United States District Court, D. Minnesota
M. Rimas, Esq., Rimas Law Firm, PLLC, counsel for Plaintiff.
R. Wood, Esq., Katherine Nyquist, Esq., and Stephanie D.
Sarantopoulos, Esq., Littler Mendelson, PC, counsel for
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DONOVAN W. FRANK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss Count X of
the Amended Complaint brought by Defendant Mayo Clinic. (Doc.
No. 9.) In Count X of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff
Mohamed Elsherif asserts a cause of action against Defendant
Mayo Clinic for breach of contract. (Doc. No. 5.) For the
reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion.
case Plaintiff alleges twenty counts against Defendants Mayo
Clinic and Richard J. Spinner related to Plaintiff's work
as a Research Temporary Professional (“RTP”) in
the Research Department of the Mayo Clinic, located in
Rochester, Minnesota. (Doc. No. 5 (Am. Compl.) ¶¶
2, 9; Doc. No. 7 (Defs.' Answer) ¶¶ 2, 9.) As
Defendants concede, Plaintiff completed a one-month
observation period as an RTP before accepting appointments
for the same position for one-year terms set for
approximately August 1, 2015 to July 31, 2017. (Defs.'.
Answer ¶¶ 11, 12.) Plaintiff's employment with
Defendants ended on July 7, 2017. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9,
of the Amended Complaint alleges that the parties
“entered into various agreements” that imposed
obligations upon Defendant Mayo Clinic with respect to the
conditions of Plaintiff's employment. (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 120, 121.) Plaintiff further alleges that
several policies maintained by Defendant Mayo Clinic such as
its anti-discrimination policy, grievance policy, and code of
conduct defined the terms and obligations of the parties'
employment agreement. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49-54.) Each
of the policies referenced in the Amended Complaint contains
three similarly-worded disclaimers, including statements that
the policies are “subject to change at any time.”
(Doc. No. 13 (“Campbell Decl.”), Exs. 1-7.) The
policies contain identical disclaimers that “[t]he
contents of this policy are not intended to constitute a
contract of employment, ” and that “[b]oth Mayo
Clinic and the individual may terminate the employment
relationship at any time.” (Campbell Decl. at 2, 5, 9,
14, 18, 21, 27, 31.)
Mayo Clinic now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for
breach of contract under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a
court assumes all facts in the complaint to be true and
construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the
light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v.
Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). In doing so,
however, a court need not accept as true wholly conclusory
allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview
Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal
conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts alleged,
Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th
Cir. 1990). A court may consider the complaint, matters of
public record, orders, materials embraced by the complaint,
and exhibits attached to the complaint in deciding a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Porous Media Corp. v.
Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). Although a complaint
need not contain “detailed factual allegations, ”
it must contain facts with enough specificity “to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Id. at 555. As the United States Supreme Court
reiterated, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
” will not pass muster under Twombly. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, this standard
“calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the
claim].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.