United States District Court, D. Minnesota
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Petitioner Marco R.'s
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. No. 1)
(“Petition”) and the Response to Petition (Dkt.
No. 9) filed by Respondents Secretary Department of Homeland
Security; William Barr,  Attorney General; and Peter Berg, ICE
Field Office Director (collectively, “Federal
Respondents”). The case has been referred to the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a report and
recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local
Rule 72.1. For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends
that the Petition be dismissed as moot.
is a native and citizen of Mexico. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2.)
Petitioner was taken into custody on April 16, 2018, and
filed this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 on February 25, 2019. (Dkt. No. 1 at
1-2.) In his request for relief, Petitioner requests that the
Court release him from custody or to order a hearing to
determine if he can be released on bond. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4-5.)
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered Petitioner
removed on September 21, 2018. (Id. at 2.)
Petitioner appealed the IJ's decision, but the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed his appeal
on February 21, 2019 (Dkt. No. 10-2 at 2-3), making his
removal final. Petitioner was removed to Mexico on March 13,
2019 via charter air. (Dkt. No. 10 ¶ 5.)
Federal Respondents argue that the Petition should be
dismissed as moot because Petitioner was removed to Mexico on
March 13, 2019. (Dkt. No. 9 at 1.) “Article III of the
United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to actual, ongoing cases and
controversies.” Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722,
723 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Haden v. Pelofsky, 212
F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 2000)) (citing U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1). “When, during the course of
litigation, the issues presented in a case ‘lose their
life because of the passage of time or a change in
circumstances . . . and a federal court can no longer grant
effective relief,' the case is considered moot.”
Id. (quoting Haden, 212 F.3d at 469). When
a case becomes moot, a federal court cannot “address
the merits because any opinion [the court] would issue would
be merely advisory.” In re Search Warrants Issued
in Connection with Investigation of S. Cent. Career Ctr., W.
Plains, Mo. (“In re Search Warrants”), 487
F.3d 1190, 1192 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Haden, 212
F.3d at 469).
case, the case became moot when Petitioner was removed
because the Court “can no longer grant effective
relief” since he is no longer in custody. See
Ali, 419 F.3d at 723. Accordingly, the Court should not
address the merits of his case because any such opinion would
be merely advisory. See In re Search Warrants, 487
F.3d at 1192.
Federal Respondents also argue that no exceptions to mootness
apply. (Dkt. No. 9 at 3-4.) A court should not dismiss a
habeas petition as moot if any of the following exceptions
(1) secondary or ‘collateral' injuries survive
after resolution of the primary injury; (2) the issue is
deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review; (3)
the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal
practice but is free to resume it at any time; or (4) it is a
properly certified class action suit.
Ahmed v. Sessions, No. 16-CV-02124 (DSD/HB), 2017 WL
3267738, at *2 (D. Minn. July 11, 2017) (quoting Riley v.
I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2002)),
R&R adopted, No. 16-CV-2124 (DSD/HB),
2017 WL 3268176 (D. Minn. July 31, 2017).
those mootness exceptions apply here. The collateral-injuries
exception does not apply when such injuries are a result of
the final order of removal, not the prolonged detention
itself. Ahmed, 2017 WL 3267738, at *2. As to
“a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review,
” that “exception applies if the matter is too
short in duration to be fully litigated before it ends or
expires and there is a reasonable expectation that
[Petitioner] will be subjected to the same action
again.” In re Search Warrants, 487
F.3d at 1193. Here, there is nothing remaining to litigate in
this case and Petitioner is not likely to be held pending
removal again. Ahmed, 2017 WL 3267738, at *3. The
voluntary cessation exception does not apply because ICE did
not cease its attempts to remove Petitioner, rather it
pursued and effectuated Petitioner's removal.
Id. Finally, the Petition was brought on behalf of
the individual Petitioner, not on behalf of a class of
individuals. See Id. Accordingly, the Court
recommends dismissal of the Petition as moot.
on the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT ...