United States District Court, D. Minnesota
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LEO I.
BRISBOIS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This
matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge pursuant to a general assignment, made in accordance
with the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636, and upon
Plaintiff's Motions for Reasonable Accommodations,
[Docket Nos. 15, 17, 46]; Plaintiff's Motion for
Extension of Time for Process Service, [Docket No. 16];
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No.
25];[1] Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to
File First Amended Complaint, [Docket No. 54];
Plaintiff's Motions to Perfect Personal Service, [Docket
No. 43, 55]; and Defendants' second Motion to Dismiss.
[Docket No. 68].[2] The Court took the parties'
Motions under advisement on the parties' written
submissions. (Order [Docket No. 90]).
For the
reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff's Motion for
Extension of Time for Process Service, [Docket No. 16], is
DENIED as moot; Plaintiff's Motions for
Reasonable Accommodations, [Docket Nos. 15, 17, 46], are
DENIED as moot; Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to File First Amended Complaint, [Docket No. 54], is
DENIED; and Plaintiff's Motions to
Perfect Personal Service, [Docket Nos. 43, 55], are
DENIED as moot.
For the
reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends that
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 25], be
GRANTED; Defendant's second Motion to
Dismiss, [Docket No. 68], be GRANTED; and
Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED with
prejudice.[3]
I.
Background
Plaintiff
Kevin Scott Karsjens (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) is
a patient civilly committed in the Minnesota Sex Offender
Program (hereinafter “MSOP”). (Compl [Docket No.
1]).
On
December 21, 2011, patients civilly committed at the MSOP
Moose Lake facility, including Plaintiff in the present case,
“filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against
various state employees for violations of their
constitutional and statutory rights.” Karsjens, et
al. v. Minnesota Department of Human Services, et al.,
11-cv-3659 (DWF/TNL), Order, [Docket No. 828], at 6-7 (D.
Minn. Feb. 2, 2015). The plaintiffs in Karsjens
“identif[ied] numerous policies, procedures, and
conditions of confinement that they claim[ed], when
considered cumulatively and in context, violate[d] their
constitutional rights.” Id. at 7. On July 24,
2012, the Court in Karsjens certified a class which
consisted of “‘[a]ll patients currently civilly
committed' to MSOP” and “[t]he Court
appointed the fourteen named Plaintiffs” including the
Plaintiff in the present case, “to serve as class
representatives.” Id.
On
October 28, 2014, the plaintiffs in Karsjens filed a
Third Amended Complaint which asserted thirteen claims
including the following “claims: (I) Minnesota Statute
§ 253D is facially unconstitutional; (II) Minnesota
Statute § 253D is unconstitutional as applied; . . . (V)
Defendants have denied Plaintiffs the right to be free from
punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the Minnesota
Constitution;” and “(VII) Defendants have denied
Plaintiffs the right to be free from inhumane treatment in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution . . . .”
Id. at 10-11.
On June
15, 2015, the Honorable Donovan W. Frank, after a six week
trial, found that the Minnesota Sex Offender Program
statutory scheme was “unconstitutional on its face and
as applied (Count I and II), ” and therefore, Judge
Frank granted “Plaintiffs' request for declaratory
relief with respect to Count I and II of their Third Amended
Complaint . . . .” Karsjens, et al. v. Minnesota
Department of Human Services, et al., 11-cv-3659
(DWF/TNL), Order, [Docket No. 966], at 65-75 (D. Minn. June
15, 2015). Because the remedial measures ordered respective
to Counts I and II would “addressed the issues raised
in . . . Counts III, V, VI, and VII” Judge Frank did
not address Counts III, V, VI, and VII in the June 15, 2015,
Order. See, Id. at 65.
On June
23, 2016, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated the present
case by filing his Complaint. [Docket No. 1]. On December 13,
2016, Defendants in the present case, in their official
capacities, moved to dismiss the present Complaint against
them in its entirety. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss [Docket No.
25]).
Defendants
in Karjens appealed Judge Frank's June 17, 2015,
Order, and “[o]n January 3, 2017, the Eighth Circuit
issued an opinion ‘revers[ing] the district court's
finding of a constitutional violation and vacat[ing] the
injunctive order.” Karsjens, et al. v. Minnesota
Department of Human Services, et al., 11-cv-3659
(DWF/TNL), Order, [Docket No. 1108], at 5 (D. Minn. Aug. 23,
2018).
