United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Jeffrey S. Paulsen, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, for plaintiff.
William Cecil Romig, pro se defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE
R. TUNHEIM CHIEF JUDGE
pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846,
William Cecil Romig was sentenced to 264 months in prison and
ten years of supervised release. Romig's supervised
release term included special conditions related to drug
testing and association with gang members. Romig now brings a
motion to modify those conditions pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(2) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32.1(c). The Court will deny Romig's motion because the
special conditions are necessary to provide Romig future
deterrence and correctional treatment, and are related to his
offense, history, and characteristics.
March 14, 2001, Romig was charged along with five
codefendants in an 18-count Superseding Indictment.
(Superseding Indictment, Mar. 14, 2001, Docket No. 36.) Romig
pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine,
(see Plea Agreement, Oct. 30, 2001, Docket No. 225),
and was sentenced to a 264-month term of imprisonment, (J. at
1-2, Apr. 16, 2002, Docket No. 276; Tr. at 10:5-7, May 14,
2003, Docket No. 318). In addition, Romig was sentenced to a
ten-year term of supervised release, during which Romig is to
“comply with state, federal, and local laws, comply
with the rules and regulations of the probation office, [and]
abide by the standard conditions of supervised
release.” (J. at 3; Tr. at 12:12-17.) Two special
conditions of supervised release were also imposed, which
1) The defendant shall submit to periodic drug testing and
participate in substance abuse treatment and aftercare as
directed by the probation office.
2) The defendant shall not associate with any member,
prospect, or associate of the Hell's Angels motorcycle
gang, or any other gang.
(J. at 4; Tr. at 12:20-24.) Romig did not object to these
conditions at the time of his sentencing and did not directly
appeal his conviction or his sentence. He also did not object
to these conditions when he later filed a motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Romig,
Crim. No. 00-355, Civ. No. 03-2640, 2003 WL 22143730, at *1
(D. Minn. Aug. 18, 2003). In 2014, Romig brought a motion to
modify the conditions of his supervised release pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) and Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32.1(c). Romig requested that the Court eliminate
from the terms of his supervised release the special
conditions related to drug testing and gang association. The
Court denied Romig's motion without prejudice, holding
that § 3583 was not a vehicle for legal or
constitutional challenges to terms of supervised release,
and, to the extent Romig's motion sought relief available
under § 3583(e)(2), the motion was not ripe for
adjudication. See United States v. Romig, Crim. No.
00-355, 2014 WL 1048390, at *2-3 (D. Minn. Mar. 18, 2014);
aff'd, No. 14-2355 (8th Cir. Sept.
19, 2014). On February 20, 2018 (approximately two months
before his April 11, 2018, release), Romig filed the same
motion to amend his conditions of supervised release.
(Compare Mot., Feb. 20, 2018, Docket No. 409,
with Mot., Nov. 8, 2013, Docket No. 357.)
SCOPE OF 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2)
courts have the broad discretion to impose conditions of
supervised release that “(1) [are] reasonably related
to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a); (2) involve[ ] no greater deprivation of liberty
than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in
§ 3553(a); and (3) [are] consistent with any pertinent
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
United States v. Kelly, 625 F.3d 516, 519
(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Bender, 566 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2009));
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 5D1.3(b). A
district court may also modify, reduce, or enlarge those
conditions of supervised release “at any time prior to
the expiration of the period of supervised release.”
United States v. Yankton, 168 F.3d 1096, 1098 n.6
(8th Cir. 1999); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(2). “[W]hen considering whether to
‘modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of
supervis[ed release],' a court is limited to considering
the sentencing factors enumerated in § 3553(a), any
applicable Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
applicable provisions for setting the initial conditions of
supervised release.” United States v. Shipley,
825 F.Supp.2d 984, 988 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
noted, Romig makes the same arguments as he did in his 2014
motion. This Court already ruled that Romig “may
challenge the illegality of conditions of supervised release
only through a direct appeal, § 2255 . . ., or by
bringing a motion to correct a sentence under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 35.” Romig, 2014 WL 1048390
at *2. Thus, the Court will not consider whether Romig's
special conditions of supervised release violate the terms of
his plea agreement, were unsupported by the sentencing
record, or constitute an unconstitutional restriction on his
freedom of association because those challenges attack the
legality or constitutionality of the conditions and are
therefore not cognizable in a motion to modify brought under
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