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Shoots v. iQor Holdings US, Inc.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

March 27, 2018

Paris Shoots, Jonathan Bell, Maxwell Turner, Tammy Hope, Phillipp Ostrovsky, Brenda Brandt, Anissa Sanders, Najai McCutcheon, and Michael Chavez, on behalf of themselves, the Proposed Rule 23 Classes, and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
iQor Holdings U.S. Inc., Defendant.

          Unsealed April 10, 2018 Carl F. Engstrom, Rachhana T. Srey, and Robert L. Schug, Nichols Kaster, PLLP, 80 South Eighth Street, Suite 4600, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402, Brian T. Rochel, Douglas L. Micko, Marisa C. Katz, and Vildan A. Teske, Teske Micko Katz Kitzer & Rochel, PLLP, 222 South Ninth Street, Suite 4050, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402, for Plaintiffs.

          Brian T. Benkstein, Charles McNeill Elmer, Elizabeth S. Gerling, and Gina K. Janeiro, Jackson Lewis P.C., 150 South Fifth Street, Suite 3500, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402, Robert James Lee, Shon Morgan, and Viola Trebicka, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 865 South Figueroa Street, Los Angeles, California 90017, for Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge

         I. INTRODUCTION

         This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Decertification of the Conditionally Certified Class under the Fair Labor Standards Act [Doc. No. 347] and Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 [Doc. No. 353]. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's Motion is denied in part and granted in part, and Plaintiffs' Motion is denied.

         II. BACKGROUND

         A. Procedural Background

         This lawsuit arises from Plaintiffs' employment as call center workers, or “contact center agents, ” (“CCAs” or “agents”), for Defendant iQor Holdings U.S. Inc. (“Defendant” or “iQor”). In their Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint (“FAC”) [Doc. No. 336], Plaintiffs Paris Shoots, Jonathan Bell, Maxwell Turner, Tammy Hope, Phillipp Ostrovsky, Brenda Brandt, Anissa Sanders, Najai McCutcheon, and Michael Chavez, all current or former employees of iQor, seek to represent a class and collective of CCAs.[1] In particular, Plaintiffs assert Rule 23 state-law claims under the laws of Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Arizona, Colorado, North Carolina, South Carolina, and California seeking to recover unpaid wages, and a nationwide collective action claim for unpaid overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“the FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et. seq. (FAC ¶¶ 121-375.) Plaintiffs also assert a California class action for failure to provide itemized wage statements and for violation of California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. (Id. ¶¶ 376-89.) Finally, Plaintiffs assert a class action for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. (Id. ¶¶ 217- 26, 344-46.)

         In October 2015, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to conditionally certify the FLSA collective action and denied Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (See Oct. 19, 2015 Order [Doc. No. 142] (“Conditional Certification Order”) Specifically, under the FLSA, the Court conditionally certified a collective for “all current or former iQor contact center agents who used TimeQey for timekeeping purposes at any time during the relevant period, ” that is, the three years prior to the commencement of the action, (id. at 51), and who worked more than 40 hours during any workweek in that period, (Second Amended Class Action Complaint [Doc. No. 121], ¶ 174). Approximately 3, 500 individuals opted into the FLSA collective action. (Decl. of Robert L. Schug in Supp. of Pls.' Mot. for Class Certification Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 [Doc. No. 363] (“Schug Decl.”), ¶ 2.) The parties have completed fact discovery, and Plaintiffs now move for class certification, while iQor moves to decertify the conditional FLSA collective.

         B. Defendant's Organization

         Defendant provides outsourced customer contact services to companies in a variety of industries across the United States. (Decl. of Shon Morgan in Supp. of Mot. to Decertify the FLSA Class [Doc. No. 351] (“Morgan Decl.”), Ex. A [Doc. No. 351-1] (Argiropoulos Decl. ¶ 4).)[2] It operates approximately 22 call centers (referred to by iQor as “contact centers”) in the United States. (Id., Ex. D-1 [Doc. No. 351-3] (30(b)(6) Dep. at 64).) Defendant currently employs more than 8, 000 CCAs in its contact centers, and pays them on an hourly basis. (Id., Ex. A (Argiropoulos Decl. ¶ 5).) The typical duties of a CCA are to receive incoming calls from customers of iQor's clients, or to make outgoing calls on behalf of iQor's clients, usually to debtors. (Schug Decl., Ex. 1 (30(b)(6) Dep. at 78-79).) Some CCAs do not receive or make calls, but instead perform administrative tasks or act as “floor support” for other CCAs. (See Morgan Decl., Ex. C-6 [Doc. No. 351-2] (Decl. of Lasonya Brown at 24, ¶ 3), Ex. C-7 (Decl. of Teshawn Brown at 28, ¶ 5), Ex. C-35 (Decl. of Kimberly Worthy at 151, ¶ 4).)

