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Pereida v. Barr

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

March 1, 2019

Clemente Avelino Pereida Petitioner
v.
William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States Respondent

          Submitted: October 24, 2018

          Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

          Before ERICKSON, BEAM, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

          BEAM, Circuit Judge.

         Clemente Avelino Pereida, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) grant of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) motion to pretermit Pereida's cancellation of removal application. Pereida pleaded no contest to a Nebraska criminal attempt charge (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-201(1)(b)) arising from the use of a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment at National Service Company of Iowa, operating in rural Crete, Saline County, in violation of Nebraska Revised Statute § 28-608 (2008).[1] The determinative issue in this matter is whether Pereida's criminal attempt conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), making him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The criminal impersonation offense underlying Pereida's attempt conviction is a divisible statute with subsections, some of which qualify as CIMTs and one subsection that may not. Applying the modified categorical approach, it is not possible to ascertain which subsection formed the basis for Pereida's conviction. It is Pereida's burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal and he thus bears the adverse consequences of this inconclusive record. Accordingly, because Pereida cannot establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, we uphold the Board's determination that he has not shown such eligibility. Thus, we deny Pereida's petition for review.

         I. BACKGROUND

         Pereida is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without authorization or inspection in, according to his application for cancellation of removal, approximately 1995. He has thus lived in the United States for an extended period of time and, according to the immigration record, has been gainfully employed, paid taxes and with his wife, raised his family (comprised of their three children) here. On August 3, 2009, DHS issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging Pereida with removability. Pereida admitted the factual allegations in the NTA and conceded the charge of removability, but in March 2011 filed an application for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). In August 2014, DHS filed a Motion to Pretermit Pereida's application asserting that he had been convicted of a CIMT, which is a mandatory bar to his requested relief, given Pereida's no contest plea to a charge of attempted criminal impersonation

         The IJ analyzed the substantive crime of criminal impersonation in Nebraska underlying Pereida's criminal attempt charge and held that the statute is divisible; that Pereida was necessarily convicted under a subsection requiring the specific intent to defraud, deceive or harm; and thus Pereida's conviction under this statute constituted a CIMT. Having found Pereida's attempted criminal impersonation conviction to be a CIMT, the IJ additionally held that because the conviction was punishable by a maximum term of "not more than one year imprisonment," Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-106(1), it constituted a conviction "of an offense under subsection 1182(a)(2) [and] 1227(a)(2)," barring Pereida from the relief requested, at least according to the IJ's analysis of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). The IJ's decision was reviewed by the Board, which did not go so far in its analysis.

         The Board agreed that only three subsections under Nebraska Revised Statute § 28-608 qualified as CIMTs because each contained as a necessary element the intent to defraud or deceive, thus making the statute divisible. Under a modified categorical approach, the Board found no record as to which particular subsection of the statute Pereida was ultimately convicted of violating. This is where the Board ended its analysis. The Board noted that Pereida bore the burden of proving that his particular conviction did not bar relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4). Accordingly, the Board found that Pereida failed to carry his burden of proving that his conviction was not a CIMT, and that he was thus statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. Pereida petitioned this court for review of the Board's order, claiming that his conviction of attempted criminal impersonation does not fall within the definition of a CIMT. Pereida additionally claims that even if his Nebraska conviction qualifies as a CIMT, it falls within the petty offense exception available under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii).

         II. DISCUSSION

         We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review "constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review." "We review the [Board's] factual determinations under a substantial-evidence standard and its legal conclusions de novo." Andrade-Zamora v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 945, 948 (8th Cir. 2016). Where, as here, the Board adopted the reasoning of the IJ, we consider the two decisions together. Saldana v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 2016).

         To be eligible for cancellation of removal, Pereida had to meet four requirements. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). At issue here is whether, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), Pereida's conviction for attempted criminal impersonation is a CIMT as defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) or § 1227(a)(2). If it is, and if no exceptions apply, Pereida is ineligible for cancellation of removal.

         We first apply the "categorical approach" to determine whether Pereida's conviction qualifies as a CIMT by comparing the elements of that state offense to see if it fits within the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013). In doing so, we presume that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized by the state statute. Gomez-Gutierrez v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 1053, 1058 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying the realistic probability test in the context of a CIMT analysis). Deferring to the agency's interpretation of this ambiguous statutory phrase left undefined by Congress, "[c]rimes involving moral turpitude have been held to require conduct 'that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.'" Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lateef v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 592 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 2010)). "Crimes involving the intent to deceive or defraud are generally considered to involve moral turpitude." Id. (quoting Lateef, 592 F.3d at 929).

         The underlying Nebraska offense of criminal impersonation at issue, as it ...


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