United States District Court, D. Minnesota
BROCK
FREDIN, PRO SE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SUSAN
RICHARD NELSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
This
matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff
Brock Fredin's Objections (“Obj.”) dated
February 21, 2019 [Doc. No. 21] to United States Magistrate
Judge Hildy Bowbeer's Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) dated October 29, 2018 [Doc. No. 8].
The magistrate judge recommended that Fredin's
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP Application”) [Doc. No. 3] be denied, the
action be dismissed without prejudice, and any request for a
preliminary injunction or a Younger bad faith
hearing contained in Fredin's Memorandum [Doc. No. 2] be
denied as moot. For the reasons set forth below, Fredin's
Objections are overruled and the R&R is adopted.
II.
BACKGROUND
Fredin
filed a complaint [Doc. No. 1] (“Compl.”) on
October 11, 2018, against the attorneys of the Saint Paul
City Attorney's Office (“SPCAO”) and Lyndsey
M. Olson, in her official capacity as the Saint Paul City
Attorney. The Complaint raises various claims under the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments which the magistrate
judge construed as claims for injunctive relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Fredin's claims arise out of a number
of criminal cases filed against him by the SPCAO.
In
connection with the criminal cases pending against Fredin, a
search warrant was obtained and a search of his then
residence was subsequently conducted on April 28, 2017.
(Compl. at 1.) A number of Fredin's allegations arise out
of this search. Fredin alleges that Olson prosecuted him as a
means to cover up a “violent assault” that
occurred upon the execution of the search warrant. (R&R
at 4.) Plaintiff further alleges that Olson and other SPCAO
attorneys acted in concert with the Ramsey County District
Court to deliberately deny Fredin sufficient opportunity to
present constitutional defenses to his criminal complaints.
(Id. at 9.) He also contends that the attorneys
acted in bad faith in bringing the cases such that a hearing
is required to determine if the bad faith exception to
Younger abstention applies. (Id. at 4 and
12.)
Along
with his Complaint, Fredin filed an IFP Application. As the
magistrate judge recognized, an IFP application will be
denied and an action dismissed if the applicant has filed a
complaint that fails to state a cause of action on which
relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In
this case, the magistrate judge found that the action should
be dismissed as to “the attorneys of the Saint Paul
Attorney[']s Office” for failure to appropriately
name a party, and as to Defendant Olson for failure to state
a claim on which relief can be granted. Further, the
magistrate judge recommended that dismissal is compelled
because Younger abstention is appropriate.
III.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant
to statute, the Court must conduct a de novo review of any
portion of the R&R to which specific objections are made.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); D. Minn. L.R.
72.2(b).
Much of
Plaintiff's Objections proffer new allegations, none of
which are contained in the originally filed Complaint, and
thus they are not appropriately before this Court. (See,
e.g., Obj. at 11) (stating “The presiding judge
ignored IFP filings to prevent Plaintiff Fredin from filing a
writ of prohibition in the Minnesota Court of Appeal. As a
result, Plaintiff Fredin had no avenue to raise
constitutional challenges[.]”). Plaintiff has also
recently filed three affidavits [Doc. Nos. 22, 23, 24.], one
of which is a statement by Fredin in which he proffers new
allegations regarding his inability to access a law library
or computers within prison and generally alleges mistreatment
within the Ramsey County Correctional Facility. [Doc. No.
22.] The other two affidavits are statements by fellow Ramsey
County Correctional Facility inmates corroborating the
validity of Plaintiff's alleged inability to access legal
materials and computers. [Doc. Nos. 23, 24.] None of the
allegations presented in these affidavits are presented in
Plaintiff's original Complaint, therefore the Court does
not consider the information contained in these affidavits
for purposes of its review of the R&R and Plaintiff's
Objections. New allegations aside, Plaintiff generally
objects to the finding that an injunction is inappropriate in
this case.
Though
pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, they still
must allege sufficient facts to support the purported claims
against the defendant. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d
912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). Numerous problems with
the Complaint necessitate dismissal of this case without
prejudice.
First,
Fredin sues Olson in her official capacity, but in order to
assert an official-capacity § 1983 claim, the
complainant must allege the official implemented a policy or
custom of the state entity. See Marsh v. Phelps
Cty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2018). Here, Fredin
fails to allege such conduct by Olson on behalf of the City
of Saint Paul. (See R&R at 6.)
Second,
abstention is warranted here. Under Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), “[f]ederal court
abstention in warranted when one of a few
‘exceptional' types of parallel pending state court
proceedings exist[.]” Banks v. Slay, 789 F.3d
919, 923 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Sprint Commc'ns,
Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013)). Magistrate
Judge Bowbeer provided a thorough analysis of
Younger and its applicability here, finding that the
underlying proceedings were criminal prosecutions, that
Fredin had an opportunity to present constitutional
challenges, and that no exception to abstention applies.
(R&R at 7-13.) As to Fredin's opportunity to assert
constitutional challenges in state court, the magistrate
judge observed that Fredin had, in fact, asserted a First
Amendment argument that the trial court rejected.
(Id. at 9.) As Magistrate Judge Bowbeer noted,
“This shows Fredin failing to prevail on an
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