         CCAs begin as Trainees and progress to agent positions as Trainee Agent, Junior Agent, Agent, Senior Agent, and Specialist. (Schug Decl., Ex. 1 (30(b)(6) Dep. at 78- 90).) Each CCA is placed into a unit of approximately 14 staff, supervised on-site by an Assistant Vice President (“AVP”). (Morgan Decl., Ex. A (Argiropoulos Decl. ¶ 6).) Each AVP reports to a Managing AVP or to a Vice President. (Id.) Vice President is a director-level position that may be responsible for an entire client relationship or, for larger clients, a subset of the client relationship. (Schug Decl., Ex. 1 (30(b)(6) Dep. at 98).)

         Before a CCA begins work with iQor, the CCA signs an offer letter describing the basic terms of employment, including the hourly rate of compensation. (Def.'s Opp'n Mem. to Pls.' Mot. for Class Certification Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 [Doc. No. 398] (“Def.'s R. 23 Opp'n Mem.”), at 8-9; Schug Decl., Ex. 1 (30(b)(6) Dep. at 110-11), Sealed Ex. 23 [Doc. No. 372] (Bell Employment Agreement).) The offer letter that Plaintiff Jonathan Bell received, entitled “Employment Agreement, ” instructed him to “confirm [his] acceptance of this Agreement by clicking on the link below.” (Schug Decl., Sealed Ex. 23 (Bell Employment Agreement at IQOR_00000782).) The offer letter set forth the start date, title, function, location, and hourly wage of the CCA position. (E.g., id. at IQOR_00000781.) In addition, the offer letter contained a merger clause that provided, “This Agreement represents our mutual complete understanding of your employment terms at iQor and supersedes any prior agreement (oral or written) that you may have, but does not constitute an agreement for employment for any specific period of time.” (E.g., id. at IQOR_00000781-82.)

         Of the approximately 8, 000 CCAs that iQor currently employs, fewer than 500 work remotely from their homes. (Id., Ex. 1 (30(b)(6) Dep. at 106).) The majority come to iQor's contact centers for their scheduled shifts. (Morgan Decl., Ex. A-1 (Employee Handbook at 40).) Schedules are set by iQor's project managers, based on anticipated call volume for incoming calls and outcome goals for outgoing calls. (Schug Decl., Ex. 1 (30(b)(6) Dep. at 229-31).) Defendant's employee code of conduct states, “We carefully schedule employee activities, and rely on strict adherence to these schedules to deliver exceptional service to our clients. As such, we expect you to understand your schedule and adhere to it.” (Morgan Decl., Ex. A-2 (Code of Conduct at 3).)

         C. TimeQey

         In mid-2008, iQor began developing TimeQey, a proprietary software program to track CCAs' work time. (Schug Decl., Ex 1 (30(b)(6) Dep. at 113).) Mason Argiropoulos, iQor's Chief Human Resources Officer, testified that the goals of the program were to reward and retain more productive CCAs by compensating them at a higher rate of pay for all productive time, and to increase profits by reducing the cost to the company of employing less productive CCAs. (See Id. at 119-21.) TimeQey's precise tracking also gave CCAs increased freedom to take unscheduled breaks for personal reasons, subject to manager approval. (Morgan Decl., Ex. A (Argiropoulos Decl. ¶ 7), Ex. A-3 (“Tracking Your Time” at IQOR_00000196).)

