Justin K. Ayers, et al., Respondents,
v.
John William Kalal, et al., Appellants.
Dakota
County District Court File No. 19HA-CV-14-2487
Christopher L. Goodman, Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons,
LLP, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents) [1]
Patrick L. Arneson, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellants John William Kalal and City of
Burnsville)
Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Reilly,
Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.
SYLLABUS
Under
Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1 (2018), basic economic
loss benefits paid to or on behalf of a person injured in the
maintenance, use, or operation of a motor vehicle must be
offset from any verdict in a personal-injury action brought
by the injured person, regardless of whether the reparation
obligor is entitled to indemnity from the tortfeasor under
Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1 (2018). A reparation
obligor is subrogated to claims based on either negligence in
a state other than Minnesota or negligence other than
negligence in the maintenance, use, or operation of a motor
vehicle.
OPINION
RODENBERG, JUDGE
Appellants
John William Kalal and City of Burnsville (the city) appeal
from judgment in favor of respondent Justin Ayers on his
claims arising out of personal injuries he suffered when his
van was hit by a city snowplow driven by Kalal. Appellants
argue that the district court erred in (1) declining to
submit to the jury factual issues concerning snow-and-ice
immunity in the first trial (which determined liability), (2)
granting respondent's motion for a new trial on damages,
(3) failing to apply the statutory offset under Minn. Stat.
§ 65B.51, subd. 1, for basic economic loss (no-fault)
benefits paid to respondent, and (4) improperly determining
the amount of costs and disbursements and prejudgment
interest. We affirm the district court's grant of
respondent's new trial motion and see no reversible error
in the district court's instructions to the jury, but we
reverse and remand for the district court to properly apply
section 65B.51, subdivision 1, and to properly determine
costs, disbursements, and interest.
FACTS
On
January 11, 2011, respondent was driving his van southbound
on Highway 13 in the city of Burnsville when he was involved
in a motor-vehicle collision. As respondent approached the
intersection of Highway 13 with Horizon Drive to the east and
117th Street to the west, a snowplow driven by Kalal, an
employee of the city, collided with respondent's van when
Kalal attempted to cross the intersection by driving from
Horizon Drive onto 117th Street, crossing Highway 13 in the
process. The snowplow hit the driver's side of
respondent's van, separated the driver's seat from
the van, and pierced a hole in the side of the van large
enough for respondent to crawl out of the van through that
hole after the collision. It is undisputed that respondent
had the right of way.
Respondent
sued Kalal and the city, alleging that Kalal was negligent in
operating the snowplow (which was not plowing snow at the
time), and that the city was vicariously liable for
Kalal's negligence. Appellants moved the district court
for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) Kalal's acts at
the scene of the accident are protected by common-law
official immunity; (2) the facts of the accident entitle
appellants to statutory snow-and-ice immunity; (3) appellants
are protected by statutory discretionary immunity to the
extent respondent's claims are based on the city's
snow-removal policy; and (4) Kalal had no duty to obey
traffic laws at the time of the accident. The district court
denied appellants' motion for summary judgment.
Appellants
brought an interlocutory appeal, arguing that they were
entitled to common-law official immunity and vicarious
official immunity, or, in the alternative, snow-and-ice
immunity under Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 4
(2018).[2] Ayers v. Kalal, No. A15-0694,
2015 WL 9264116, at *1 (Minn.App. Dec. 21, 2015) (Ayers
I). We affirmed the district court's denial of
summary judgment. Id. at *3.
The
case proceeded to a jury trial. Respondent introduced the
medical testimony of Dr. Wengler, a board-certified
orthopedic surgeon, who opined that respondent had suffered
permanent injuries as a result of the
collision.[3] Appellants did not obtain a medical
expert, procure any independent medical examination, or
produce expert medical testimony at trial. The jury's
special verdict found that Kalal's negligence was a
direct, and the only, cause of respondent's injuries. The
jury found that respondent had not suffered a permanent
injury as a direct result of the collision, and calculated
that respondent suffered damages of $42, 178.07. The district
court entered judgment accordingly. Respondent moved the
district court for judgment as a matter of law (for damages
above those awarded by the jury) or, in the alternative, for
a new trial. Appellants moved the district court to reduce
the amount of the judgment by the amount of no-fault benefits
paid to or on behalf of respondent. The district court
granted respondent's motion for a new trial on the basis
that the jury's verdict was not justified by any
reasonable interpretation of the evidence.
At the
second jury trial, limited to the issue of damages, the
jury's special verdict found that respondent suffered
damages of $152, 810.07 resulting from the collision.
Appellants again moved the district court to reduce the award
for no-fault benefits paid. Respondents moved the district
court for entry of final judgment and applied for taxation of
costs and disbursements. The district court declined to
reduce respondent's award by the $23, 000 respondent
received from his no-fault insurance provider, and entered
final judgment.
This
appeal followed.
ISSUES
I. Did
the district court err by rejecting the issue of snow-and-ice
immunity as a matter of law?
II. Did
the district court abuse its discretion in granting
respondent's motion for new trial on damages?
III.
Did the district court err when it declined to deduct from
the verdict no-fault benefits paid to or on behalf
respondent?
IV. Did
the district court err in its award of costs and
disbursements, and its award of interest?
ANALYSIS
I.
The district court did not err by declining to submit the
question of ...