United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Dana D. Kruckow, Plaintiff,
Merchants Bank, Rushford State Bank, Craig Schroeder, individually, and Paul A. Kruckow, individually, Defendants.
J. Lyons, Jr, Esq., Consumer Justice Center P.A., counsel for
Charles E. Nelson, Esq., Kathryn E. Wendt, Esq., and Kirstin
D. Kanski, Esq., Lindquist & Vennum LLP, counsel for
Defendant Merchants Bank.
P. Boyle, Esq., and Sarah E. Doerr, Esq., Moss & Barnett,
PA, counsel for Defendant Rushford State Bank.
Kristin B. Rowell, Esq., Anthony Ostlund Baer & Louwagie
P.A., counsel for Defendant Craig Schroeder.
Charles A. Bird, Esq., and Grant M. Borgen, Esq., Bird,
Jacobsen & Stevens, P.C., counsel for Defendant Paul A.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DONOVAN W. FRANK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
plaintiff brought this action after learning in divorce
proceedings that her then-husband had obtained a number of
loans by allegedly forging her signature as a co-signer.
After this revelation, the plaintiff filed suit against the
banks, the loan officer, and her husband alleging violations
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”) as well as various state law claims. The
Court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint in part. The
matter is now before the Court on the plaintiff's motion
to reconsider. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
grants the plaintiff's motion.
Court assumes the reader's familiarity with the facts of
the case, which are more fully set out in the Court's
July 19, 2017 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. No. 83). In
short, Defendant Paul A. Kruckow allegedly misrepresented
Dana's (his then-wife) intent to be jointly
liable for various loans from Defendants Merchants Bank and
Rushford State Bank. The misrepresentations took many forms,
ranging from forging Dana's signature to verbal
representation. As relevant here, Paul told Rushford Loan
Officer Schroeder that Dana intended to be jointly liable for
two loans, which would close on November 15, 2013. Schroeder
and Rushford allegedly did not require Paul to submit any
documentation to show Dana's intent, including, for
example, an application for the loan. Although Paul had
worked with Schroeder to borrow money before, who was then at
Merchants Bank, Paul had never borrowed money from Rushford
up to that point. Based on Paul's verbal representation,
Schroeder and Rushford pulled Dana's credit report on
November 8, 2013.
relevant here, Plaintiff brought claims against Rushford Bank
and Schroeder for violating the FCRA and various state laws
for the credit report obtained on November 8, 2013, in
advance of two loans closed on November 15, 2013. The Court
dismissed the claims against Rushford and Schroeder for the
November 8, 2013 report because the Court concluded that
Plaintiff had failed to plausibly allege that the banks and
Schroeder did not have a permissible purpose to obtain the
report. Additionally, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's
claims for invasion of privacy, vicarious liability, and
civil conspiracy for the November 8, 2013 report based on the
conclusion that Rushford Bank and Schroeder had a permissible
purpose. Plaintiff now moves the Court to reconsider its
dismissal of the claims associated with the November 8, 2013
‘motion for reconsideration' is not described in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but such a motion is
typically construed either as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or
amend the judgment or as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from
judgment.” Peterson v. The Travelers Indem.
Co., 867 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Auto
Servs. Co. v. KPMG, LLP, 537 F.3d 853, 855 (8th Cir.
2008)). This Court's Local Rules authorize a party to
move for reconsideration after obtaining leave, upon a
showing of “compelling circumstances.” D. Minn.
LR 7.1(j). Non-final orders are challenged under Rule
60(b). See, e.g., Broadway v. Norris, 193
F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that motions under Rule
59(e) are directed only to judgments, “not any
non[-]final order, ” and hence a motion for
reconsideration directed to a non-final order should be
considered under Rule 60(b), which by its terms applies to
both judgments and orders); see also Elder-Keep v.
Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir. 2006)
(“[M]otions for reconsideration are nothing more than
Rule 60(b) motions when directed at non-final orders.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule 60(b), the Court may relieve a party from an order due
to, among other things, “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1).
“The rule ‘provides for extraordinary relief
which may be granted only upon an adequate showing of
exceptional circumstances.'” Jones v.
Swanson, 512 F.3d 1045, 1048 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Young, 806 F.2d 805, 806 (8th Cir.
1986)). “Rule 60(b) is a motion grounded in equity and
exists to prevent ...