         Defendant began implementing TimeQey in its contact centers in 2009. (Morgan Decl., Ex. A (Argiropoulos Decl. ¶ 7).) Before that, iQor had tracked CCAs' time using a standard punch-in, punch-out mechanism. (Schug Decl., Ex. 1 (30(b)(6) Dep. at 122- 24).) Defendant asserts that CCAs were given the information they needed to use the new TimeQey system during the transition, and that CCAs hired after the transition were trained to use it, citing informational hand-outs and presentations. (See Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Decertify the FLSA Class [Doc. No. 350] (“Def.'s Decert. Mem.”), at 8; Morgan Decl., Ex. A (Argiropoulos Decl. ¶¶ 13-14), Ex. A-3 (“Tracking Your Time” at IQOR_00000195-97), Ex. A-4 (TimeQey PowerPoint at 37-42).) But some CCAs stated that they did not receive training on the TimeQey system before they started using it, and had to learn on their own. (See Morgan Decl., Ex. D-9 (McCants Dep. at 14), Ex. D-11 (Pryor Dep. at 26-27, 32-33); Decl. of Shon Morgan in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot for Class Certification Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 [Doc. No. 399] (“Morgan Opp'n Decl.”), Ex. 3 [Doc. No. 399-1] (Dorsey Dep. at 34-35).)

         TimeQey categorized a CCA's time according to the type of work performed on the CCA's work computer.[3] Time recorded as “core” work-including time spent placing and receiving calls, inputting information from calls, and waiting for calls in “ready” mode-was automatically considered compensable. (Morgan Decl., Ex. A (Argiropoulos Decl. ¶ 8), Ex. A-3 (“Tracking Your Time” at IQOR_00000195-96).) Other time was recorded as presumptively noncompensable; after two minutes of computer inactivity, or “idle time, ” the TimeQey system logged the CCA out and began recording the time as an unpaid break.[4] (Morgan Decl., Ex. A-3 (“Tracking Your Time” at IQOR_00000196-97); Schug Decl., Sealed Ex. 19 [Doc. No. 368] (TimeQey User Tutorial at IQOR_00000117).) CCAs could request retroactive “manual adjustments” from their supervising AVPs for periods that TimeQey had recorded as noncompensable or “idle” time, but only for certain tasks that iQor categorized as “‘Non-Core' Work Time.” (Morgan Decl., Ex. A-3 (“Tracking Your Time” at IQOR_00000195).) Compensable non-core work included meetings, team huddles, training, downtime due to system outages, and work performed off the phone. (Id.; Schug Decl., Sealed Ex. 19 (TimeQey User Tutorial at IQOR_00000117).)

         The TimeQey user tutorial instructed CCAs to “include detailed information in reference to why you are requesting time” when submitting requests for manual adjustments to a supervising AVP. (Schug Decl., Sealed Ex. 19 (TimeQey User Tutorial at IQOR_00000122).) Defendant told AVPs to make sure that requests for manual adjustments were “valid and accurate” before approving them. (Id. at IQOR_00000137.) The tutorial also cautioned CCAs that “BREAK time due to inactivity is not reimbursable-please do not request to be paid.” (Id. at IQOR_00000120.)

         In addition to categorizing time as core work time or unpaid break time (which might later be adjusted to non-core work time), TimeQey also categorized time spent logging in and logging out of the computer, as well as “not ready” time, which took place after logging in, but before clicking the “ready” button to start calls. (Schug Decl., Ex. 1 (30(b)(6) Dep. at 180-83), Ex. 15 [Doc. No. 363-15] (Steward Report ¶ 10); Morgan Decl., Ex. A-4 (TimeQey PowerPoint at 38).) For the first four years of TimeQey's use, iQor did not compensate CCAs for log-in time, although computer problems sometimes caused log-in to take longer than expected. (Schug Decl., Ex. 1 (30(b)(6) Dep. at 180- 83).) In 2013, after it had observed considerable differences in log-in time depending on a particular CCA's computer applications, iQor began compensating log-in time after the first two minutes. (Id.; Sealed Ex. 19 (TimeQey User Tutorial at IQOR_00000117).)

         The typical work day for a CCA during the relevant period included an unpaid 30-minute meal break and two short paid breaks, which were scheduled at particular times. (Schug Decl., Ex. 1 (30(b)(6) Dep. at 204), Ex. 6 [Doc. No. 363-6] (Lehtio Dep. at 16); Morgan Decl., Ex. D-2 (Bell Dep. at 34-37), Ex. D-4 (Dorsey Dep. at 58-61); Ex D-5 (Evenski Dep. at 54-57), Ex. D-6 (Gonzalez Dep. at 50-53).) In nearly all of iQor's United States contact centers, CCAs received five minutes of paid break time for every four hours worked.[5] (Morgan Decl., Ex. A-3 (“Tracking Your Time” at IQOR_00000196).) Defendant explained to its CCAs, “[Y]ou can use that paid Break Time [i.e., five minutes, every four hours] for restroom breaks or other activities.” (Id.) With the introduction of TimeQey, iQor gave CCAs the ability to request additional unpaid breaks from their supervising AVP. (Id. (“Agents may take as many breaks as they want at any time they wish for as long as they choose, after securing permission from their Supervisor.”).) From their computers, CCAs could request breaks, subject to AVP approval. (Morgan Decl., Ex. A-4 (TimeQey PowerPoint at 39).)

