United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Roy A. Day, Plaintiff,
State of Minnesota et al., Defendants.
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
WILHELMINA M. WRIGHT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the March 22, 2019 Report and
Recommendation (R&R) of United States Magistrate Judge
Leo I. Brisbois. (Dkt. 11.) The R&R recommends dismissing
Plaintiff Roy A. Day's federal claims as frivolous and
dismissing his state claims for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Day filed timely objections to the R&R. For
the reasons addressed below, Day's objections are
overruled, the R&R is adopted, and Day's complaint is
R&R contains a detailed recitation of the factual and
procedural background of this case. As relevant here, Day
alleges that Defendants Target Corporation and Starbucks
Corporation fraudulently deprived him of four dollars. When
Day commenced a lawsuit in Minnesota state court arising from
this alleged fraud, the state district court denied Day's
petition to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), finding
that Day's lawsuit was frivolous, and closed the case for
failure to pay the filing fee. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
affirmed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court denied Day's
petition for further review. See Day v. Target
Corp., No. A18-0611, 2018 WL 6729772 (Minn.Ct.App. Dec.
24, 2018), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2019).
subsequently commenced this federal lawsuit against the State
of Minnesota, the Minnesota Supreme Court, and the Chief
Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court (collectively,
“the state defendants”), as well as Target
Corporation, Starbucks Corporation, and the attorney and law
firm that represented Target Corporation in Day's
state-court lawsuit (collectively, “the private
defendants”). Count One and Count Two of Day's
amended complaint allege that Defendants conspired to deprive
him of his rights to due process and equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(hereinafter, “federal claims”). Count Three and
Count Four of the amended complaint allege state-law tort
claims for infliction of emotional distress and fraud
(hereinafter, “state claims”). Day seeks
injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as damages, costs,
and attorneys' fees in excess of $1 million.
R&R recommends dismissing Day's federal claims with
prejudice as frivolous and dismissing Day's state claims
without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As
such, the R&R also recommends denying as moot Day's
pending IFP application. Day filed timely objections to the
district court reviews de novo those portions of an R&R
to which an objection is made and “may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); accord Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3); LR 72.2(b)(3). A district court reviews for clear
error any aspect of an R&R to which no objection is made.
See Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir.
1996) (per curiam); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)
advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment (“When
no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy
itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record
in order to accept the recommendation.”). Because the
R&R recommends dismissing Day's federal claims and
state claims on different bases, the Court addresses the
federal claims and state claims separately.
Day's Federal Claims
amended complaint alleges that Defendants violated his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and conspired to deprive
Day of his rights to equal protection, privileges, and
immunities, see 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The Court
separately addresses Day's claims under Section 1983 and
Day's Section 1983 Claims
amended complaint first alleges that Defendants are liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his rights to due
process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As relevant here, Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color [of law] . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . .
. to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Section 1983 does not
establish any substantive rights, it may be invoked to
vindicate federal rights conferred by the United States
Constitution and federal statutes that Section 1983
describes.Henley v. Brown, 686 F.3d 634,
640 (8th Cir. 2012). The R&R ...