On
March 6, 2017, Defendants in the present case, in their
individual capacities, moved to dismiss the present Complaint
against them in its entirety. (Defs.' Second Mot. to
Dismiss [Docket No. 68]).
On June
30, 2017, the Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief District Court
Judge for the District of Minnesota, stayed the present case
“pending the litigation in Karsjens, or until
further order of the Court stating otherwise.” (Order
[Docket No. 87]).
On
August 23, 2018, Judge Frank in the Karsjens case
issued an Order addressing, among other things, Counts III,
V, VI, and VII “in light of the Eighth Circuit's
decision.” Karsjens, et al. v. Minnesota Department
of Human Services, et al., 11-cv-3659 (DWF/TNL), Order,
[Docket No. 1108], at 1 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2018). With
respect to Counts V and VII, Judge Franks concluded that
based on Eighth Circuit precedent defendants were “not
liable under Counts V and VII.” Id. at 18.
Specifically, Judge Frank concluded “that the Eighth
Circuit's holdings and reasonings preclude finding a
substantive due process violation under Counts V and
VII.” Id. at 17. Judge Frank held that
“[r]egardless of the theory of liability alleged,
Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
claims are analyzed under the two-part test identified by the
Eighth Circuit in its Karsjens opinion. Furthermore,
the Eighth Circuit has explicitly held that Defendants'
actions, as revealed in Phase One of trial, do not rise to
the conscience-shocking level necessary to support Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process liability.”
Id. at 19. Accordingly, Judge Frank dismissed with
prejudice Counts V and VII of the Karsjens Third
Amended Complaint. Id. at 20.
On
October 22, 2018, the stay in the present case was lifted.
(Order [Docket No. 89]).
II.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint
articulate “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. “The words ‘short and plain'
are themselves short and plain, and they mean what they say:
A complaint must be concise, and it must be clear. Rule 8 was
not promulgated to provide helpful advice; it has the force
of law, and it must be followed.” Gurman v. Metro
Housing and Redevelopment Authority, 842 F.Supp.2d 1151,
1152 (D. Minn. 2011).
In the
present case, Plaintiff's Complaint, [Docket No. 1],
names over thirty Defendants each of whom is alleged to be
culpable in each of the three discrete causes of actions
despite the fact that the vast majority of the named
Defendants are only related in an ancillary manner to the
factual allegations underlying the causes of action.
(See, Compl. [Docket No. 1]). Moreover,
Plaintiff's Complaint sprawls over fifty-three pages with
120 paragraphs many of which contain several subparts.
(See, Id.). Plaintiff's Proposed
Amended Complaint stretches over 105 pages with over 200
paragraphs many of which again contain several subparts.
(See, Proposed Amended Compl. [Docket No. 54-1]).
A Court
may sua sponte dismiss a complaint that fails to comply with
Rule 8. See, Olson v. Little, 978 F.2d 1264
(8th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table disposition); see
also, Mangam v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 909, 911
(8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1013 (1989).
Plaintiff's Complaint, and even his Proposed Amended
Complaint, fail to comply with Rule 8's requirement that
a complaint articulate “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” On that basis alone, the undersigned could
recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed.
The
undersigned will, however, in an abundance of caution
evaluate Plaintiff's claims on the merits.
III.
Plaintiff's Complaint. [Docket No. 1].
Plaintiff's
Complaint, [Docket No. 1], alleges that Defendant Ludeman and
Defendant Benson purposefully caused Complex 1 at the MSOP
Moose Lake facility to be constructed in a manner consistent
with a “maximum security prison facility” which
according to Plaintiff constitutes a violation of his
constitutional rights. (See, Compl. [Docket No. 1]).
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants, apparently
individually and as a collective, have failed to do anything
to rectify these constitutional violations.
Plaintiff
alleges that Complex 1 at the MSOP Moose Lake facility, where
Plaintiff is housed, was constructed in a manner akin to a
“maximum security prison facility” as opposed to
a treatment facility, and therefore, Plaintiff's
constitutional rights have been violated because he was
civilly committed for treatment purposes not for punishment.
