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Mendez v. Paul

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

July 23, 2019

Raphael Mendez, Plaintiff,
v.
David Paul, et al., Defendants.

          REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

          LEO I. BRISBOIS U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         This matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a general assignment made in accordance with the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636, and upon Plaintiff, Ralph Mendez's, Complaint, [Docket No. 1], as well as, his Application to Proceeds in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. [Docket No. 2].

         For the reasons discussed herein, the Court recommends the Plaintiff's Complaint, [Docket No. 1], be DISMISSED, and that Plaintiff's Informa Pauperis Application, [Docket No. 2], be DENIED as moot.

         Plaintiff commenced this action with a filing entitled “PETITIONING for ORDER against NAZI CAMP under COLOR of CORRECTIONAL [sic] at FMC ROCHESTER MINNESOTA” (hereinafter “Petition”) (Pet. [Docket No. 1]) (capitalization in original). In this Court's previous Order, the undersigned observed that “[t]he overall character of” the present Petition was “unclear for several reasons.” (Order, [Docket No. 3], at 1). Certain aspects of the Petition suggested that Plaintiff wanted to sue various prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or another unspecified federal statute. (See, Id. at 2). However, other aspects of his Petition suggested that Plaintiff was challenging the underlying validity of his present confinement, in which case a habeas petition would be the appropriate procedural vehicle. (See, Id. at 3). Because of this lack of clarity, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file “an addendum of no more than two pages explaining exactly what relief he seeks.” Id.

         The Court received Plaintiff's response on March 18, 2019. (See, Response [Docket No. 4]) (hereinafter “Response”). In his response, Plaintiff states the following:

1. Raphael Mendez, WANTS an EMERGENCY INJUNCTION and RESTRAINING ORDER against the DEFENDANTS. Raphael Mendez, WISHES this REQUEST, so that FMC Rochester, MN employs COULD STOP, Obstructing, Delaying or Even Hindering JUSTICE OWE to Raphael Mendez. See 42 USC 1985 (3).
2. How the DEFENDANTS is wronging Raphael Mendez WILL TAKE MORE Than 2 Pages and a longer ALLOWABLE Time than 7 days. THEREFORE, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), MUST be APPLIED hereto Pretrial Civil Detainee Raphael Mendez, WHO is NOT a License Attorney for this DEMAND.
3. This CASE also ALLEGES BOTH a PRISON CONDITION and a Civilian ACTION as RAPHAEL MENDEZ, IS STILL A PRETRIAL CIVILIAN WHO IS DEMANDING TRIAL RIGHTS REINSTATEMENT AGAINST CIVIL COMMITMENT MADE WITHOUT FEDERAL JURISDICTION INSTIGATORS.

(Id. at 1)(typography and errors in original) (several citations omitted).

         These foregoing statements are themselves not an entirely direct response to the Court's earlier directive, however, in the Court's view, the overall better conclusion is that Plaintiff seeks release from federal custody. Accordingly, the Court construes Plaintiff's filing as a Petition seeking habeas relief. The Court notes that this construction is supported by Plaintiff's statements that he is a “pretrial civilian . . . demanding trial rights.” (Id.) (capitalization altered). Furthermore, while the Response cites 42 U.S.C. § 1985-suggesting that Plaintiff may seek to pursue a civil action-that citation arises from a demand that FMC-Rochester employees stop “obstructing . . .justice owe[d]” to Plaintiff, and as best as can be gleaned from his filings, the sought-after “justice” concerns Plaintiff's claims of impermissible federal confinement. Therefore, as noted, the Court construes the present action by Plaintiff as seeking habeas relief-specifically, to be released from his present federal confinement.[1]

         As the Court best understands the Petition, Plaintiff is presently confined under 18 U.S.C. § 4246, (See, Pet., [Docket No. 1], at 2), which provides that:

If the director of a facility in which a person is hospitalized certifies that a person in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons whose sentence is about to expire, or who has been committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d), [2] or against whom all criminal charges have been dismissed solely for reasons related to the mental condition of the person, is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, and that suitable arrangements for State custody and care of the person are not available, he shall transmit the certificate to the clerk of the court for the district in which the person is confined. The clerk shall send a copy of the certificate to the person, and to the attorney for the Government, and, if the person was committed pursuant to section 4241(d), to the clerk of the court that ordered the commitment. The court shall order a hearing to determine whether the person is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.

         Section 4246(d) explains the potential consequences of such a hearing:

If, after the hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, the court shall commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall release the person to the appropriate official of the State in which the person is domiciled or was tried if such State will assume responsibility for his custody, care, and treatment. The Attorney General shall make all reasonable efforts to cause such a State to assume such responsibility. If, ...

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