Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-09-11740
Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Michael
O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny,
Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge;
Schellhas, Judge; and Randall, Judge.[*]
district court has jurisdiction to reimpose a mandatory
conditional-release term if it was authorized by law at the
time the district court removed it from the sentence and the
defendant had not developed a crystallized expectation as to
the finality of his sentence.
his conviction of failing to register as a predatory
offender, appellant argues that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to impose a ten-year term of conditional
release. We affirm.
Michael Allen Franson was required to register as a predatory
offender following his 1987 conviction of criminal sexual
conduct. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to one count of failing
to register as a predatory offender. The district court
sentenced Franson to 15 months in prison, a mitigated
durational departure, but failed to include the statutorily
mandated conditional-release term. See Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166, subd. 5a (2016) (mandating imposition of a
ten-year conditional-release term if the predatory offender
is deemed to be a risk-level III at the time of the offense);
see also Minn. Stat. § 244.052, subd. 3(a)
(2016) (requiring commissioner of corrections to establish
end-of-confinement review committee to assess risk level of
predatory offenders who are near prison release date). Three
months later, after the Minnesota Department of Corrections
advised the district court that Franson was a risk-level-III
offender, the district court amended the sentencing order to
include the mandated ten-year conditional-release term. The
district court amended Franson's sentence without a jury
finding or Franson's admission of his risk-level status.
2016, while Franson was serving the conditional-release term
of his sentence, he moved to correct his sentence, asking the
district court to vacate the conditional-release term based
on two recent supreme court decisions, Reynolds v.
State, 888 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2016), and State v.
Her, 862 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 2015). The district court
construed the motion as a petition for postconviction relief.
Her, the supreme court held that a district court
may not impose the ten-year conditional-release term for a
conviction of failing to register as a predatory offender
unless a jury finds or the defendant admits to being a
risk-level-III offender. 862 N.W.2d at 696-700 (concluding
that determination of defendant's status as a
risk-level-III offender is constitutionally required to be
found by a jury and risk-level determination is an
administrative assessment that does not meet the
prior-conviction exception to Sixth Amendment's
jury-trial right). In Reynolds, the supreme court
concluded that a defendant may challenge a
conditional-release term by filing a motion to correct the
sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. 888 N.W.2d
district court granted Franson's motion, in part, and
ordered a resentencing hearing for a jury to determine if
Franson was a risk-level-III offender at the time of the
offense. Franson appealed the district court's decision
to hold a resentencing hearing. A special-term panel of this
court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was
premature. See Franson v. State, No. A16-1872
(Minn.App. Feb. 28, 2017) (order).
district court held a resentencing hearing on September 25,
2017. Franson moved to terminate the proceedings and vacate
the conditional-release term, arguing that the original
complaint did not include any reference to his risk-level
designation and that it was too late for the state to amend
the complaint. In response, the state moved to amend the
complaint. In a September 29, 2017 order, the district court
denied the state's motion and terminated the proceedings,
determining that, because the complaint did not allege that
Franson was a risk-level-III offender, there was "no
question for a jury to consider." Also on that date, the
district court issued a second ...