental license
revocation, application denial, and the Hennepin County
District Court's dismissal of his claims. See
generally ECF No. 40, Exs. 2, 3. In addition to state
court litigation, Plaintiff has filed multiple suits, either
active or dismissed, in the District of Minnesota, seeking
federal review of Plaintiff's myriad state court claims
stemming from the City's rental license revocation and
application denial, see e.g., Kapacs v. City of
Minneapolis Regulatory Service, et al., 16-cv-2540
(PJS/BRT), and his divorce. See e.g., Kapacs v.
State of Minnesota, et al., 17-cv-3615 (WMW/HB).
27, 2017, Plaintiff commenced this action, raising claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1961, l8 U.S.C.
§ 1621, and l8 U.S.C. § 1623, alleging violations
of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights.
See generally ECF No. 1. In the instant motions for
a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,
Plaintiff “requests to stay the enforcement of the
[C]ity's decision revoking the rental license [for the
3324 23rd Avenue South, Minneapolis, Minnesota, property] . .
. until the merits of this lawsuit may be decided.” ECF
No. 31 at 1.
oppose the request, arguing that the particular injunctive
relief Plaintiff seeks is barred “under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and . . . by res
judicata” and “Plaintiff cannot establish
irreparable harm or show a likelihood of success on the
merits.” ECF No. 36 at 3.
also requests appointment of counsel because, primarily, he
is financially exhausted and English is his second language.
See generally ECF No. 42. Plaintiff also argues that
courts are increasingly appointing counsel in cases, such as
here, in which there is a potential property interest
deprivation. See Id. at 8. Defendants oppose
Plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel, arguing
that Plaintiff is a serial litigant that the Court should
avoid allocating resources for in this
“frivolous” suit. ECF No. 52 at 2.
MOTIONS FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION (ECF Nos. 6, 30)
Court may grant a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction only upon the movant's proper showing: (1)
that it will suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction;
(2) of a probability of success on the merits; (3) that the
balance of harm favors the injunctive relief sought; and (4)
that the public interest favors granting injunctive relief.
See Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems,
Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113-14 (8th Cir.1981) (en banc);
see e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Filipas, Civil No. 07-4803 (JNE/JJG), 2008 WL 251872 at
*1, n.1 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2008) (reasoning that the
Dataphase factors ordinarily apply to both requests
for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction); see also Aune v. Ludeman, Civil No.
09-15 (JNE/SRN), 2009 WL 1586739, at *2 (D. Minn. June 3,
2009). The movant carries the burden of proof for each
Dataphase factor. See Gelco v. Coniston
Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 418 (8th Cir.1987).“It
frequently is observed that a preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be
granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the
burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). The Court concludes that the
balance of factors here do not favor Plaintiff's request
for injunctive relief.