         In actual practice, however, several CCAs testified that iQor discouraged unscheduled breaks. (Morgan Decl., Ex. D-2 (Bell Dep. at 35-37 (“They expressed to us that they wanted us to take [breaks] at certain times of the day.”)), Ex. D-4 (Dorsey Dep. at 33 (“They don't always want you to take the break. . . . Because they want everybody on the phone.”)), Ex. D-9 (McCants Dep. at 17 (“[O]ur supervisor is always on us about breaks.”)).) But other CCAs testified that they were routinely allowed to take unscheduled breaks. (Id., Ex. D-5 (Evenski Dep. at 62-63), Ex. D-15 (Williams Dep. at 46-49); see also Ex. C (CCA Decls.).) Defendant evaluated CCAs based on adherence to their work schedules, (Schug Decl., Ex. 6 (Lehtio Dep. at 16-21), and scheduling was based, in part, on forecasts of call volume. (Id., Ex. 1 (30(b)(6) Dep. at 229-31.) Typically, CCAs were not allowed to leave the premises except during their meal breaks. (Morgan Decl., Ex. D-2 (Bell Dep. at 72), Ex. D-5 (Evenski Dep. at 71, 75).)

         Due to technical problems with TimeQey, time “gaps” sometimes appeared in CCAs' time logs. One such problem occurred if a CCA requested manual adjustment for a period that overlapped with an unpaid break and a paid break in TimeQey, and the AVP then denied the adjustment. (Schug Decl., Ex. 1 (30(b)(6) Dep. at 298-300).) The TimeQey system would cause the overlapping paid time to disappear. (Id.) Another technical problem occurred when CCAs switched computers due to technical difficulties, after having already logged in on another computer. (Id., Ex. 5 [Doc. No. 363-5] (Husby Dep. at 44-45).) TimeQey could receive information about the same CCA from both computers, causing time gaps. (Id.) Defendant presents evidence that some of these gaps do not reflect compensable time, but were caused by a delay between the end of a CCA's shift and the AVP's approval of manual adjustments for the day. (See Morgan Decl., Ex. B-1 (Revised White Rep. at 5-9).)

         CCAs routinely requested manual adjustments for work performed away from the computer at trainings, meetings, or team huddles, or when technical difficulties caused downtime. (E.g. id., Ex. D-2 (Bell Dep. at 84 (adjustment for downtime caused by computer problems)), Ex. D-4 (Dorsey Dep. at 54-56 (adjustment for meeting).) Many reported that their requests were denied or they were discouraged from submitting requests. (See Schug Decl., Ex. 11 [Doc. No. 363-11] (Selected Pls.' Interrogatory Responses, at ECF p. 10 (“Plaintiff recalls that the response [to adjustment requests] was typically ‘no'.”), ECF p. 28 (“Plaintiff felt discouraged from submitting requests because they often denied [sic].”), ECF p. 40 (“Plaintiff felt discouraged from making time adjustment requests because some supervisors were more apt than other supervisors to approve time adjustments.”), ECF p. 64 (“Plaintiff felt discouraged from requesting time adjustments because her supervisors had a negative attitude regarding these requests.”).) Other CCAs testified that the approval or denial of their requests depended upon the supervising AVP for the particular shift. (See id., Ex. D-2 (Bell Dep. at 2637), Ex. D-11 (Pryor Dep. at 50, 93).) Some CCAs testified that most or all of their adjustment requests were approved. (See id., Ex. D-14 (Ward Dep. at 72-73), Ex. D-15 (Williams Dep. at 35).)[6] Others stated that adjustment requests for short periods, such as a few minutes, were discouraged. (Id., Ex. D-3 (Blomquist Dep. at 35-36), Ex. D-6 (Gonzalez Dep. at 51).) But others stated that they could adjust periods as short as one or two minutes. (Id., Ex. D-2 (Bell Dep. at 60), Ex. D-5 (Evenski Dep. at 79-80).)

