United States District Court, D. Minnesota
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AS
DONOVAN W. FRANK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court upon Defendant St. Mary's
Regional Health Center's objections (Doc. No. 74) and
Plaintiff Corey Bevin's objections (Doc. No. 77) to
Magistrate Judge Becky R. Thorson's November 13, 2017
Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 71). In the Report and
Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Thorson recommended denying
St. Mary's motion to dismiss and dismissing the claims
against Randy Hodges for failure to prosecute. St. Mary's
objects to the Report and Recommendation insofar as it
recommends denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction,
insufficient process, and insufficient service of process.
Additionally, Bevins objects to the Report and Recommendation
insofar as it recommends dismissing the claims against
Court has conducted a de novo review of the record,
including a review of the arguments and submissions of
counsel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local
Rule 72.2(b). The factual background for the above-entitled
matter is clearly set forth in the Report and Recommendation
and is incorporated by reference here. The Court notes
particular facts relevant to this Order below.
8, 2017, Bevins filed pro se his Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. No. 24) relating to his incarceration at
Becker County Jail, including two, seven-day admissions to
St. Mary's. As relevant here, Bevins alleges that St.
Mary's acted grossly negligent in its care and that that
various state actors interfered with his treatment at St.
Mary's. For example, Bevins alleges that his symptoms
were exacerbated because jail staff denied Bevins access to
Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Thorson
recommended denying St. Mary's motion to dismiss for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. Magistrate Judge Thorson
concluded that Bevins had adequately alleged a claim against
St. Mary's for deliberate indifference in violation of
the Eighth Amendment, which confers the Court with
subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In
concluding that St. Mary's was a state actor, the
magistrate judge inferred a contract between Becker County
and St. Mary's. On review, St. Mary's submitted a
declaration that it has no contract with Becker County. (Doc.
No. 75). St. Mary's argues that, as a result, it is not a
state actor and the Court therefore does not have
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the
Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(1). To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the party
asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proof. V S Ltd.
P'ship v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 235
F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000). “Subject-matter
jurisdiction is a threshold requirement which must be assured
in every federal case.” Kronholm v. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990).
12(b)(1) motion may challenge a plaintiff's complaint
either on its face or on the factual truthfulness of its
averments. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724,
729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). When a defendant brings a facial
challenge-that is, even if the allegations were true, they
lack an essential element for jurisdiction-a court reviews
the pleadings alone and assumes the allegations are true.
Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993);
accord Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6. In a factual
challenge to jurisdiction, the court may consider matters
outside the pleadings and weigh the accuracy of the
allegations. Titus, 4 F.3d at 593; accord
Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6.
St. Mary's was not a state actor, the Court concludes
that it still has supplemental jurisdiction over the claims.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), a federal court has
supplemental jurisdiction “over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.” Thus, a federal court may properly
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that
“derive from a common nucleus of operative fact”
as the federal claims. City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll.
of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997).
Bevins's claims against St. Mary's arise from the
same common nucleus of operative facts as the federal claims.
Bevins claims that both St. Mary's and state actors acted
with gross negligence while he was being treated at St.
Mary's. Because these claims arise from the same nucleus
of facts-his treatment at St. Mary's-the Court has
supplemental jurisdiction. The Court therefore overrules St.
Mary's objection based on subject-matter jurisdiction.
Service of Process
Judge Thorson also recommended denying St. Mary's motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient
process, and for insufficient service of process for failure
to properly name and serve St. Mary's. Bevins named
“Essentia-St. Mary's Hospital” and served
Peter Jacobson, President of St. Mary's and Senior Vice
President of Innovis Health LLC, d/b/a Essentia Health West.
(Doc. No. 56 ¶ 5.) Bevins was treated at St. Mary's,
which employs the staff, but the physicians at St. Mary's
were likely employed by Innovis. (Id.) In the Report
and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Thorson concluded that
Bevins's mistake was a mere misnomer.
Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's analysis and
adopts it here. St. Mary's essentially argues that both
St. Mary's and Innovis could be liable for Bevins's
claim and therefore service on “Essentia” was
ineffective. Because Bevins is a pro se plaintiff, without
the benefit of discovery, and received care at the hospital,
the Court concludes that St. Mary's motion to dismiss
should be denied. It may be the case that Bevins should name
both Innovis and St. Mary's as defendants, but the Court
declines to resolve that issue at this juncture.