United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Hoye Nelson, United States Attorney counsel for plaintiff.
M. Lopez, Office of the Federal Defender, counsel for
S. Doty, Judge
matter is before the court upon the objections by the parties
to the February 27, 2018, report and recommendation (R&R)
of United States Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel. Based on
a review of the file, record, and proceedings herein, and for
the following reasons, the court sustains the
government's objection and overrules defendant Lawrence
Emmanuel Jackson's objection.
background of this matter is fully set forth in the R&R,
and the court incorporates those facts by
reference. The magistrate judge recommended that the
court deny Jackson's first motion to suppress evidence
relating to the April 25, 2017, search of his home. Neither
party objects to that recommendation. The magistrate judge
also recommended that the court grant in part Jackson's
second motion to suppress as follows: (1) deny Jackson's
request to suppress statements made to police officers on
October 14, 2016; (2) grant Jackson's request to suppress
statements made to police officers on April 25, 2017, after
he invoked his right to counsel; and (3) deny Jackson's
request to suppress evidence obtained as a result of
statements, admissions, or answers made during the April 25,
2017, interview. The government objects to the second
recommendation and Jackson objects only to the third
court reviews the report and recommendation of the magistrate
judge de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Crim.
P. 59(b); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b).
government objects to the R&R insofar as it recommends
suppression of Jackson's April 25, 2017, statements made
after he allegedly invoked his right to counsel.
suspect subject to custodial interrogation has a right to the
presence of counsel unless that right is knowingly and
intelligently waived. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 479 (1966). Once a suspect unequivocally invokes his
right to counsel, interrogation must cease until counsel is
present unless the defendant “initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485
(1981). In other words, not all direct questioning by law
enforcement officials constitutes interrogation. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals “generally do[es] not find a
mere factual statement to be an interrogation where it serves
to inform the suspect as to the status of his case or the
investigation into his activities.” United States
v. Hull, 419 F.3d 762, 767 (8th Cir. 2005); see also
United States v. Wipf, 397 F.3d 677, 685 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the officer's statement that he wanted to
tell defendant “the situation, and explain the charges
against him, ” does not amount to custodial
interrogation). Rather, direct questioning is interrogation
only if it is “reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). Whether an
officer sought an incriminating response is determined
“from the perspective of the suspect” and not by
the officer's actual intent. United States v.
Richardson, 427 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2005)
(rev'd on other grounds).
there is no dispute that Jackson was given a Miranda
warning, as required under the circumstances. Rather, the
parties contest whether (1) Jackson unequivocally invoked his
right to counsel, and (2) officers reinitiated interrogation
after he did so.
relevant exchange between Jackson and the officers was as
Jackson: Ah, well, if I could get the lawyer, it
would be cool because I'm not familiar with, you know the
whole process and all that so I'd just rather be ... I
mean, is there a way I could, cause I could afford one, but I
just got to get prepared. Is there a way we ...