In the Matter of: Tracy Elizabeth Thompson and o/b/o Minor Child, Appellant,
John Patrick Schrimsher, Respondent.
of Appeals Office of Appellate Courts
Bradford Colbert, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
Cathryn C. Schmidt, Victoria A. Elsmore, Amy M. Kurpinski,
Collins, Buckley, Sauntry & Haugh, P.L.L.P., Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for respondent.
Elizabeth J. Richards, Brianna H. Boone, Minnesota Coalition
for Battered Women, Saint Paul, Minnesota;
Alexander, Standpoint, Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Caroline S. Palmer, Minnesota Coalition Against Sexual
Assault, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Kristine Lizdas, Battered
Women's Justice Project, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
amici curiae Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women,
Standpoint, Minnesota Coalition Against Sexual Assault, and
Battered Women's Justice Project.
Henschel, Henschel Moberg Goff P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota;
L. Olson, Edina, Minnesota;
Michael D. Dittberner, Linder, Dittberner, Bryant &
Winter, Ltd., Edina, Minnesota; and Mary Catherine Lauhead,
Law Offices of Mary Catherine Lauhead, Saint Paul, Minnesota,
for amicus curiae Minnesota Chapter of the American Academy
of Matrimonial Lawyers.
Under the Domestic Abuse Act, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01
(2016), a petitioner establishes "domestic abuse"
by showing that "physical harm, bodily injury, or
assault" has occurred, irrespective of when it occurred.
Upon that showing, the district court has the discretion,
based on all of the relevant circumstances, to grant or deny
a petition for an order for protection.
district court did not abuse its discretion by granting
appellant's petition for an order for protection against
September 2015, appellant Tracy Thompson petitioned for an
order for protection ("OFP") against respondent
John Schrimsher. The petition was based largely on
allegations of physical abuse from summer 2011 through spring
2012. We granted review to decide whether past physical
abuse, standing alone, can support the issuance of an OFP
under the Domestic Abuse Act ("the Act"), Minn.
Stat. § 518B.01 (2016). Because the plain language of
the Act imposes no temporal ...