Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Kruckow v. Merchants Bank

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

December 1, 2017

Dana D. Kruckow, Plaintiff,
Merchants Bank, Rushford State Bank, Craig Schroeder, individually, and Paul A. Kruckow, individually, Defendants.

          Thomas J. Lyons, Jr, Esq., Consumer Justice Center P.A., counsel for Plaintiff.

          Charles E. Nelson, Esq., Kathryn E. Wendt, Esq., and Kirstin D. Kanski, Esq., Lindquist & Vennum LLP, counsel for Defendant Merchants Bank.

          John P. Boyle, Esq., and Sarah E. Doerr, Esq., Moss & Barnett, PA, counsel for Defendant Rushford State Bank.

          Kristin B. Rowell, Esq., Anthony Ostlund Baer & Louwagie P.A., counsel for Defendant Craig Schroeder.

          Charles A. Bird, Esq., and Grant M. Borgen, Esq., Bird, Jacobsen & Stevens, P.C., counsel for Defendant Paul A. Kruckow.




         The plaintiff brought this action after learning in divorce proceedings that her then-husband had obtained a number of loans by allegedly forging her signature as a co-signer. After this revelation, the plaintiff filed suit against the banks, the loan officer, and her husband alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)[1] as well as various state law claims. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint in part. The matter is now before the Court on the plaintiff's motion to reconsider. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the plaintiff's motion.


         The Court assumes the reader's familiarity with the facts of the case, which are more fully set out in the Court's July 19, 2017 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. No. 83). In short, Defendant Paul A. Kruckow allegedly misrepresented Dana's[2] (his then-wife) intent to be jointly liable for various loans from Defendants Merchants Bank and Rushford State Bank. The misrepresentations took many forms, ranging from forging Dana's signature to verbal representation. As relevant here, Paul told Rushford Loan Officer Schroeder that Dana intended to be jointly liable for two loans, which would close on November 15, 2013. Schroeder and Rushford allegedly did not require Paul to submit any documentation to show Dana's intent, including, for example, an application for the loan. Although Paul had worked with Schroeder to borrow money before, who was then at Merchants Bank, Paul had never borrowed money from Rushford up to that point.[3] Based on Paul's verbal representation, Schroeder and Rushford pulled Dana's credit report on November 8, 2013.

         As relevant here, Plaintiff brought claims against Rushford Bank and Schroeder for violating the FCRA and various state laws for the credit report obtained on November 8, 2013, in advance of two loans closed on November 15, 2013. The Court dismissed the claims against Rushford and Schroeder for the November 8, 2013 report because the Court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to plausibly allege that the banks and Schroeder did not have a permissible purpose to obtain the report. Additionally, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims for invasion of privacy, vicarious liability, and civil conspiracy for the November 8, 2013 report based on the conclusion that Rushford Bank and Schroeder had a permissible purpose. Plaintiff now moves the Court to reconsider its dismissal of the claims associated with the November 8, 2013 report.


         “A ‘motion for reconsideration' is not described in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but such a motion is typically construed either as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment or as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment.” Peterson v. The Travelers Indem. Co., 867 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Auto Servs. Co. v. KPMG, LLP, 537 F.3d 853, 855 (8th Cir. 2008)). This Court's Local Rules authorize a party to move for reconsideration after obtaining leave, upon a showing of “compelling circumstances.” D. Minn. LR 7.1(j).[4] Non-final orders are challenged under Rule 60(b). See, e.g., Broadway v. Norris, 193 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that motions under Rule 59(e) are directed only to judgments, “not any non[-]final order, ” and hence a motion for reconsideration directed to a non-final order should be considered under Rule 60(b), which by its terms applies to both judgments and orders); see also Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[M]otions for reconsideration are nothing more than Rule 60(b) motions when directed at non-final orders.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         Under Rule 60(b), the Court may relieve a party from an order due to, among other things, “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). “The rule ‘provides for extraordinary relief which may be granted only upon an adequate showing of exceptional circumstances.'” Jones v. Swanson, 512 F.3d 1045, 1048 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Young, 806 F.2d 805, 806 (8th Cir. 1986)). “Rule 60(b) is a motion grounded in equity and exists to prevent ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.