         D. Plaintiffs' Claims

         Plaintiffs claim that iQor unlawfully withheld earned wages using TimeQey. They assert that FLSA regulations required iQor to compensate CCAs for the entire continuous workday, except for bona fide meal breaks, and to pay them for short rest breaks. (Pls.' Mem. of Law in Opp'n to iQor's Mot. to Decertify the FLSA Class [Doc. No. 403] (Pls.' Decert. Opp'n Mem.”) at 26-27, 30.) Plaintiffs also argue that iQor's employment offer letters represent employment contracts creating an obligation to compensate CCAs, at the stated rate, for all hours worked. (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pls.' Mot. for Class Certification Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 [Doc. No. 354] (“Pls.' R. 23 Mem.”) at 31.)

         Plaintiffs also claim that iQor has violated the overtime requirements of the FLSA. Because iQor unlawfully excluded some hours from compensable work time, Plaintiffs assert, CCAs who actually worked more than 40 hours in a week did not receive due overtime wages. (FAC ¶¶ 334-43.)

         Plaintiffs also claim that iQor has unlawfully deprived them of straight-time wages under the laws of seven states, overtime wages under the laws of six states, and minimum wages under California law. (Id. ¶¶ 227-333, 347-71.) Plaintiffs argue that the offer letters gave CCAs the substantive right to be compensated at the agreed-upon rate for every hour worked, but that TimeQey shaved away parts of those hours in violation of state laws. (Id.; Pls.' R. 23 Mem. at 20-27.)[7]

         Finally, Plaintiffs claim that iQor's violations were willful because iQor knew that TimeQey was unlawfully depriving CCAs of earned wages. (Pls.' R. 23 Mem. at 18-20, 35-36.) Plaintiffs point to an investigation by the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (“Minnesota DOL”) which, although finding “no evidence of minimum wage violations, ” informed iQor as early as 2009 that Minnesota law requires compensation for rest breaks shorter than 20 minutes. (See Schug Decl., Sealed Ex. 42 (2009 Minn. DOL Letter), Sealed Ex. 43 (2013 Minn. DOL Letter).) In July 2013, in response to a client request for additional call center work, an iQor Human Resources officer asked Argiropoulos “Is there a reason why we are not paying for breaks? According to Dept[.] of Labor any breaks given under 20 minutes should be paid.” (See id., Ex. 29 (July 2013 Email Chain at IQORJL_0016328).) Argiropoulos testified that he could not recall whether this question caused him any concern, nor could he recall whether he even responded to the email. (Id., Ex. 3 (Argiropoulos Dep. at 54-55).) In addition, internal iQor communications among management in January 2015-shortly after iQor discontinued the practice of recording computer inactivity as unpaid break time-state, “Some history: the old way on TimeQey, was less compliant to [sic] labor law.” (See id., Sealed Ex. 35 (Jan. 2015 Email Chain at IQORJL_0107705).)

         In addition, CCAs and at least one AVP submitted approximately 70 internal complaints about under-reported hours and unpaid break time due to issues with TimeQey. (See id., Sealed Ex. 17 (Complaint Log).) Argiropoulos could not recall receiving the complaints, making any changes to TimeQey or iQor's policies as a result of the complaints, or initiating any investigation into the employees' complaints. (Id., Ex. 3 (Argiropoulos Dep. at 26-30).) The following complaints are illustrative of many concerning lost time and possible labor violations:

