United States District Court, D. Minnesota
ROBERT L. STABNOW, Plaintiff,
TONY LAUREY; NANCY JOHNSTON; JANNINE HEBERT; JAMES BERG; DAVID BORNUS; KEVIN MOSER; TERRY KNEISEL; PETER PUFFER; NANCY STACKEN; JORDAN GOODMAN; KRIS HUSO; LAURIE SEVERSON; RYAN FAHLAND; JANA BRISTER-KORBY; DEBBIE THAO; CHARLES FAI; TINA OLSEN; DAVID AVRIL; ROSS PETERSON; DR. AMY FARMER; ALLISON IMMEL; RANDY GORDON; TAYAH ZUK; all in their official and individual capacities; MINNESOTA SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM, and THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, Defendants.
ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
E. BRASEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Court has received the July 23, 2019 Report and
Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Hildy
Bowbeer. [ECF No. 15 (“R&R”).] Judge Bowbeer
recommends denying pro se plaintiff Robert L. Stabnow's
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [ECF No. 6] without
prejudice because Stabnow provides no reason why the
defendants should not receive advance notice of the motion.
(R&R at 2.) In the alternative, Judge Bowbeer recommends
denying the motion because it fails on the merits under the
four factors of Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys.,
Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
Stabnow objected to the R&R. [ECF No. 23 (“Pl.
Obj.”).] This Court reviews the R&R de novo.
See, e.g., Semler v. Ludeman, No. CIV 09-0732
ADM/SRN, 2010 WL 145275, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2010). Since
the filing of the R&R, Stabnow has notified the
defendants of this lawsuit. [ECF Nos. 25-27.] As a result,
the Court will treat his motion as a request for a
preliminary injunction. See Buffalo Wild Wings
Intʹl, Inc. v. Grand Canyon Equity Partners, LLC,
829 F.Supp.2d 836, 838 (D. Minn. 2011).
the Dataphase factors is, of course, that a movant
seeking a preliminary injunction or TRO must show a threat of
irreparable harm. (R&R at 3 (citing Dataphase Sys.
Inc., 640 F.2d at 114)). Stabnow claims he will suffer
harm if he is transferred to the 1D living unit at MSOP. This
is so, Stabnow argues, because he “was previously in
the unit and was assaulted because he got into a dispute with
another client.” (R&R at 3.) But as the R&R
notes, Stabnow “does not allege that the other client
still resides in the unit, nor does he allege that he has
reason to fear future assaults absent a new dispute.”
(Id.) Without specific allegations of a threat of
irreparable harm, this Court cannot grant Stabnow a
objections to the R&R, Stabnow makes several arguments
about why he faces irreparable harm. He argues (1) that
“the staff that work on these units have, and continue
to, abuse [him] as a result of his refusing to participate in
their treatment . . . .” and (2) that he “is of
the belief that if he willfully participates in doing wrong
that he is in danger of being damned for all of his eternal
existence.” (Pl. Obj. 3-4.) But Stabnow made neither of
these arguments before Judge Bowbeer, and the Court need not
consider them. Ridenour v. Boehringer Ingelheim
Pharm., Inc., 679 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2012). Even
if considered, however, neither argument is supported by any
facts or evidence beyond the conclusory allegations in
Stabnow's objections. See Midwest Sign & Screen
Printing Supply Co. v. Dalpe, 386 F.Supp.3d 1037, 1055
(D. Minn. 2019) (denying a preliminary injunction when the
plaintiff “framed this risk of irreparable harm . . .
in general, conclusory terms and without citation to
evidence.” (quoting Mgmt. Registry, Inc. v. A.W.
Cos., No. 17-CV-5009 (JRT/FLN), 2018 WL 461132, at *6
(D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2018))). Because Stabnow has failed to
demonstrate irreparable harm, denial of the preliminary
injunction is proper.
on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Court
OVERRULES the Plaintiff's objections [ECF No. 23] and
ACCEPTS the R&R [ECF No. 15]. As a result, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT the Plaintiff's Motion for Emergency
Temporary Restraining Order [ECF No. 6] is DENIED WITHOUT
 The Court acknowledges that Stabnow is
appearing pro se. While “pro se pleadings are to be
construed liberally, pro se litigants are not excused from
failing to comply with substantive and procedural
law.” Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th
 The Court has received Stabnow's
letter filed on August 14, 2019, which cites difficulty
communicating with the Court because of MSOP's monitoring
of phone calls and his belief that his calls with the Court
are “Privileged.” [ECF No. 24.] The Court notes
that he may schedule a hearing by letter rather than
telephone; in addition, the Court considers many motions on
the papers without holding a hearing at all. More
importantly, communications with the Court are never
“privileged” and all communications, no matter
how transmitted, must be copied to opposing counsel. In fact,
the applicable rules require a moving party to serve the
opposing party with motion papers. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 5(a). The Court ...