United States District Court, D. Minnesota
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
DAVID
T. SCHULTZ United States Magistrate Judge.
This
matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Patricia
Davis's (1) Complaint, Docket No. 1, and (2) Application
to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs,
Docket No. 2 (Pro Se Application). For the following reasons,
the Court recommends (1) dismissing this action without
prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and (2) denying the Pro
Se Application as moot. Under Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f the court determines at
any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court
must dismiss the action.” After reviewing the
Complaint, the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over this action.
The
thrust of the Complaint concerns a slip-and-fall accident
that Davis experienced in a Quality Inn parking lot; the
Defendants appear to be Quality Inn itself, the corporate
owner of the specific Quality Inn location where Davis was
injured, and various individuals associated with that
location. Compl. 1-2, 5.[1] The Complaint asserts that this court
has federal-question jurisdiction over this matter, but the
only stated basis for such jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. §
1331. Id. at 3. Section 1331 merely provides that
“district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States”; under this statute,
“[a] plaintiff properly invokes § 1331
jurisdiction when she pleads a colorable claim ‘arising
under' the Constitution or laws of the United
States.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 513 (2006) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
681-85 (1946)); see also, e.g., Dettle v.
Treasure Island Resort & Casino, No. 17-CV-2327
(SRN/TNL), 2019 WL 259652, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 18, 2019)
(quoting Arbaugh). Section 1331 thus does not
support a standalone assertion of jurisdiction; instead, it
explains what other sort of claim a plaintiff must
make to support a claim of § 1331 jurisdiction.
Reviewing the Complaint's allegations, the Court
concludes that-even interpreting the pleading liberally,
given Davis's pro se status, see Topchian v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014)
(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976))-the Complaint does not plead a colorable claim
arising under federal law. It may present a viable state-law
claim for negligence or another cause of action; but
federal-question jurisdiction does not apply to state-law
negligence claims, and the Court sees no other ground here
for asserting such jurisdiction.[2]
As this
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action, the
Court recommends that this action be dismissed without
prejudice. Accordingly, the Court also recommends that the
Pro Se Application be denied as moot.
RECOMMENDATION
Based
on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and
proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. This
action be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction.
2.
Plaintiff's request to proceed in this action pro se
(Docket No. 2) be DENIED as moot.
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Notes:
[1] Because the Complaint is not
consecutively paginated, references to the Complaint are to
the page numbers generated by the Court's ECF filing
system.
[2] Davis does not assert that diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 exists here, but
even if she did, the Court would disagree. Under § 1332,
diversity jurisdiction exists only where there is complete
diversity between the parties-that is, the plaintiff cannot
share a state of citizenship with any defendant. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (establishing diversity-jurisdiction
requirements); 4Brava, LLC v. Sachs, No. 15-CV-2744
(JRT/DTS), 2018 WL 2254569, at *3 (D. Minn. May 17, 2018)
(“Section 1332(a) requires complete diversity of
citizenship among litigants to satisfy diversity jurisdiction
in federal court. Complete diversity occurs when no defendant
and plaintiff have citizenship in the same state.”)
(citing OnePoint Sols., LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d
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