We were informed today that we will be converting to a new system in which we will not be paid for our breaks due to we are not “logged into the system.” Please review the statutes set by the Minnesota [DOL] . . . which states that all breaks under 20 minutes must be included in working hours. (Minnesota employee, Feb. 9, 2009) (Id., Sealed Ex. 17 (Complaint Log at 2).)
[C]ould you please fix the system[?] [I]nactive mode keeps going out every 1 minute and it's causing us to lose time. (Arizona employee, August 19, 2009) (Id. at 3).
When I get logged out after 2 min of inactivity and the screen goes black but then log back on within 10 secs[, ] does the system not pay me for 10 secs or does it round up to one min[?] (Minnesota employee, Nov. 18, 2009) (Id. at 4.)
PAY U.S. FOR BREAKS. (Ohio employee, Jan. 18, 2010) (Id. at 4).
The company implemented a new rule regarding paid break time. We will only get paid for taking a 10 minute break in our 8 hour work day. So that basically means I have to work steadfast for 7 hours and 50 minutes straight. (Arizona employee, Jan. 17, 2012) (Id. at 9).
I am following up with a conversation that I had yesterday with my VP/SVP regarding the new [TimeQey]. I checked with the state of Mn yesterday regarding allowed break times-the Dept[.] of Labor in Mn. The rep at the Dept[.] of Labor read . . . Mn rules Chapter 5200.0120 Sub Part 1. She quoted the following: Rest periods of less than 20 minutes may not be deducted from total hours (every 4 hours). I want to make sure that we are doing this legally and not in any violation of state law. As an AVP, I know I represent the company at a management level and want to make sure that what we are doing is legal and correct. The rep at the state of Mn indicated that it was illegal and that we could not limit to 5 min breaks for every 4 hours worked. (Minnesota AVP, Jan. 26, 2012) (Id. at 10).
The system will log us out even if we are sitting at our computers and charge us unpaid breaks whether or not we get right back in. This caused me to lose 3.36 hours last pay period that I have not found out if I am even getting paid for which is wrong. Secondly, the new “5” min paid breaks are ridiculous. According to state labor laws every 4 hours of work time we are supposed to get “enough time to use the restroom.” I am not sure about how you feel[, ] but personally[, ] 5 min isn't enough time to get to the restroom here and pull my pants down. (Minnesota employee, Feb. 22, 2012) (Id. at 11).
Just wishing to send out a heads up about the Charleston, SC iQor. In reading about the corporate policies, I can't help but notice that this location is in violation of rules set for the benefit of the rank and file employees, pertaining to breaks allowed. The allotted time for breaks continues to shrink here. (South Carolina employee, May 21, 2012) (Id. at 13).
I am writing to you with a very big concern about Time[Q]ey. I have studied it very closely and it seems as though we are not getting paid the time we are actually working. On an average, we are getting shorted 10 minutes per day. . . . I am very concerned about this and request a formal investigation take place regarding the Time[Q]ey software. (Minnesota employee, Sept. 19, 2012) (Id. at 14).
Mr. Merritt, I am asking that the TimeQey be looked at. I write all my hours worked (down to the minute) as well as all my breaks. And every day I lose minutes some up to 14 minutes a day, for no reason that I do not get paid. If you do a census and ask all employees[, ] they will say the same thing. . . . I have brought this to my supervisor many times, and I am still losing time worked pay. Something in this system is just not right. (Arizona employee, Dec. 28, 2012) (Id. at 15).
I have a concern. The wait break times to log you off are too long. I [am] on medication and the wait becomes too long to where it hurts me. It is not good to hold your inner movements to wait for break to be approved. (Arizona employee, Jan. 16, 2014) (Id. at 20).
Aren't short breaks supposed to be paid? Per the FLSA shorter breaks we are provided we are supposed to be paid for our entire breaks that are not lunch breaks. (Ohio employee, Nov. 13, 2014) (Id. at 22).

         E. Named Plaintiffs

         Plaintiffs are current and former employees of iQor. Plaintiff Paris Shoots is a Minnesota resident and former iQor employee. (FAC ¶ 23.) He was employed as a CCA in iQor's Plymouth, Minnesota contact center from approximately April 2014 to June 2014. (Schug Decl., Ex. 10 [Doc. No. 363-10] (Decl. of Paris Shoots ¶ 2).) Defendant agreed to pay Shoots an hourly wage of $12 per hour. (Def.'s Am. Answer, Ex. D [Doc. No. 78-1] (Shoots Employment Agreement at 1).) Shoots states that he was not fully compensated for all hours worked, including overtime, because of TimeQey. (Schug Decl., Ex. 10 (Shoots Decl. ¶ 9).) In Count I of the FAC, Shoots, individually and on behalf of a proposed Minnesota Rule 23 class, contends that iQor violated the Minnesota Payment of Wages Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 181.101, 181.13, 181.14, and Minn. R. 5200.0120, subpt. 1, by failing to pay all straight time worked. (FAC ¶¶ 227-41.)

