United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Christopher Ivey, (pro se Plaintiff)
Brandon L. Boese, Assistant Attorney General, (for
N. Leung United States Magistrate Judge
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel Discovery (ECF No. 93), Plaintiff's Motion to Deny
Confidential Designation (ECF No. 97), and Defendants'
Motion for Protective Order (ECF No. 121). For the reasons
set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in
part the motion to compel, deny without prejudice the motion
to deny confidential designation, and grant in part and deny
in part the motion for protective order.
January 5, 2012, Plaintiff Christopher Ivey filed an 18-count
complaint against the Minnesota Sex Offender Program
(“MSOP”) and several staff members, alleging they
violated his civil rights following an incident in his room
in November 2011. (Compl., ECF No. 1). Multiple rounds of
motion practice have reduced the complaint to the following:
excessive force claims against Defendants Daniel Williams,
Michael Glavan, William Gullickson, Scott Giannini, Tara
Halverson, and Matthew Dahl; a battery claim against Glavan;
and Fourth Amendment claims against Defendants Kevin Dreher,
Dahl, and Gullickson. Defendants answered the complaint on
March 5, 2019.
one of the motions-to-dismiss was pending, Ivey served
written discovery on Defendants, including requests for the
production of documents. (ECF No. 103-1, pp. 5-17). Among
other things, Ivey sought documents related to the use of
handcuffs at MSOP, the use of certain techniques to detain or
subdue MSOP patients, and video footage related to the
incident in question. (Id., pp. 10-17). Defendants
objected to Ivey's requests on a number of grounds,
including that certain documents Ivey sought were classified
as non-public security data under the Minnesota Government
Data Practices Act (“MGDPA”). (Id., pp.
April 17, 2019, Defendants produced over 500 pages of
documents in response to Ivey's discovery requests.
(Id., p. 197). Defendants also provided Ivey a
proposed protective order, which they contended would provide
Ivey reasonable access to video footage. (Id., pp.
203-04). Defendants continued to withhold documents that they
contended contained non-public security data, including
documents that “outline in a play-by-play fashion
MSOP's strategies and tactics in addressing clients who
are out of behavioral control.” (ECF No. 102, p. 2).
2, 2019, Ivey filed a motion to compel production of
documents responsive to certain requests and to prohibit
Defendants from designating certain material as confidential
once a protective order was issued. (ECF Nos. 93, 97). Ivey
took issue with Defendants' decision to withhold
documents on the grounds that the MGDPA prohibited their
disclosure, Defendants' argument that security concerns
prohibited them turning certain documents over,
Defendants' failure to provide a privilege log, and
Defendants' use of boilerplate objections. (ECF No. 93).
after Ivey filed his motion, he sent a letter to
Defendants' counsel. (ECF No. 103-1, pp. 224-29). He
indicated that he had reviewed Defendants' document
production and that disagreements remained regarding the
following topics: (1) a description of certain information
redacted from Defendants' discovery responses; (2) a
description of training courses related to handcuffing
procedures; (3) a description of training that Defendants
received regarding the use of handcuffs; (4) personal
responses to interrogatories from each Defendant; and (5) a
copy of an unpublished case that Defendants cited to him in a
letter. (Id., pp. 228-29). Ivey also provided
additional information regarding his own responses to
Defendants' discovery requests. (Id. at 224-25).
parties then spoke by telephone on May 10, 2019. (ECF No.
100, p. 7). In that conversation, the parties appeared to
resolve several issues related to this motion. Shortly after
that telephone call, Defendants responded to Ivey's
motions. Defendants contend the following issues remain in
dispute: (1) whether they should be required to produce
documents containing security information; (2) whether they
should be required to produce documents containing private
data on individuals other than Ivey; (3) whether Defendants
are providing Ivey reasonable access to the videos; and (4)
whether any video of the incidents should be designated as
confidential. Defendants argued that Ivey's motion
regarding the confidential designation of certain materials
was premature, as the Court had not yet issued a protective
order and because neither party had designated materials as
then filed a motion for a protective order. (ECF No. 121).
Defendants contend a protective order is necessary because
this action implicates documents protected from public
disclosure under state law. Defendants further contend the
protective order should prohibit the disclosure of
confidential security data.
Court begins with Ivey's motion-to-compel. As Defendants
note, Ivey did not meet and confer with them before filing
either of his motions. Local Rule 7.1 requires a
meet-and-confer occur before or immediately after the moving
party files his motion. In this case, the parties conferred
shortly after Ivey filed the motions and, according to
Defendants, were able to substantially narrow the issues
before the Court. Based on Defendants' ...