United States District Court, D. Minnesota
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jawana Keshun Jackson pleaded guilty in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama to one
count of bank robbery, see 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a),
(d); and one count of carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c). Jackson received a 46-month term of
imprisonment on the robbery count and a 120-month term of
imprisonment on the firearm count, with the two terms to run
consecutively. See United States v. Jackson, No.
2:09-CR-0453 (2) (VEH/JHE) (N.D Ala.). Since that time,
Jackson has repeatedly attempted to challenge her sentence
collaterally pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the
Northern District of Alabama, but each of those attempts has
November 8, 2018, Jackson-who is now incarcerated at the
Federal Correctional Institution in Waseca, Minnesota-filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241. (See Dkt. No. 1.) The habeas petition made
clear that Jackson intended to contest the validity of her
Alabama conviction or sentence (or both) in this proceeding,
but was less clear about the exact legal claim she intended
to raise. Accordingly, this Court ordered Jackson to expand
upon the basis of her claim for relief and explain why this
Court had jurisdiction to consider such a claim in a habeas
corpus proceeding. (See Dkt. No. 3.)
has now responded to the Court's Order. (See
Dkt. No. 4.) The basis of Jackson's claim appears to be
that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sessions
v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018), renders her conviction
for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence invalid. (See Id. at 3.) The contention
that Dimaya and related cases might call into
question the validity of some convictions under § 924(c)
is not necessarily frivolous. See United States v.
Davis, No. 18-431, - S.Ct. -, 2019 WL 98544 (Jan. 4,
2019) (granting petition for writ of certiorari). But
“[i]t is well settled a collateral challenge to a
federal conviction or sentence must generally be raised in a
motion to vacate filed in the sentencing court under §
2255 . . . and not in a habeas petition filed in the court of
incarceration . . . under § 2241.” Hill v.
Morrison, 349 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2003). A narrow
exception to this rule has been carved out where § 2255
“is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality” of the prisoner's detention. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e). In her response, though, Jackson seems to
acknowledge that § 2255 is not
inadequate or ineffective for her to raise her
claim. (See Dkt. No. 4 at 3.) Rather,
Jackson may request authorization from the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals to bring a second or successive motion under
§ 2255 in the district of conviction. See 28
U.S.C. § 2255(h). And because § 2255 is not
“inadequate or ineffective” for Jackson's
purposes, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), that
provision is the exclusive remedy through which she may raise
her acknowledgement, Jackson asks that the Court “allow
her to proceed with her claim for relief.” (Dkt. No. 4
at 3.) The exclusive remedy rule of § 2255(e), however,
is jurisdictional. See DeSimone v. Lacy, 805 F.2d
321, 323 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Section 2255 provides
a procedural vehicle through which Jackson may raise her
claim in the district of conviction, and this Court therefore
cannot proceed to the merits of that claim.
said, the Court is permitted, “if it is in the interest
of justice, ” to transfer this matter “to any
other such court in which the action . . . could have been
brought at the time it was filed or noticed . . . .” 28
U.S.C. § 1631. The appropriate step for Jackson to take
would have been to request authorization from the Eleventh
Circuit for her claim. Because she has yet not done so,
because an attempt to do so would not necessarily be futile,
and because further delay might result in Jackson's claim
becoming untimely, this Court recommends that this matter be
transferred to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration
as a request for authorization to file a second or successive
motion for relief under § 2255. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and
proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED
that this matter be TRANSFERRED to the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
 Even if Jackson did not intend to make
this concession, her point would be correct: § 2255 is
the exclusive vehicle for her to raise her claim under
Dimaya. See, e.g., Gibson v.
Barnes, No. 18-CV-1984 ...