         Plaintiff Jonathan Bell is a resident of New York and former iQor employee. (FAC ¶ 24.) Bell was employed as a CCA in iQor's Buffalo, New York call center from approximately July 2011 to May 2014. (Schug Decl., Ex. 10 [Doc. No. 363-10] (Decl. of Jonathan Bell ¶ 2).) Defendant agreed to pay Bell an hourly wage of $15 per hour. (Def.'s Am. Answer, Ex. A [Doc. No. 78-1] (Bell Employment Agreement at 1).) He states that he was not fully compensated for all hours worked, including overtime, because of TimeQey. (Schug Decl., Ex. 10 (Bell Decl. ¶ 9).)

         Plaintiff Maxwell Turner is a resident of New York and current iQor employee. (FAC ¶ 25.) He has been employed as a CCA in iQor's Buffalo, New York contact center from approximately July 2013 to the present. (Schug Decl., Ex. 10 [Doc. No. 363-10] (Decl. of Maxwell Turner ¶ 2).) Defendant agreed to pay Turner an hourly wage of $9 per hour. (Def.'s Am. Answer, Ex. E [Doc. No. 78-1] (Turner Employment Agreement at 1).) He states that he has not been fully compensated for all hours worked, including overtime, because of TimeQey. (Schug Decl., Ex. 10 (Turner Decl. ¶ 9).)

         In Count II of the FAC, Bell and Turner allege, individually and on behalf of the proposed New York Rule 23 class, that iQor violated N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 190, 191, and 29 C.F.R. § 785.18, as adopted by the State of New York, by failing to pay all straight time worked. (FAC ¶¶ 242-51.) In Count III of the FAC, Turner alleges, individually and on behalf of the proposed New York Rule 23 class, that iQor violated N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Title 12, § 142-2.2, and 29 C.F.R. §§ 790.6, 785.11, 785.15, and 785.18, as adopted by the State of New York, by failing to pay all overtime wages. (Id. ¶¶ 252-62.)

         Plaintiff Tammy Hope is an Ohio resident and former iQor employee. (Id. ¶ 26.) Hope worked as a CCA at iQor's call center in Columbus, Ohio from approximately November 2011 to November 2013. (Schug Decl., Ex. 10 [Doc. No. 363-10] (Decl. of Tammy Hope ¶ 2).) Defendant agreed to pay Hope an hourly wage of $9 per hour. (Def.'s Am. Answer, Ex. B [Doc. No. 78-1] (Hope Employment Agreement at 1).) She states that she was not fully compensated for all hours worked, including overtime, because of TimeQey. (Schug Decl., Ex. 10 (Hope Decl. ¶ 9).) In Count IV of the FAC, Hope alleges, individually and on behalf of a proposed Ohio Rule 23 class, that iQor violated the Ohio Prompt Pay Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.15, by failing to pay all straight time wages earned. (FAC ¶¶ 263-71.) In Count V of the FAC, Hope alleges, on her own behalf and on behalf of a proposed Ohio Rule 23 class, that iQor violated the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 4111.03, by failing to fully pay overtime compensation. (Id. ¶¶ 272-81.)

         Plaintiff Phillipp Ostrovsky is a resident of Arizona and former iQor employee. (Id. ¶ 27.) He worked at iQor's Tempe, Arizona call center from approximately August 2014 to October 2014. (Schug Decl., Ex. 10 [Doc. No. 363-10] (Decl. of Phillipp Ostrovsky ¶ 2).) Defendant agreed to pay Ostrovsky an hourly wage of $11.50 per hour. (Def.'s Am. Answer, Ex. C [Doc. No. 78-1] (Ostrovsky Employment Agreement at 1).) He states that he was not fully compensated for all hours worked, including overtime, because of TimeQey. (Schug Decl., Ex. 10 (Ostrovsky Decl. ¶ 9).) In Count VI of the FAC, Ostrovsky alleges, on his own behalf and on behalf of a proposed Arizona Rule 23 class, that iQor violated Arizona's wage statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-351, by failing to pay for all straight time and overtime work. (FAC ¶¶ 282-93.)