(See, Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that Complex 1 of the MSOP Moose Lake facility is
constitutionally impermissible because its construction
“failed to contain the correct floor coverings”;
“failed to contain the minimum amount of usable floor
space for double-occupancy rooms”; “contains a
steel prison cell door with a ‘cuff port' installed
into the door”; “failed to contain the correct
distance between beds”; “failed to contain the
proper furniture and fixtures”; “failed to
contain the correct sink and lavatory facilities”;
“failed to contain the correct type of shower rooms;
semiprivate with a half-door open to the dayroom”;
“failed to contain the correct level of privacy for
each patient”; and “failed to contain any laundry
facility for [Plaintiff's] personal use.” (Compl.,
[Docket No. 1], at 23-28). Plaintiff alleges “[t]hat
even though each defendant knew of the constitutional
deficiencies of Complex 1, they constructed it and forcibly
housed [Plaintiff] in Complex 1, with complete knowledge and
disregard for [Plaintiff's] civil rights under due
process.” (Id.).
On the
basis of this allegations, Plaintiff raises three claims: (1)
“Denial of Right to be Free from Punishment in
Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution” (Count 1),
(2) “Denial of Right to be Free from Inhumane Treatment
in Violation of the Fourteen Amended to the United States
Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution” (Count 2),
and “Denial of Due Process under Equal
protection/discrimination because [Plaintiff] received much
more draconian physical restriction than any similarly
situated committed patients within the MSOP-ML; and severely
more draconian physical restriction than any other class of
civilly committed patient outside the MSOP-ML” (Count
3).
IV.
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint. [Docket No. 54].
As
noted above, on December 13, 2016, Defendants, in their
individual capacities, filed their Motion to Dismiss. [Docket
No. 25]. On January 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Motion for
Leave to File First Amended Complaint. [Docket No. 54]. And
on March 6, 2017, Defendants filed their Second Motion to
Dismiss, [Docket No. 68], to which Plaintiff also responded.
Plaintiff's
Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint, [Docket No.
54], seeks to double the length of Plaintiff's Complaint
to add more discussion of the history of the construction of
Complex 1 at the MSOP Moose Lake facility, additional
statutory definition quotes, more details regarding the
construction of Complex 1 at the MSOP Moose Lake facility,
more details regarding how the construction of Complex 1 at
the MSOP Moose Lake facility affects the operation of the
MSOP Moose Lake facility, rhetoric regarding the history of
perceived discrimination in the United States, and a
description of each Defendant's position, as well as, how
Plaintiff perceives that Defendant to be related to his
previous assertions. (See, Proposed Amended Compl.
[Docket No. 54-1]). Plaintiff also adds several paragraphs
which simply repeat and summarize assertions already made in
his original Complaint. (See, e.g., Id. at
32-37, 60-65, 90-99). Plaintiff's Proposed Amended
Complaint contains the same three Counts as his original
Complaint, however, through his Proposed Amended Complaint
and in his Equal Protection claim Plaintiff makes passing
references to the Americans with Disabilities Act.
(See, Proposed Amended Compl. [Docket No. 54-1]).
Eighth
Circuit jurisprudence provides that courts should consider
motions to amend the pleadings prior to ruling on pending
motions to dismiss. In Pure Country, Inc., the
defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Pure Country, Inc. v. Sigma Chi Fraternity, 312 F.3d
952, 955 (8th Cir. 2002). While the motion to dismiss was
pending, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend its pleading
and add additional parties. Id. The district court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and denied as
moot the plaintiff's motion to amend. Id. On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, writing:
[T]he district court ignored Pure Country's motion to
amend, granted Sigma Chi's motion to dismiss the original
complaint, and then denied Pure Country's motion to amend
the complaint as moot. That approach, as a procedural matter,
was plainly erroneous. If anything, Pure Country's motion
to amend the complaint rendered moot Sigma Chi's motion
to dismiss the original complaint. We therefore reverse the
district court's denial of Pure Country's motion to
amend the complaint, and we remand the matter to the district
court with instructions to reconsider the motion under the
discretionary standard asserted by Pure Country. In order to
permit the district court to reconsider the motion to amend
the complaint, we also vacate the district court's
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