United States District Court, D. Minnesota
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
A. Magnuson United States District Court Judge
matter is before the Court on Defendant Hennepin
County's Motion to Dismiss. For the following
reasons, the Motion is granted.
a Minnesota Vikings game at the U.S. Bank Stadium, Defendant
Minneapolis police officers and an employee of Defendant
Monterrey Security Consultants, Inc., were escorting
Plaintiff Anastacio Lemus Lopez to a security processing
center before ejecting him from the venue. (Am. Compl.
(Docket No. 93) ¶¶ 30-38.) On the way, they
allegedly “attacked [Lopez] while [he] was in custody,
due to his color and ethnicity.” (Id. ¶
1.) One Defendant police officer discharged his Taser on
Lopez twice. (Id. ¶¶ 60-64.) The officers
also allegedly hit and punched Lopez while he was pinned down
on the floor. (Id. ¶¶ 51-52.)
on scene removed the Taser probes and treated Lopez for
injuries to his right eye. (Id. ¶ 71.) The
officers ultimately transported Lopez to the Hennepin County
jail, where he was booked for attempting to disarm a police
officer. (Id. ¶ 73.) The next day, a state
court judge found sufficient probable cause to order
Lopez's continued detention. (Martenson Decl. (Docket No.
148) Ex. 1.) A jury ultimately found Lopez not guilty. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 79.) Lopez alleges that the County
“falsely arrested, incarcerated, maliciously
prosecuted, and failed to provide adequate medical
attention.” (Id. ¶ 78.)
14-Count Amended Complaint contains nine Counts against the
County, including excessive use of force (Count I); a
Monell violation (Count II); a § 1985 violation
for conspiring to deprive Lopez of his civil rights (Count
III); negligent failure to provide adequate medical care
(Count VI); negligent training, hiring, retention, and
supervision (Count VII); false imprisonment (Count XI);
malicious prosecution (Count XII); and respondeat superior
claims for intentional and negligent misconduct (Counts XIII
and XIV). The County moves to dismiss for failure to state a
evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court
assumes the allegations in the Amended Complaint to be true
and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Morton
v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). But the
Court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations,
Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d
799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions that the
plaintiff draws from the facts pled. Westcott v. City of
Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990).
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face” to survive a
motion to dismiss. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain
“detailed factual allegations, ” it must contain
facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Id. at
555. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, ” will
not pass muster under Twombly. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). This standard
“calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the
claim].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
§ 1983 Individual-Capacity Claims
is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the
individual County Defendants violated Lopez's rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 80-81.) “Because vicarious liability is
inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
the Amended Complaint fails to allege a discrete act by any
of the individual County Defendants. Cf. Ellis v.
Norris, 179 F.3d 1078, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming
dismissal of a § 1983 complaint for “fail[ure] to
allege facts supporting any individual defendant's
personal involvement” in the alleged violation of
plaintiff's constitutional rights). Thus, Count I is
dismissed against the individual County Defendants.
claims that the County is liable under § 1983 for
inadequately training its employees to provide medical
assistance to inmates in jail. See Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). As relevant here,
“liability for a constitutional violation may attach to
a municipality if the violation resulted from . . . a
deliberately indifferent failure to train or
supervise.” Corwin v. City of Independence,
829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016); accord City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). A claim for
inadequate training exists if (1) the county's
“training practices [were] inadequate”; (2) the
“failure to train reflects a deliberate or conscious
choice” by the county; and (3) the “alleged
deficiency in the . . . training procedures actually caused
the plaintiff's injury.” Parrish v. Ball,
594 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2010) (alterations in ...