         Plaintiff Brenda Brandt is a Colorado resident and former iQor employee. (Id. ¶ 28.) Brandt worked as a CCA at iQor's call center in Colorado Springs, Colorado from approximately June 2013 to October 2014. (Schug Decl., Ex. 10 [Doc. No. 363-10] (Decl. of Brenda Brandt ¶ 2).) Defendant agreed to pay Brandt on an hourly basis. (Id. ¶ 4.) She states that she was not fully compensated for all hours worked, including overtime, because of TimeQey. (Id. ¶ 9.) In Count VII of the FAC, Brandt alleges, individually and on behalf of a proposed Colorado Rule 23 class, that iQor violated the Colorado Wage Claim Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 8-4-103, -109, by failing to pay all straight time wages earned. (FAC ¶¶ 294-306.) In Count VIII of the FAC, Brandt alleges, on her own behalf and on behalf of a proposed Colorado Rule 23 class, that iQor violated the Colorado Minimum Wage Order Number 31, Colo. Code Regs. § 1103-1, by failing to fully pay overtime compensation. (Id. ¶¶ 272-81.)

         Plaintiff Anissa Sanders is a North Carolina resident and current iQor employee. (Id. ¶ 29.) Sanders has worked as a CCA at iQor's call center in Charlotte, North Carolina since approximately January 2006. (Schug Decl., Ex. 10 [Doc. No. 363-10] (Decl. of Anissa Sanders ¶ 2).) Defendant pays Sanders on an hourly basis. (Id. ¶ 4.) She states that she was not fully compensated for all hours worked, including overtime, because of TimeQey. (Id. ¶ 9.) In Count IX of the FAC, Sanders alleges, individually and on behalf of a proposed North Carolina Rule 23 class, that iQor violated the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 95-25.1 et seq., by failing to pay all straight time and overtime wages earned. (FAC ¶¶ 319-33.)

         Plaintiff Najai McCutcheon is a South Carolina resident and former iQor employee. (Id. ¶ 30.) McCutcheon worked as a CCA at iQor's call center in Charleston, South Carolina from approximately July 2011 to October 2015. (Id.) Defendant paid McCutcheon on an hourly basis. (Id. ¶ 66) She states that she was not fully compensated for all hours worked, because of TimeQey. (Id.) In Count XII of the FAC, McCutcheon alleges, individually and on behalf of a proposed South Carolina Rule 23 class, that iQor violated the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act, SC Code Ann. §§ 41-10-40, -50, by failing to pay all straight time wages earned. (Id. ¶¶ 347-56.)

         Plaintiff Michael Chavez is a California resident and former iQor employee. (Id. ¶ 31.) Chavez worked as a CCA at iQor's call center in Simi Valley, California from approximately September 2009 to November 2014. (Schug Decl., Ex. 10 [Doc. No. 363-10] (Decl. of Michael Gonzalez ¶ 2).) Defendant agreed to pay Chavez on an hourly basis. (Id. ¶ 4.) He states that he was not fully compensated for all hours worked, including overtime, because of TimeQey. (Id. ¶ 9.) In Count XIII of the FAC, Chavez alleges, individually and on behalf of a proposed California Rule 23 class, that iQor violated the California state labor code, Cal. Lab. Code § 1182.12, by failing to pay the California minimum wage for all hours worked. (FAC ¶¶ 357-364.) In Count XVI of the FAC, Chavez alleges, individually and on behalf of a proposed California Rule 23 class, that iQor violated the California state labor code, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194, by failing to pay all overtime wages earned. (Id. ¶¶ 365-71.)[8]

         Finally, as alleged in Count X of the FAC, Plaintiffs Bell, Turner, Hope, Ostrovsky, Brandt, and Sanders, individually and on behalf of a proposed nationwide FLSA collective, allege that iQor failed to properly pay its employees overtime pay, in violation of the FLSA and related regulations. (Id. ¶¶ 334-43.)

         F. Parties' Motions

         On August 18, 2017 iQor filed the instant motion seeking decertification of the conditionally certified FLSA class, and Plaintiffs filed the instant motion seeking class certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.

         In support of its motion for decertification, iQor argues that Plaintiffs cannot show that the members of the conditionally certified FLSA overtime class are “similarly situated, ” because multiple individual inquiries are required to fairly adjudicate the claims. (Def.'s Decert. Mem. at 3.) Whether CCAs were undercompensated, iQor asserts, depends upon what they were doing when TimeQey recorded idle time, whether they made an adjustment request, and why that request was rejected. (Id. at 14-18) Defendant argues that it was required to compensate CCAs only for the time they spent working, so each plaintiff's claim will turn on what they were doing during each specific period that TimeQey recorded as idle time. (Id. at 18-25.) Finally, iQor ...


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