United States District Court, D. Minnesota
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BRISBOIS U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge pursuant to a general referral in accordance with the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1, as
well as, upon Petitioner Jermaine Carter's Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
[Docket No. 1].
reasons set forth herein, the Court recommends that the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [Docket No. 1], be
DENIED, and this action be
DISMISSED without prejudice.
November 21, 2008, Petitioner Jermaine Carter pled guilty to
a single count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (See, No.
08-cr-00042 (JAJ/TJS) (S.D. Iowa) [Docket No. 39-2]). On
April 24, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of natural
life imprisonment, with the caveat that if released he would
be subject to ten years of supervised release. (See,
Id. [Docket No. 49]). On November 23, 2016, Petitioner
received an executive grant of clemency that converted his
term of natural life to a term of 180 months imprisonment to
be followed by 10 years of supervised release (See
Id. [Docket No. 58 at 2]).
is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Sandstone, Minnesota (hereinafter “FCI
Sandstone”). (Petition [Docket No. 1]). He has a
projected release date of June 28, 2020, via the current good
time conduct calculation. (See,
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc and searching Petitioner's
Prison Id. No. 08718-030).
argues that the Bureau of Prisons (hereinafter
“BOP”) should immediately recalculate his good
conduct credit in accordance with the First Step Act of
2018's amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 3264(b) affecting
the calculation of good time credits to expedite his release
date. (See, Petition [Docket No. 1]).
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
well established that a federal prisoner seeking relief
through a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 must first exhaust the administrative remedies available
to him. See, Mathena v. United States, 577
F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 2009) (“A prisoner may bring a
habeas action challenging the BOP's execution of his
sentence only if he first presents his claim to the
BOP.”); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1015
(8th Cir. 1974) (“If grievance procedures provide an
adequate means for impartial review, then a federal prisoner
must exhaust available administrative remedies within the
correctional system prior to seeking extraordinary relief in
federal court.”). In the present case, the Petition
indicates that Petitioner has not exhaust the administrative
remedies available to him. (Petition, [Docket No. 1], at
exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional. See,
Lueth v. Beach, 498 F.3d 795, 797 n.3 (8th Cir.
2007). It is, however, generally enforced absent
circumstances which justify an exception. See, e.g.,
Masri v. Watson, No. 16-cv-4132 (MJD/FLN), 2017 WL
1131891 (D. Minn. Feb. 17, 2017) (denying habeas petition for
failure to exhaust all available administrative remedies);
Knox v. United States, No. 16-cv-879 (WMW/KMM), 2016
WL 6022940 (D. Minn. Oct. 13, 2016) (same); Aguilar v.
United States, No. 15-cv-487 (SRN/JSM), 2015 WL 5719166,
at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2015) (noting that “habeas
petitioners can be excused from the exhaustion requirement if
proceeding through the administrative remedy process would
undoubtedly be an exercise in futility that could serve no
useful purpose”). The Eighth Circuit has held that a
Federal District Court may err by considering the merits of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner
“failed to demonstrate he had” properly exhausted
his administrative remedies prior to seeking habeas corpus
relief. See, United States v. Thompson, 297
Fed.Appx. 561, 562 (8th Cir. 2008).
are exceptions, however, to the exhaustion requirement for
habeas petitioners, including when requiring a habeas
petitioner to exhaust all available administrative remedies
would be futile and serve no useful purpose. See,
Aguilar, 2015 WL 5719166, at *2. Courts have also
excused the exhaustion requirement when the issues raised in
the action are time-sensitive and may become moot without
expeditious judicial resolution. See, Simon v.
L. LaRiva, No. 16-cv-146 (ADM/TNL), 2016 WL 1626819, at
*3-4 (D. Minn. March 10, 2016).
present case, the undersigned is cognizant that Petitioner
contends that he may be improperly denied an earlier release
date via good time credit if the present matter is not
resolved in a timely manner. The time-sensitive nature of
Petitioner's claim, combined with the relative ease of
resolution, persuades the undersigned to recommend that the
Court excuse the exhaustion requirement and address