Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, also known as OOIDA; Scott Mitchell Petitioners
United States Department of Transportation; Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration; United States of America Respondents
Submitted: November 15, 2017
of Transportation, National Transportation Safety Board
BENTON, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
SHEPHERD, CIRCUIT JUDGE
who has undergone sleep apnea testing knows it is expensive,
time-consuming, and unpleasant. Owner-Operator Independent
Drivers Association, Inc. ("OOIDA") and Scott
Mitchell (a member of OOIDA) allege that a new administrative
rule means that OOIDA members are being subjected to more of
these onerous tests, which in turn has led to delays, or
worse, denials of medical certification to drive commercial
motor vehicles ("CMV"). They petition us, an
Article III court, to vacate the rule. As an initial step,
they must-among other things-offer evidence that the
challenged rule has caused the harm they allege. OOIDA and
Mitchell have not taken that step. In other words, they have
not proven standing to invoke our jurisdiction, and we
therefore dismiss the petition.
delegated authority to the Department of Transportation
("DOT") to "establish, review, and revise . .
. medical standards for operators of [CMVs] . . . and
requirements for periodic physical examinations of such
operators." 49 U.S.C. § 31149(c)(1)(A). The Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Agency ("FMCSA"), an agency
within the DOT, has long been in charge of exercising that
delegated authority. See e.g., Medical Certification
Requirements as Part of the CDL, 73 Fed. Reg. 73, 096, 73,
096 (Dec. 1, 2008) ("The FMCSA is required by statute to
establish standards for the physical qualifications of
drivers who operate CMVs in interstate commerce.").
to that delegated authority (and others), the FMCSA
promulgated a final rule entitled "Medical
Examiner's Certification Integration." 80 Fed. Reg.
22, 790 (April 23, 2015) ("Rule"). The thrust of the
Rule is efficiency: FMCSA wanted medical examiners to deliver
the results of their examination quicker and electronically
in order to ensure better coordination between the state and
federal agencies that regulate CMV drivers. As part of that
effort, the Rule revised, and made mandatory, the Medical
Examination Report Form ("Revised MER Form") used
to evaluate CMV drivers. The Revised MER Form contained
additional questions, including a question asking the driver
whether he or she has ever been tested for sleep apnea. It
also no longer contained detailed guidance for medical
examiners. Instead, the Advisory Guidance that used to be
attached to the MER Form was moved to an Appendix in the Code
of Federal Regulations.
and Mitchell petitioned the FMCSA for reconsideration of the
Rule. After the petition was denied, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2342(3)(A), they filed for review of the Rule in this
court, arguing that its promulgation violated the
Administrative Procedure Act and other statutory
requirements. They assert that due to the Rule "OOIDA
members have suffered real, personalized harm" because
they "have been subjected to unnecessary and expensive
testing . . . particularly in connection with sleep
disorders" and such testing has led to denials of
medical certification to drive CMVs in some cases.
Government's primary contention is that both OOIDA and
Mitchell lack standing to bring this claim. We begin, and
III commands that federal courts intervene only in
"Cases" or "Controversies." U.S. Const.,
Art. III, § 2. Standing is a doctrine that illuminates
the contours of our constitutional authority by
"identify[ing] those disputes which are appropriately
resolved through the judicial process." Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014)
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992)). Because of this, it is axiomatic that a
party seeking to litigate in federal courts must have
"(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3)
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct.
1540, 1547 (2016).
appellate review of administrative action-as is requested
here-does not alter the requirements of standing.
See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on
Statutory Standing, 42 Duke L.J. 1219, 1226 (1993)
("[T]he conclusion [reached by the Supreme Court] that
Article III limits congressional power can hardly be regarded
as remarkable"). Thus, we have said that "parties
seeking direct appellate review of an agency action must
prove each element of standing as if they were moving for
summary judgment in a district court." Iowa League
of Cities v. EPA., 711 F.3d 844, 869 (8th Cir. 2013).
Just like at the summary judgment stage, we look for
"specific facts supported by affidavit or other
evidence." Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n,
Inc. v. Dep't of Transportation, 831 F.3d 961, 966
(8th Cir. 2016) ("OOIDA I"). Simply ...