United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Katherine T. Buzicky & Surya Saxena, United States
Attorney for Plaintiff.
Robert Carpenter, Pro Se.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
RICHARD NELSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Defendant Lyle Robert
Carpenter's Pro Se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct the Sentence Imposed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255 (“§ 2255 Motion”) [Doc. No. 585]. Based
on a review of the files, records and proceedings herein, and
for the reasons set forth below, the Court denies
Defendant's § 2255 Motion.
10, 2012, Defendant was charged, along with six other
defendants, with: 1) conspiracy to commit bank burglary in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), 2113(b), and
2314; 2) conspiracy to steal controlled substances in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2118(d) and 2118(b); 3)
two counts of bank burglary in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2113(a); 4) two counts of bank larceny in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(b); 5) two counts of burglary involving a
controlled substance in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2118(b)(1); 6) credit union burglary in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a); and 7) interstate transportation of
stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
(Indictment at 1-12 [Doc. No. 1].) Defendant went to trial
and was convicted on all counts. (Jury Verdict [Doc. No.
December 2014 sentencing hearing, this Court found Defendant
qualified as a career offender based partially on his prior
Minnesota burglary convictions, and sentenced him to a prison
term of 210 months. (Sentencing J. at 2 [Doc. No. 513].)
and his co-defendant Derek Benedict appealed their sentences.
United States v. Benedict, 815 F.3d 377 (2016)
(“Benedict I”). Mark Nyvold,
Defendant's counsel, represented Carpenter both at
sentencing and throughout all of his appeals. In Benedict
I, Defendant argued that he should be resentenced due to
the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United
States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). Id. at 385-86.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's Career Offender
sentence based on its prior decision in United States v.
Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 769 (8th Cir. 2009), which held
that commercial burglary both qualified as a crime of
violence under the residual clause and alternatively, under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) as an enumerated offense even
though it is not specifically listed therein. Id.
and his co-defendant Benedict next filed a petition for
rehearing en banc, which was granted. United
States v. Benedict, 855 F.3d 880 (2017)
(“Benedict II”). In light of Beckles
v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 886 (2017), in which the
Supreme Court clarified that the Career Offender Guidelines
are not subject to the same constitutional vagueness
challenges addressed in Johnson regarding the
residual clause under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”), the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Id. at 890. The Eighth Circuit further noted that,
although the Sentencing Commission removed the residual
clause from U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) in 2016, that removal
could not apply retroactively to Defendant's 2014
sentence. Id. at 888-89. Defendant then filed a
petition for writ of certiorari, which was denied on October
10, 2017. Carpenter v. United States, No 17-5812,
138 S.Ct. 341 (Oct. 10, 2017).
§ 2255 Motion, Carpenter argues that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from Mr.
Nyvold's alleged failure to argue on appeal that the
Defendant's burglary convictions should not count as
predicate “crimes of violence” under U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(a)(2). (See Def's § 2255 Mot.
at 4 (citing Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243
(2016); Johnson, 135 S.Ct. 2551; United States
v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 938 (8th Cir. 2017).)
[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established
by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral ...